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Divine Command Theory And The Foundations Of Ethics 
Mark lan Thomas Robson 
The author defends a version of the Divine command theory of ethics. 
He distinguishes two main areas of criticism that are brought against such a 
conception: 
1 . The Divine command ethics compromises the autonomy of the moral 
agent and\or the autonomy of morality. 
2. That Divine command ethics is arbitrary since God can have no 
elucidating reasons for what he commands to be moral. Again, should God 
change his mind about what is to be moral, such a change would be 
arbitrary since no elucidating reasons could be given. 
The author tries to show how these criticisms can be met. He argues 
that all moral systems are in some sense and at some level arbitrary or 
reasonless. He employs the scholastic notion that God is Goodness-itself, 
along with a limited notion of God's immutability, to show that the basis of 
morality is fixed and eternal and not subject to arbitrary change. He tries to 
· show how this kind of metaphysical identification can be made and rendered 
plausible. 
The argument is broadened out to Include the idea that God's Goodness 
is Love. 
Towards the end of the thesis, the author tries to show how his version of 
Divine command ethics meets the demands of religious experience more 
successfully than theories which attempt to separate the moral from the 
Divine. 
In conclusion, the author looks at various historical and contemporary 
precedents for the idea that God is to be identified with Goodness. 
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In this thesis I attempt to defend a version of the Divine command theory of 
ethics. in the ~irrst iwo chapter~. ~ tuy t()) state in the s~rongest possible terms 
the arguments brought against this conception of ethics. The rest of the 
thesis is mostly an attempt to reply io these criticisms. This means my 
thesis is mostly defensive in tone. Only in chapter seven do I try to show the 
advantages inherent in my theory, but then only to a 'religious' audience. 
Those who would prefer a more attacking, positive style will, I fear, be 
disappointed. 
Divine command ethics is usually understood as claiming that God's 
commands are the ultimate bedrock of morality, that if God commands X, 
then to do X becomes an obligation. This obligation to do X is produced 
purely by it being God's command. Tttis conception of Divine command 
ethics is NOT the one that I attempt to defend - I argue for a modified Divine 
command theory. In my version, it is God's nature that provides the reason 
for believing that His commands oblige. It is not God's commands ,:)er se 
that provide reason for their own obligation, rather it is the fact that they are 
God's commands and that He possesses a certain type of nature. 
I argue in chapter three that it is God's nature to be not merely good, but to 
be Goodness-itself. This Goodness is identified in chapter five as being 
Love. But nothing external to God makes Him good. Because God Is 
Goodness-itself if He commands a type of action X, then X becomes 
obligatory. If God is pleased or gratified with type of action Y, then Y 
becomes supererogatory. 
In the course of defending my thesis I adopt a type of Process Theology 
understanding of Deity. Thus in chapter four I defend the idea that God is 
only immutable to a limited degree - in His being Goodness-itself. I try to 
show show how this commitment to the unchangeable moral perfection of 
God does not have to lead the theist into the scholastic notion that God is 
completely unchangeable in every aspect. Such an understanding is hard to 
reconcile with the Biblical understanding of Deity. 
~ ntroduction 
In chapter six ! look at the criticisms of Divine command ethics tha~ accuse it 
of compromising ihe autonomy of ihe individual and the autonomy of 
morality. 
In chapter seven I try to show what religious motivations there are in 
adopting this modified version of Divine command theory. As I say, this 
chapter attempts to be more aggressive and illustrate the merits of my 
theory. 
In the final chapter I look at the history of the metaphysical identification 
between God and Goodness. Here I try to show that this identification is 
orthodox and has been held by many theologians and philosophers. 
Because my area of study oomes under the broad classification of 
philosophical theology I run the risk of failing to satisfy both philosophers 
and theologians. I have tried to be more philosophical than theological in 
this thesis, so I am sorry if my arguments fail to meet the demands of any 
potential theological audience. 
One final caution before the reader goes on: I have written this thesis 
looking mainly at the Christian tradition. Probably there are elements of my 
argument that apply to just about all monotheistic faiths, but I make 
assumptions about the nature of God that are Christian. This makes me 
hesitant in saying that all of my argument applies equally to all faiths. The 
Christian tradition Is the tradition I best understand and so that Is the one I 
concentrate on. In any case, there is not the space to examine what 
implication my argument has on, say, Islam. 
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On® o~ ths mao01 ~hru~i~ oV aJVlY <a1WIDc~ (»fl ~ Di~in® oomma~ruo1 mora11i~ u~ss 
ths notion o~ auionomy - usually ii i~ claom®d tha~ any IDivim~ command 
ij"joory rom(Q)B'¢)mis®~ ~h® amo~nomy o~ ~h® i~nCilMd~~l or ~h® a~~~~~ne»my o~ 
morality. Thi~ parli{}ufar att21ck ha~ it~ main philosophi~l anoo~iry' in too 
writillllg~ o~ ~ant To tLmOOmmntdl ~hm ~iilirulelr ~h1@ ©~ ctoj®dioril ~© a~ny lDivin® 
command tllsory W® mus~ go ~ck to Kan~ and di$OOV®r why h®, in U't~ 
n~ms oU au~©n©my, gound no si~nlf~n~ p~oo V©r ~(21 ~~ a cr®atlv® ~ador in 
th@ idsa o~ moraliiy. (Kant did, of rourss, hav® a rei® for Gool in ~h~ senoo 
that· he thought ths ootueU in God's S){is~snoo was a neoossa~ry practical 
postulate of morality; happiness in ths summum bonum must bs 
proportional ~o viilu®; ~nly God ~n ~!Yawant®® ~his, sc th® ~H®U in Hos 
e}(is~enoo is n~ssa~ for a ~ully pradi~® m©mli~). 
At ~h® ~innirug o~ Ths Gnmndwor~ C{aWlJ~ ~y~ ifla~ ~® i~ ooe~nfJ to 
"establish the su~m~me principiiS og moraJiiyi> [Ka~n~ i 948 p.57]. Nrow i~ I~ ju~i 
as wsll ~o m®n~icn h®r® iR'la!ft ~oor® i~ oom® oonfusi\llrl ov®li' wtisiihsli" Kani 
meant his supli'®ms prin~iple io ~ a norma~iv® prlncipl~ whsr®[Oy on® oould 
dstermine th® righ~Fi®~ or wmngn®s~ o~ a1 ~uiirular maudm, or wfnsfth®r h® 
meani it as a crit®rion such that i~ could b® d®t®rminoo wh®th®r a ~rtieularr 
point of vi~w was a moral as oppoo~d to ~ non-m«>ral point of visw; that is to 
say, whath~r til® ~onft of viaw w~s moral ~~ oppoood t© a ooi®nijfic point c~ 
view or a musical poin~ of view. Differing formulations of Kant'$ ~tegorical 
imp3rath!e and oome of his ®Jmmpl~~ tsnCi'l to su~li din'smnt 
int~rpremiions in diff®rent plaoos. Howev®w, for our purpose~. it is the latt~r 
~.nndemt~ooin~ o~ th® suprem® prind~® tMft i~ mor® im~rt~mt. C®Vla1inly itt is 
ths oontra®t oomresro moral snol non-motel~ points of vi®w that is th® tool 
USlYta~l~ lYSOO ~© Mlllld~~n ~h® ld®ta~ ilh~ft M©ral~~ I$ ai!.Bi©rrt©ffi~Q.n~, t!~h©aA~h, tal~ 
wa shall ooa, som® moo~m KemiiBJU't~ Q(l) furt~®w ~nd pr®feJr to claim ataft any 
Divo~nG oommandl sthic in~v~bl)f imm©l~oo~ immoral! alWDdl oo~ ju~t f'i(l)n-mornt~ 
consld~m~ion~ ln~o th® workln~s of moraliiy. Strialy ~p®~kln@, ihi$ ®rnti~il®®i~ 
~~s~n imm(Q)mi 1a1n«)J moml ins~®adl o~ m©m~ B~rrudl n©n-m©ml I$ mm® in 
ksrsping wiih the firsi in~srpr~mtlon of ~Bini'~ ®l!lpr®m~ prirnt;:ipiG whsr® H i~ 
s~en as a norma~iv~ test o~ a ~rticular md}(im. 
Anyhow lei us, Vor the tim® being, stick to the moral\non-moral 
in~erpr~ta~tion o~ Kant·~ suprem® p&inclpl®. Wha!t i§ l}(anft'$ supreme pruB1cipl~ 
that is meant to sort ou~ morality from ~hat which i~ morally neutral? Again 
~ere are marly way~ o1 UormLD!sting &<ani'~ prindpiG. For our pw·po$eS, ~ 
ihink it is best that w0 see i~ a~ sorting categorical from hypothetical 
imperative~. For Kam it i~ ~ di~ingui$hing mark oi th® moral that it is 
categorical and not hypotheticaL 
What is meant by this? Kant maintained that the truly moral was 
dependant on nothing but rationality; morality depended not pn desires or 
wants or temperament, rather it de~nded on rationality in actioro. Morality 
flows clearly and purely from rational thinking, from logical consistency. Thi$ 
idea can oo better 11.1nderstoool by oontrasting ii with hypothetical imperatives 
which were, for Kant, defitnitely non-moral in character. 
Some actions are hypothetical because they depend on assumptions 
which are contingent in character. For example, it is a hypothetical maxim 
that I must dig my garden for it is contingent on my desire to keep it free of 
weeds. Hence the force of the imperative "dig my garden, is derivative or 
hypothetical, it is not categorical. It depends on my desires. For Kant, any 
recourse to desires to determine what I ought to do Is definitety non-moral. 
The essence of morality is its absolute, categorical character: a truly moral 
action is one untainted by desire. Morality depends not on what particular 
temperament one happens to possess - this is just luck - It depends (as far 
as we can say it depends on anything) only on rationality or consistency, on 
whether one can ~II one's action as an law of universal legislation." If one 
is offended by the use of the word "depends, In the tam sentenoo it could be 
replaced so that morality is, in effect, dependent oro nothing: we could say 
morality IS pure consistency or rationality in action. 
But why does this kind of picture of morality cause Kant to reject any 
Divine command ethic? To fully appreciate his reasoning we must delve a 
- 4 -
little drsspsr in~o his th®OlU"lf a~rnd loo~ clos~ly at why he WaJr!~®ID1 rnftfiona~liiy to 
have such aJ decisive mls In his ~heory. 
J. G. Murphy argu®~ ~hat Kanf~ iro~i~t~noo on fth® ~rlftml mira o~ 
raiionall~ was, in p~ut. a pr(f)~emptivs action again~~ th® empirical spirii o~ 
utilitarianism [Murphy 1970 p.38]. Th~ oontral pillar oi utilitarianl~m is th® 
empiriCBtl observation that men desir~ happh1@SS. From thi~ observation it 
was ooduood (fals~ly) that happineS® was desirnbl~. that ~appiness was 
what we ought to aim at So the theory was founded on this fad of man's 
desires. Kant was unhappy about this because, like Frege with 
mathematics, he wanted more assurance than msre psychological 
conviction. Murphy oomments there were a numoor oi reasons for Kant's 
wish to do this, the most impotiant, for our purpooos ooing that he saw it as 
an affmrrt to human dignity. "Kant wants to argi!J8 that such a conception of 
morality [like utifitariani~m] is inrompatible with tht® basic dignity of human 
ooings, beings ooi apart from all other natural creatures by their 
freedom ... To ground morality in some empirical value, in some merely 
contingent fact aoout human beings (eg their desire for happiness) is to 
obscure the essential character of humanity. For man is essentially a free 
and rational creature. A [Murphy 1970 p.39]. 
We have now laid the ground for an understanding of why Kant rejected 
any Divine command ethic: 
i: He believed it, like utilitarianism, founded morality on empiricism, on 
an essentially contingent foundation. 
2: He believed It was an affront to man's dignity as a rational, 
autonomous being. 
The first of these ideas can be read as an objection to any Divine 
command thoory saying ira effect that the autonomy of morality is being 
compromised, while the second obviously is concerned with the autonomy 
of the moral agent I will look at the seoooo of these objections first before I 
- 5 _. 
Autonomy 
look more closely at the first because implicit in number one is two further 
objections to any Divine command morality. tt will be more elegant to 
consider all these together. 
Man's dignity is compromised by any Divine command theory because it 
gives primacy to God rather than man's autonomous reason. Morally and 
logically we cannot rely on God to tell us what we ought to do because that 
would mean a surrender of our moral identity. Logically our moral identity is 
inescapable because any such surrender is in itself a moral act. Macintyre 
sums up this kind of idea well: "Suppose that a divine being, real or alleged, 
commands me to do something. I only ought to do what he commands if 
what he commands is right. But if I am in a position to judge for myself 
whether what he commands is right or not, then I have no need of the divine 
being to instruct me in what I ought to do. Inescapably, each of us is his own 
moral authority." [Macintyre 1967 p.195J. It is Kant's contention that we are 
in a position to judge because we are free, rational creatures. Morally our 
moral identity is inescapable because If we did, so to speak, surrender our 
moral identities into the hands of divinity,_ that act In itself would be an 
immoral impugning of our basic dignity. 
Some modem Kantians even use this kind of idea as a moral disproof of 
the existence of God. For example, Rachels starts his essay God and 
Human Attributes with these words from Kant, "Kneeling down or grovelling 
on the ground, even to express your reverence for heavenly things, is 
contrary to human dignity." Rachels develops this theme, arguing that God's 
existence is morally impossible since were he to exist then he must be 
worthy of worship, but worship is morally unacceptable since It '"requires the 
abandonment of one's role as an autonomous moral agent." [Rachels 1971 ). 
The central Kantian notion employed here is the autonomy of the moral 
agent. 
Let us now consider the first of Kant's objections to any Divine command 
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ethic - ihs on(!?) whi©h sa~y8 frla~ ~ ~e!OO$ mornliiy on an IS~~~r~tiaUy 
contingent basis. 
!}(an~ ilil ~is temng~y ~iji®d Religion Within fth® limi~ ©lff IA®a~on Alon® 
again and again empha~is~~ his ooll~f ~h~i religion is manifestly oon~lng®nt, 
that is to say, it us a oociai am)J hi~toricat phen()menon baood @n ~mpirical 
statements of fadual import. The main me~age of Kant's book Is his 
proposijli that the historical rellgicm o~ Chri~tlanity should oo supemeded by 
a timeless, rational religion untied t() any factual events such a~. say, the 
death of Christ Kant's consideration o~ the relative merits of a belief in 
Christ's atonement or a faithful adharenoo to duty finds more merit in the 
latter: "Sinoo knowledge of the atonement belong~ to eoet®siastical faith, 
while the improved way of life [baood on duty) belong~ to pure mor~ij faith, 
the latter must take preoodenoo over the iormer ... [p.i 08]. Only self lov~ ©an 
prompt a man to believe in the moral primacy of the atonement (p.1 07]. 
This idea of contingency being em improper foundation for true morality is 
an aspect of Kant's categorical\hypothetical distinction. The Christian 
religion bases its moral teaching on the sayings of an historical figure called 
Jesus Christ (or the Bible or the Church) - that is to say, it bases morality on 
an authority. Now any appeal to external authority to justify a ooume of 
action lacks true morality's essentially categorical nature. It is a mark of the 
categorical that it Is absolutely binding on the rational man because he 
cannot consistently will its opposite as a universal law of legislation. The 
sayings of the Church may well be identical to that which duty categorically 
prescribes so, in one sense, they are the same. Foundationally, however, 
they am poles apart. Religion bases Its teaching on authority whereas the 
categorical true morality bases itself on morality's one sure foundation -
rationality. 
This idea of the importance of foundations is what underlies most 
modern neo-Kantian attacks on the Divine command theory of ethics; 
founding morality on the commands of God is seen as oompmmlslng, not so 
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mucll ihe au~onomy o~ ih® individual, btn~ m~hsr Ut® autonomy o~ morali~ 
itself. Although Kani never tal~ S){plicitly about the autonomy o~ morality • 
hi~ main thn.A~i is the aLnilOlrroomy ~~ ~~® fmman wm . an ~is empha®is on~ 
foundations has . led mod~m philo~ophers in this particular direction. Kant 
claimed ~fiat moraliiy is on n(O roeoo ~~ ®mpirl~l ~IU!p(OO!fi • mooom 
philosophers claim that morality "am stand upon iw own two g®e~" to u~e 
Maclagan's vivid pttrass. 
Let us e){amine this notion of autonomy furi:her. As we have already 
discovered Kant's contention is that morality can only have a foundation o~ a 
particular sort. If a set of principles is framed Identical in linguistic structure 
to ihs principle~ of morality, blat arrs s®~ ira impropsr ~o~ndations this is 
enough to change ths fuooam®ntal charrader of theoo principles. The 
suriaoo watem of momlity a~ws w.o~ enoug~. th® iruly mor~l maru must divs 
beneath. 
This kind of idea is easy to illustrate. Two people, Bob and Bill, both utter 
the same s0ntenoo: 'We oughi to oo honest."~~ ap~am that roth believe in 
the virtue of truthfulness. But this looking at the surface is not enough, we 
have got to div® dooper and ask why th~y pui forward this recommendation. 
Imagine Bill says, 'We ought to ba honest because it pays. In the end, 
honesty benefits the honest person." Imagine Bob says, 'We ought to ba 
honest because we have a duty to tell the truth." It Is clear that Bill and Bob 
have, in 1ad, very different ooUefs about truthfulness. Bill appears to be 
basing his belief on the prudentiality. of truthfulness, Bob on a oonoorn for 
duty. Now, for Kani, Bill is basing his beliefs on a non-moral foundation and, 
therefore, his truth-tailings, while outwardly virtuous, ar®, in fact, morally 
indifferent Only Bob's adions are really morally praiseworthy oocause they 
flow from his concern for duty. As Mary Mldgely rightly says, "Kant said that 
act and motive must be seen as oontinoous and judged a~ a whole." 
[Midgeley i 981 p.90). 
Kani himself, o~ course, has a simil~r account io mine where he 
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discusses ~he mo~iva~~l~n o~ ~he gmoorr giving ths oorr~m ch~ng~F1. [D{an~ i 9~ 
p.53] 
Ws are now in a posi~ion to analyse mora closely th® various charge~ 
~ing made aJ@atin~ft D!vin® romman~ thoory ~rom ihis "1oun~alftWnalisft" 
approa©h. Two dlnsrent claims can, I thin~. bs distinguished: 
i : Th® DMi'ile oomma1nd ihemy ihmBtiens to ma~e morality pruOOO'lti~~-
2: It threat~ms to reduoo morality to the merely fadual "X commands." 
These charges are identical in the sense that they both claim any Divine 
command ethic gives morality non-moral ~oundatlon$. 
Th® pru~sntta~l a~~ oon ~ giv~m many dm®r®fili ~orms wotlll <Jliil®r®nft 
emphases ooing employed in each account Basically, however, it goes 
somethl~ng li~ this: IEitherr people rrooogti'ili~® tth®irr duty 011 they do not Why 
introduce God into the picture? 11 we s~y it Is ~o add an extra motivating 
factor into morality, the moralist is bound to ask what sort of motivation it is. 
If it is morai motivation - Rhat is, a oonc:em for dluty - the need for God cafil 
hardly ari~e. for the moral man alr€lady recognizes his duty and doos what is 
required of him without God's interference. If God is needed because 2 
person will not perform his duty, whai can God do but to introduce further 
non-moml induooments into the frame? This non-moral inducement can 
only be prudential in character: crudely, a fear of punishment if we do 
wrong, the lure of reward if we do right This prudential motivation seems 
enough to make morality merely an expression of egocentricity. 
Th~ view, ~or many mooom philosophem, is such allow minded pidur® 
of morality that It actually qualifies as being immoral, not just non-moral. 
This, forr fS)(ampiG, is the view of D. z. Phillips; in his From Fantasy to Faith i~ 
is a pervading doctrine that any oonoorn for reward is Immoral. Hence In 
one of U'ilis essays he takes it upon himself to attack ~ny sooh notion, "Som® 
philosophers and theologians, In their eagerness to oommend the Gospel of 
the few io the many, have actually· suggested that the many have 
' - Sl - . 
Au~onomy 
miscalcula~sd the world's rsward~. ij~ ()nly ttasy cairuijaftoo ~ro~riy, it i~ said, 
they would sse, aftar all, thai it is the way of the view which leads to theoo 
reward~. To oom~ io God, y~D!.!l do fi10i hava to ~top pu~ing n~Umbsr on® 1im~. 
because worshipping God is really ~he basi way of furthering the interests o~ 
number one." [!Phillips i 99i ~- i 82]. 
Other modem philosophers (Kovesi will oo our ~ncample [Kovesi 1967]) 
have this oon~rn for fm~ndations, bm differ fmm Kant irn that what is soon 
as a proper foundation for ethics is different While they keep ihe Kantian 
distinction between true morality and mere prudence, the idea of morality 
being essentially based on rationality or consistency is more or less 
discarded. Instead they insisit that true morality is basoo upon moral notions. 
For these philosophers the ronoorn is noi how a moral utteranoo is 
1orwarded (as it would oo foli' Hare) but with the oontent of th® utteranoo. 
What distlngul~hes a moral from a non-moral ad is not that the door wants it 
to be universalized, but that the doer explains his ad by referring to some 
justifying moral notion such as kindness, generosity, courage, not w, say, 
temperature or the number of atoms In a brick. 
A proper moral foundation is some relevant moral notion. Now this can 
be turned into an attack on the Divine command theory, for Kovesi ooutd 
claim that the Divine command theorist does not base his actions on any 
relevant moral notion. To appreciate the damaging nature of this attack an 
example is needed: Imagine I am asked to justify some virtuous action, say, 
giving money to charity. Kovesi would reply by referring to some moral 
notion such as benevolence and say. ISBecauoo it's kind." This is impressive 
and people would applaud. The Divine command iheorist would seem to 
have to say that God commanded him to. This somehow seems to miss the 
point - to place a question mark next to his action. His Interrogator might 
well ask, s9o is kindneoo irrelevant for you? Either you do It out of kindness 
and so God is Irrelevant or you do it for God and so kindness is irrelevant." 
The Divine command theorist af)pears to have no choice but to admit that 
kindn®ss, is at the en(] of the day, irrelevan~ ~o hom a~d oo summarily 
lambasted. At the back of this attack is the spectre of prudence: "You're only 
doing i~ ~o gaR into God's good books!" 
So that, in essence, is the prudentlallty attack. It is oo damaging oocause 
of its high minded insistence on the purity of morality. Any attempt to show 
morality is not so pure is likely to suffer from moral contempt, like that 
shown by Phillips. 
The second kind of ''foundatlonallst" attack is formulated quite clearly by 
W. G. Maclagan in his influential, The Theological Frontiers of Ethics. If, 
Maclagan says, God's commands are given as a definition of what · our 
duties are, then, "we must point out that it is a definition that does not 
elucidate, but on the contrary simply denies, the characteristic quality oi the 
experience [of duty] with which our problem began. The "normative" has 
been elided and what can be stated in the language of positive fact alone 
remains." [Maclagan 1961 p.68). Maclagan is saying that if we expenence 
something as our duty, then we experience it as binding upon us whether or 
not God is brought into the equation. To translate this experience of duty 
into the language of "God commands" Is to transform the normative Into the 
merely factual. The essential experience of duty, that it is binding upon us, 
seems to be lost. The definition has not captured all it was meant to define; 
in fact, the core of the ide~ has been completely lost. Moreover, according 
to this vein of thought, this semantic ellipsis is a necessary phenomenon 
associated with any type of translation that attempts to find equivalencies 
between propositions stating "God commands X" and "X is our duty". If this 
is so, the argument continues, it must be some kind of category mistake to 
analyse the one in terms of the other. 
Let us at this juncture turn our attention to a different way In which the 
autonomy attack can be expressed, that is, In terms of the is\ought gap. A. 
C. Ewing in his book Ethics expresses this line of thought very well. After 
discussing and rejecting attempts to define good in terms of the natural 
features of situations to which the word can be meaningfully applied, he 
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Autonomy 
turns to attempts in which goocl is dsfirnoo in tarms C>~ memphysics. IHie pu~s 
forward various classical objections, but finds in the and all attempts to 
define good, whether it bs na~tur~listically Oli metaphysically, ~all ~oul o~ the 
is\ough~ gap. "Metaphysical oofinl~lons, liks naiura!istie, err In trying to 
reduce the ought to ttle is." This he ®l:qolie$00$, like our previous attacks, in 
the language of autonomy: " .. they destroy what Kant calls the autonomy o1 
ethics by refusing to reoogni~e the unoqueness of i~ fundamental ooncept~ 
and trying to reduoo it to a mer{'} branch of another study." [Ewing 1953 
p. "1 "13 - "1 "14. Ewing makes much the same point in Value & Reality "1973 
Chapt 8.] 
This idea of an is\ought gap is sometimes ®)(pressed slightly more 
"poeticallyli: fthat is, proponenw of auronom1f ~pea~ o~ what we oughft to oo 
not being dependent on the state of the universe, e.g., what we ought to do 
is independent of whether too universe i~ iriendiy towards morality 
(Maclagan). This idea is further developed by saying that ethics is non-
contingent - ought is oo independent of is that what we ought to do is 
unchangeable. 
This kind of approach is extensively worked out in Paul Johnston's 
Wittgenstein and Moral Philosophy. Johnston claims that there is a sense in 
which the status of ethics is similar to that of logic, " .. .for both seem 
concerned with the world as a whole and thereby gain a strange profundity 
which sets them apart from those truths which are merely contingent. li 
(Johnston 1989 p. 77]. This is reminiscent of Kant's distinction between 
hypothetical and categorical imperative~. Ethics is non-oonting~nt because 
its prescriptive foroo is independent of any contingency, of any "is", whereas 
hypothetical imperatives are dependent on my desires, too Gis'" of which is 
most definitely contingent 
-The relevance of this notion of non-contingency to advocates of the 
Divine command theory is two-fold, depending on your interpretation of what 
is meant by non-contingent If you mean non-contingent in the full-blown 
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sense o~ logically necessary, then God is irre~evan~ ~o ethics in Roo same 
way as he is irrelevant to all logically necessary truths 1• Following Aquinas, 
i~ is orthodolcy that God's will has n~ cUB~hofiiy over ths logically VU'IOOSSaJI)'. 
The second way in which the notion is relevant doos no~ r~ad non-
contingency ira thi~ ~ull-b~own sens®, row rath~ll' sees it as sayiliig that ~he 
truths oi ethics are dependent on nothing tha~ is itsel1 contingent Now 
arguably God's commands are ooniingent il'il fthe oonse that if he oommands 
X, then he could have commanded V. If one argues that if God commanded 
X, then only X COnJid have been commanded by God, it appears that God 
has·no freedom. If God is free, surety he could have commanded Y instead 
of X. But if either X or Y could have been commanded by God, then X and V 
are dependent on that which is contingent eg. God's will to do X or Y. Henoo 
ethics is indepsndenft oi God's wm oocauoo Goo's wm is romingent. 
Now this notion of God's will being contingent because he Is free is 
oontroversiat Some writers, such as Swinburne, prefer to see ut as the case 
that if God commanded X, then only X oould have been commanded 
[Swinburne 1993 p.145]. God is free, but not In the sense that different 
choices could have boon made but in the sense that no el<ternal agency 
influences his choice. However, this is something that we would investigate 
further on in this essay. It is enough for the moment to see the various 
reasons why many thinkers reject Divine oommand theories. 
let us now survey the manifold armaments of war which make up the 
autonomy attack. First the Divine oommand theory is rejected because it is 
seen as placing morality on a foundation that either causes it to become 
non-moral, or worse immoral. For Kant, th~re are two ways the thoory can 
do this: 
1 : It can plaoo morality on a non-categorical, essentially 
contingent basis eg. the teachings of an S)(ternal authority such as the 
1 . 1 shall argue later that there is an important relationship between God and the truths of logic: God 
did not create logicaliaws, but they nevertheless depend on His nature. This view, I betieve, puts me 
in line with orthodoxy. 
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Church or a factual event such as the death of Christ 
2: tt can infect the workings of reason such that instead of a 
logical adherence to the rational demands of the categorical imperative, the 
doer is prompted by prudence. This can be low-minded prudence eg. l don't 
want to go to Hell, or high-minded prudence, e.g., I'm doing it for God. In 
both cases the motivation, which Is seen as a continuous whole with the 
action, is inappropriate. Only moral motivation makes moral action. This 
notion we saw can be used with pretty destructive results by modern noo-
Kantians such as Kovesi. 
The second main thrust of the autonomy attack sees .man's will as 
sufficient unto itself. Man is inevitably his own moral authority. To surrender 
your decisions to any external authority, albeit divine, is to surrender a part 
of your personhood, it is to be less than moral yourself. We cannot escape 
morality. Even to think it morally right to surrender your morality to God is to 
be yourself the moral authority which decides that such an action is good. 
Man's dignity demands we face our responsibility. 
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Th® Accusation Of Arbitrarin®ss 
We have ~ooked a~ ttl® I'Tminly Kanooli'b inspired criticism$ o~ ~e DivinG 
commano'l theory o~ etili~. These criticisms claim that such a conception m 
morality causes morality to roo prudential in character and\or damaging to man's 
proper dignity as a moral ooing. There I$, however, another strand of criticism 
which Is important enough to describe in detail. Ba~icalty this criticism allegoo tha~ 
Divine command theories neoossarily put morality on an essentially arbitrary 
foundation. In this chapter, I will try to make clear what this criticism is all about 
I think we are best placed to understand this line of attack if w0 see it as part of 
what is so puzzling about the Euthyphm Dilemma. In Plato's EuthyDhro, Socrates 
asks EIJthyphro the following question: Is ~hat is holy holy because the gods wish 
it to be or do the gods regard it as holy because it is holy?. Is holiness made so by 
the wishes of the gods or is it holy anyway Independently of their wishes? [Plato 
1969 1 OB-11 B). If we "moooml:ze" this dilemma we get something like this: Is what 
Is moral moral because God wishes it to be, or does God regard it as moral 
because It is, in fad. moral quite independently of him? 
Part of the force of this dilemma Is that if we assert that what is moral is moral 
because God wishes it to be we get the charge that this Is tan1amount to saying 
morality is essentially arbitrary. The argument proceeds something like this: What 
reasons can God have for saying "X is moral"? It is not elucidating to say that he 
has moral reasons for saying "X is moral" because morality is identical with 
whatever God desires. Thus whatever reasons God has must, by definition, be 
moral. K. Nielsen In his book Ethics without God makes exactly this point as does 
B. Brody In his article Morality and Religion Reconsidered. Both claim that in order 
that God's moral dictates be property Intelligible there must be an independent 
criterion to establiSh the moral validity of His commands [Nielsen 1973. Brody 
1974). 
Now one might argue that God CAN have reasons for wishing X to be moral for 
He might have non-moral reasons tor wishing X. Thus He might see that the 
establishment of X as a moral norm is more logically coherent or more conducive 
to the smooth running of the created order. This perhaps would be the claim that 
God was a oonsequentiallst of some type, perhaps like Hobbes who sees the 
felicity of Individuals in society as the main concem or aim of morality [Hobbes 
1991 ]. Some might be happy with this. Others would claim that such an 
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Sltplana~on oi the esmblishiroon~ o~ so~ mornl oresr ~ha~ was ~sW norHVlO!i'all 
would leave ~s moralizy o~ fu~ orrder YneJtpiB\insd. 1 X would still ros mor~lly 
arbi~rary. To show what this means oonsldsr tl1s ~allowing though~-eltpsriment 
Imagine God deems ~o lnstl~uts di~ry-!(aepin~ as a morrBJI good. Now Gool oould 
Sltplain ~i$ insmtB~n m Bl os~in eltW~~ by ~Mng oon-moml jusmDCB!iion ~r it Hs 
could psrhaps say ~hat diary-~eaping is mom efficient ~hom relying on msmovy, or 
~~. W dons aocumie~, iR me~~ Y$ M()i'® ~b~'IIS aoo!Jit our owll'i psreonaliiDss. As 
long as ~he jusmicatlon remains non-moral Rhe rationa!G is non-mu~ological. Now, I 
ihink, sl.llch a non-moral rationals givss ciiary-keepin@ some imemgibfiliiy considsi'eol 
merely as an institu~ion. However, as soon as we demand rorr its justifica~ion as a 
MORAL inmiiution the eJtplanation seems to ml! short It ssems only a oockgmuno1 
of motral reasons can serve as a adequate e){planation o~ a moral decision. li God 
oould, w~m!l\l ~rnol~y, gfus a1 mm'Bli j~JSiW~oon ctJ dSIIfY·~~ntiJ - ~ylnc ~matoo 
objectivity abouft oneseli enablas one to have more sympathy with others - fus 
goooooss o~ OJiarv-~epln~ woYid booom® im®liigi~s. ~ ~ is, lli'w non-moral 
r~ioools doss no~ S}{pl2in tile mom!tty ~ dierv-!{oo~n~. Th1.11s diruy-~ping is 
morally arbitrary. God may hB!w avoidad oomp!e~ S!ri>fu'ariness !by oon-moral 
eJtp!anatlons, bu~. withou~ moral justme21oon His insmYtion sasms unimelligifole as a 
MORAL insiUMion. 
The critics o~ Divine command thoory would presumafoly say ttta~ tile only way 
out o1 this arbitrariness is i'O sa~y moraliiy is moml indepandanily o1 Goo. Some 
things, ihey would perhaps. maimaln, are morally valuabls or virtuous just by 
naru~e. The claim is ttlS!~ atrbi!lmriness is wsmoved by the fad thm Gool can now 
oove non-tautological moral reasons ~or asserting, "X is moral." God sees thaft X is, 
jus~ by iw verv narure, good and so his asse~on tha~ ttls Is the cass is noft 
arbitrary. I cannot jusi create value; God is In tlle sanw ~sition. God may bs 
roo~nsibl® k»r tile ®ltisi1Sooe o~ ~is uniwroo, ~ ooft moml valloo~. 
1. I am not arguing hare that conssqu~mtlalism Is a non-moral basis for morality. Rather, I 
am examining the notion that one can euplain the morality of a particular moral system by 
looking at the non-moral eonsequ9ncss of rtlis system ooing institutlonali~s~. Thus ons 
might say }{ is more moral than V because the consequences oi )( are more logically 
coh0rent. I tatte it that pace Kant logical coherenc~S per se is adiophorlc. 
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rationali\y cl~ims ttla~ ttlsrs mus~ b3 undersmn~©le r®asons ror ~ng or asssrnng 
i~ tha~ action is ~o oo ronsiooreo1 rational. (ror an interesting accmm~ of various 
views o~ rational~ Antony Kenny's Wha~ is f'aith? is a valoolb!e reaol [Kenny 1992]. 
He rejects ~e Hume·inspired W. K. Gifford view which sees rationality as 
proportioning belie~ ~o evidence and instead adopts a more comple}{ account 
Instead of claiming there is a single criterion fm rationality, he claims that raoonaliiy 
is based upon a comple:n. of criteria.) Arbitrariness, that is, acting without reason is 
irrational. Them must be rationale fer an action to be rational - this, at least, is the 
picture the critic must have in mind. I do not want to reject this notion of rationality, 
although, as Kenny points out, it has its weaknesses. 
The idea is, then, of an arbitrary God. This is bad enough, but worse follows: if 
God arbitrarily decides thai X is moral today, what is to stop Him prsfemng V 
tomorrow? One only has to put something nasty in the place of the variable to get 
some idea of just how unpleasant thm picture of the foundations of morality is. 
Perhaps God's whim is love, perhaps tomorrow he institutes hate and envy as the 
comerstooo of morality. By ne>rt week we might have graduated onto sadism as 
the very pinnacle of moral grandeur. This kind of idea has as its mainstay a 
different, though related, notion of arbitrariness. The one I have concentrated on so 
far is the idea that X is arbitrary if it stands without relevant justification. However, 
X can be said to be arbitrary if it changes for no good reason. If we wish t:o accept 
that God's will Is that which makes X moral we seem to be making It the case that 
God can, without good reason, change morality any time He wants to and have the 
unwelcome consequence that whatever He decides is, by virtue of His so willing, 
absolutely good. So He could say, .. Let cruelty ber and cruelty would indeed be 
and it would be good! 
Now 1 am not going to argue against this picture by investigating whether all this 
is coherent. Pemaps a morality must. so to speak, have more to it than just one 
central action or type of action; arguably morality must have a complex of 
interconnected features and a complex background of justifying notions if it is to b9 
a coherent possible moral world. Much too often critics of Divine command ethics 
use this notion of countorfactual moralities without spelling It out in too much detail. 
Perhaps hate logically cannot be a central moral norm without incoherence - Kant 
would certainly hold it to be contradictory. Anyhow, I am not going to use this 
particular avenue of response. Suffice to say that there is such an avenue. 
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I~ is impnnan~ ~ no~a hsli'e til&~ ij')is ~oo o~ &vsn~JtS o~ response n~d oo~ IGatd ~o 
the idea that mmaley is, in some ssnse, necessary bscB!uss i'i is baseol on soma 
kind of Kantian principle o~ non-oon~radic~on. AU I am claiming is ~a~ maybs 
logical coherence can prosmioo what mnd of tllings can oo moral norms: wh~a~sr a 
concern ror logical consiswncy can ~reoorioo ro any sigrni1ican~ degrroo hS~ Bln 
entirely diffaren~ mat~r. My view is that ii CB!flnot 
I~ is also im~ft3!81~ iO note ~ant oo~ an p9lllosophem woul~ rsgmd ihe ~cruti'e mtt . 
critic is painting og God as somehow ~oo deeply weird to bs COU'l~mplated as a 
pussibilijy. Some philosophers seem to maintain that man himself is in an idsntical 
position to this arbitrary God. Some varieties oi existentialism seem to emphasize 
arbitrary choice-making. Man is ihro~m into ttls wofi'ld, is fosing-towards-death, 1sels 
angst and must choose to act His choice is unim~rtant, it is ttle action of choice 
~tat is the 1undamanml thing. 0¥ couree, so~ elti$~rmalism ti1f fto initi'oduoo som€J 
element o1 choice limitation by talking about bad mith and the Ilks, but whe~r 
1lhslr phUosophy can honesf(ly use such eJ notion is a dffieren\l matter. 
Other philosophers, in contrast, would not the mind the chargs of moral 
arbimlriruess, bufr would shy away lirom this exisientialist unooncem with any kind o~ 
rationale. The type of philosopher I have in mind oloes not mind the arbitrariness 
involved in ihe lack of moral foo.JJndation but insteac:B gives a non-moral underpinning 
to morality. Phillips Foot would perhaps fall into this category [Foot 1967]). 
However, I will concentrate my attention on Peter Winch [Winch 1972 Chapt 7]. 
Winch seems to argue that morality Is based upon the logical necessity of certain 
norms of oohaviour given that society exis1S. A norm of truth-telling, he argues, is 
logically necessary for the survival .of any oommunlty of individuals. It is impossible 
that a society would survive if successful communication were not possible and a 
prerequisite of successful oommunlcatlon Is that people room often than not tell the 
truth. Therefore, any conceivable human society must, in some way, regard truth-
telling as desirable. Winch appears to argue that the social indispensability o~ a 
norm makes that norm a moral one. So one can give relevant reasons for saying ){ 
is goooJ if orne can show that a norm of ){-lng is logically necessary for oocial 
integrity. This is to be distinguished from the view which clalrm that momlity is 
generated by logical consistency or coherence aions. Winch's claim seems to be 
that thai which is logically necessary ror the continuing of society Is moral. 
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Now, in this view, "X is good" is morally arbitrary, but no~ compleisly art:Jitnary 
because one ca~n gove relewnt noru-morB!I mason§ ~or ~ validiiy. I Unink mosit 
paople would agree that it is hard to see how social indispsnsability psr se equal~ 
BI MORAL rattler ~aW'Il non-moral mtiona~. Ooo might "moralize" ij by giving Ult 
relevan~ moral dress, thus one might say til~~ ihe dsstructton o~ society is bad and 
tterefor® any sooial structures nooes~ry fow 1he sunriw~ of soci®ty are good. But. 
in Winch's view, nt appears to oo merely the oonditional necessity attached ro 
certain norms that of Itself provides adequate non-moral rationale ror these norms. 
Again. it is hard to see how mere logical necessity can be a condition, whether 
necessary or sufficient. for something to oo moral. 
I mentioned these alternative views by way of completeness and. to clarify who 
exactly the divine command theory is dealing with. Moral arbitrariness is the 
accusation thai if God's will is that which creates value, necessarily there can ba 
no non-tautological moral explanation of His decision. Therefore, His decision is 
necessarily morally arbitrary. This, as I have said, oonflicts with that broad picture 
of rationality which sees rational actions flowing from a consideration of relevani 
reasons. Now some arbitrariness may be removed by giving non-moral 
explanations of God's decision as regards value. However, the moral arbitrariness 
or indeed irrationality is still present Morality is reduced to the whims of a morally 
arbitrary, morally Irrational God. Another sense of the arbitrary-accusation 
concerns Hself with the possibility of reasonless change. Thus if we are talking 
about whims, what guarantee can we have that God will not change His mind? 
Indeed, what stopped God, right at the Beginning, from plucking a world out of the 
Infinite possibles which had facism or sadism as its central moral be all and end 
all? Thus if the Divine Command Theory of Ethics Is true we have a morality that 
has no relevant moral justification. Furthermore, we live precariously at the edge of 
moral chaos in the sense that God might change His mind tomorrow and again 
next week and so It might go on forever: 
"And so God gave the new commandment to the second Moses. On the tablet it 
simply said, 'let them be no stability.' GOO looked on the ensuing chaos below and 
Behold I it was good.'' (From the gospel according to a Divine command theorist) . 
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lrn ill® cha~r snijttfed Ths Char~e og AmitrB~~iooss ws s2w ~h~~ tl'l®m wsrs W\f() 
dis~nguisi101ble accusations ttl~~ cmim wars li~bls ~o make aJQJBlinsft Divin® 
command ettlics. i will rscal\) on ihsss frn'iefiy: 
1 : Moralijy is made arbitrary in thaft tllem appaa~rs ~o ~ no S)(isrnal wildatin~ 
m~rd whereby God'~ mor~l asssi1Jioos mB!y oo j~d. Ali GOO's masons for 
claiming "){ is good" are tautological, slnoo what He wills is, roy virrue o1 this will, 
periootly good. Thus whatever reasooo Goo rmy haw musft oo non-elucidating. 
God's moraliiy siands arbitrary in the sense that it ha~ no external rationall~ing 
factor. Nothing can be adduced that woukll explain or elucidate the morality of what 
God commands; all we have it seems Is God continually saying, "It is good 
because I say so." 
2: Morality is made arbitrary in ~ sans® that GOO, It seems, could change 
His mind and Institute V instead of X as a rooral duty. He oould oo this at any time 
and whatever He so Instituted would oo equally good and right. Morality oould, 
therefore, arbitrarily change at any time. No external reason could be given for the 
change since God's will itself is that which MAKES X, Y or Z moral. The awfulness 
of the implications of this Is obvious when we imagine Goo commanding, as a 
moral duty, something that is, at present, morally dreadful. 
In this chapter I will try to defend Divine command ethics from these two 
damaging attacks. Against accusation number one I will argue that ali theories 
whether they be moral theories or not have a kind of arbitrariness at their oore. In 
other words, arbftrariness is absolutely unavoidable. My argument against 
accusation number two, i.e., that God might arbitrarily change His mind, will involve 
a more complex, more lengthy argument. t will claim that GOO Is Immutable in His 
essential nature and that God's essential nature Is Goodness itself. 
Let us for the time being look at my reply to accusation number one. One of 
Wlttgenstein's greatest achievements was to realize how much our systems of 
belief - our "forms of life.. - are groundless. His basic point is very simple: all 
justification must end somewhere. We wnoot haw a system of belief whose 
foundations are infinitely extended. There must be a point where a terminus is 
reached and an advooate of a particular viewpoint can say no mom. 
Nor111an Ma~lm oliscuss®s ~is id®~ in his a~~ The GmOJooiessness o~ 
Belie~ [MB!Ioolm 1977]. Hs argoos. ?ollow!n~ Wi~enSW;in, ~at la~gs sca~l® sy~ms 
o1 bslis~ - he gives such eltamples as chsmis~iY BJnd ~hslsm - ~we gmundiess. Tha~ 
is to say, in any t:alia? sysmm soms~ln~ musft bs iafwn row grantoo barors tlle 
system can, so ro S(OSS!~. g®~ o~ ihs grouoo. ColOn Lyoos, in an arocls tna~ replie$ 
directly to Maloolm's papar, t3llws issue with some oil his eltampl®s- for eltamp1e, 
Maicolm's oon~n~ion ttla~ bsllm in Gtl~ is groa.md~ss - ban doss no~ disagree wiiil 
tlle ooncep~ o? grounollessnsss i~oolt He agroos ijla~ soms bsllsm ewe groundless 
in ihe ssnss ~at Hi is oot ssnsn~a ltO BIS~ furr Bl jOJsMooi:lon ior fusss tosliaW. lycas 
distinguishes baWl/sen what he calls regulative and constliutlva principles of 
raiionBJI inquiry. Regulawe princip!es are grounded - these are very general 
hypotheses like "ttlings don't just vanish" or "nature is continuous". These are 
grouooed ~use, in prloon~. m~s can ~ tJJiv®n ~or ~lf®vi11~ ihem ~ fo3 true. 
Mo~ of too ijrvw w® oo~s sooll li'®@u~tliv® prinoiptss 1oli' ~ra1moo. om that ®ss no~ 
msBJn that they B!rs without gro~oo. Con~® roosonJs, on ~he other hand, are 
principles thai form the very crlmria of rational lrnqulry. These prirnciplas may 
include such mmdms as, "I~ is wmn@ m i~nom tlle resu~ o~ 2 pm~rly oondumsd 
scientific sxpsrimenr or "li tilers Is a oonrtmdicticm in a scientific Rhsory It Is 
wofilhless." [lycas 1 S77 p.1 51). ly~s says, " ... whai I haw; called ins oons'KUMBWJ 
rules o~ ratk>nal empirical inquiry soom to me to b3 arguably gwoundless and 
mtsmpts to ju~ ti'lem are atU'QllYB.l~ toointlass OU' circ!IJIB!r ... Atrnding by thess laws is 
a CONDITION og rational thought It makes no sensa to suppose we migil~ set 
ihem aside Ymil they are ratio111ally proved."' (p.1 00 ~~~ in original]. Lycas argtnes 
that tl1e Idea ~ha~ Goo1 eltlsiS is a rsgula~ve and no~ oonstiiutlve principle o1 
religious inquiry. 
I suggest that ~is is a cormei analysis of large scale systems of fosllef. If I am 
oowoot, ths011 1ft appti~ ro large ooai~FJ I'Vroml sys1tsi'U1S as welt Reasons 1ofi' Bl 
paiilcular mcml smnoo ~n bs asked 1or anol given, but such questioning] must 
reach a wm~inus. !Pa!IJI Johnston lQYW it like tlhls, "As~ why we act as we do, we 
can give our rreasons for actling. bu~ when these ~we mjacted nothing rem~lns to ras 
said ... Hsre we ream ~r~ and ail W® can oo is dsoori~: ti'llis Is oow we act. 
an~ these ali's tOO reBJsons ws oWsr for doing $0;. s@meone ~o whom these reasons 
mean noillln'tg Is simply !s~ with ths ~cl ~a~ we a~ in ~is way." (Jofrmsron ~ 98S 
p.81) A~ what ~in~ thG iarmlnus is reachoolln mhlcs is a hotly debatOO lool.!le. Some 
would SBJy ~ sw~ wmt oo iooMdual's wan~ and dasarss, s«JiU'1e would saJy ~ Siops 
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ai some law o1 ronsisiency, othem would say it srops BJt a prnnci~ o~ miiity ... ~® lis~ 
is very long. The poin~ is tllm tttere is such a Sio[QJ. 
I~ is insiructlvs io try and push a~ thsss dlfferen~ boundaries or oonsmt!iive rules 
to see wha~ happens. Wha~ would Kant, 1or example, say if we wsre io as~ him 
why following the categorical lmparativs was a good or dutiful thing ~o do? He 
might say tiiat ifte prindple was so iuminously reasonable llhat ons would oo utterly 
mad to ignore It And yet many have ignored it He could say that to follow the 
Categorical imperative is, in itself, a goool thing ro do. This answer appears to be 
an acceptable one, until one asks in what sense it is good io follow the principle. 
What is good is defined by Kant as that which is in aooordance with this principle. 
If, therefore, Kant means good in this way the answer he gives does not elucidate. 
If he uses the word in any Oiher way he is going beyond his own system. I think 
these consideration~ shoW that tOO Categorical Imperative is a oonstiMtw mt® oi 
his ethical system. As such It is groundless; it fundamentally characterizes his 
ethics- it is not itself characterized by anything deeper. The same would be true of 
the principle of utility in utilitarian thought. The utilitarian who believes that the 
principle picks out the moral from tile Immoral cannot call the principle itself 'moral' 
except In a tautological, non-elucidating sense. 
Consider how this relates to the question of the Divine command ethic. What 
reasons can God have for saying "X is moral"? This was the questiOn the critiC 
claimed could not be answered in an elucidating way. It is a .. pushing at the 
boundaries" question because it ought to be obvious by now that, for the Divine 
command theorist, God's commands could be understood as the constitutive 
principle from which his ethical system is built They are. therefore, groundless as 
far as the ethical system is concerned. Just like Kant, the Divine command theorist 
cannot elucidate the goodness of his morality without begging the question. So the 
force of the accusation of arbitrariness . implicit in accusation one is rendered 
harmless by the fact that all moral systems must have a reasonless. bedrock from 
which their morality is generated. 
Now 1 am, in my version of Divine oommand ethics, going to argue that it is not 
God's commands parse that are the oonstitutivs principle of the theory. I will argue 
that God's commands are grounded in something logically prior, but this 'deeper 
bedrock' is not something external ro Goo to which he must adhere in order to be 
properly called moral, mihsr ~e tosdroc~ Is God's own i'lta~rure. lai®r on I wm a1rgue 
mr ~s old schol~stic ~ttssos ~hat God BJnol Goodns$$ ars ·identical. Thu® GOO's 
commands could ba called, in LyCBJs' phrase, a regulative principl®. That is, God's 
oomm&md~ ~ay a vsny1uno1almeV'I~I. ~o~nJnd pail iru til~ life o? a1 oolisver, oo~ they 
am 'only' regulative becayoo there is something d0ep®li' ~a~ underlie~ them, 
namely, God's numerical iden~ity wiih Goodness. Thus God's commands can be 
given an non-tautological elucidation as regards their goodness, but not God's 
nature. In fact, in my theory, to question the goodness of God and how He comes 
to ba called good is to seriously misunderstand the metaphysical relationship 
between God and His Goodness; He is not good because he fulfils perfectly the 
demands made by some autonomous, external world of value, rather God IS that 
world of value. To ask for a deeper, more elucidating reason why we ascribe 
Goodness to God is to ask for the impossible. As I say, God's nature, and not His. 
oomma~ par se, an~ the oonstitU!tlw ~n©ipk:JJ on my vemion of ~e DMne 
command theory. 
Let me at this point try to summarize the basic points I am trying to make. I am 
saying that both my theory and any other theory stand equal before the charge of 
arbitrariness in the sense given in accusation number one. The argument could be 
put like this: at any point in the investigation of a moral theory one can ask how a 
particular principle is grounded, i.e., one can ask what reasons can oo given to 
justify the principle. Two options or kinds of reply can be given. The advocate of a 
particular moral theory can either give a deeper, more profound principle that 
underlies and elucidates the former principle OR he can say that the principle in 
question is itself the reasonless ground from which all his other principles grow. A 
utilitarian is satisfied with his constitutive principle and thinks it provides a plausible 
ground for morality; he probably believes the principle to be coherent in the sense 
that all the principles that grow out of it fOllow logically from the principle itself. For 
the Kantian, them is another satisfying fundamental principle. Again, for the DMne 
command theorist, God's nature stands as the ground from which value grows. 
The point is that for all theories of morality there Is such a ground and that this 
ground is itself groundless. All theories S1and equal when we oonsider 
groundlessness alon@. 
It seems to me then that we can tum our attention to accusation number two, 
i.e., the claim that DMne command ethics oomm~ tile theorist to the possibility of 
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aroiitrauy chemgs in wh~U is moml or immo~t Thus Pftb)blem ~P\03Sffi ro m~ ro bs 
nearer the centre o~ tradmonal ooncem$ aoout DMrn® oommaoo ethiC$. I ~m swe 
thai Plato's main reason 1or his rejemion o~ Divine command ethics in Euthyphm 
was booauoo oi popyl~r ancient Grook oonooptions of tile DMoo. The worid oi the 
Grook god~ wa~ a world wfrlers ~ asserrtoo aroitmrily w any whim ihey thad. 
This capricious world was a oonooption that was at odds with whai Plato saw as 
the permanent Ideal world o~ tile Platonic Forroo. Divine command ETHICS would 
have boon a strange coupling of the arbitrarily changi~ and the absolutely 
permanent For this reason Plato wished ro establish whether the gods' desires or 
the moral had logical priority. in the Euthyphm dilemma he uncovers a laternt 
contradiction in Euthyphro's thought Euthyphro believes what is good is good 
because the gods love it, but also believes what is good is good in~pendantly of 
the divine desires {Plato 1969 1 OB-11 BJ. 
Of course, the God of Christian theism Is not seen in this exaggeratedly 
anthroporoophized light, but a lingering doubt remains: if God is a person, then 
surely there is the possibility of a change of mind. If it is GOO that underlies and 
provides a foundation for morality, then sumly His personhood carries with it the 
potentiality for change and, therefore, a change of morality. If. we have non-
personal Platonic Forms as the foundation of morality there is no possibility of 
change, for such Forms are not the kind of things that have minds to change. The 
personhood of GOO seems, then, to be the sticking point. If God were a mindless 
tablet of stone upon which were written the rules of morality such a problem 
concerning change could not occur. 
I suggest that this problem of potential arbitrary change can be avoided by 
adopting the traditional scholastic doctrine that God Is Goodness Itself. If we add 
this doctrine to the traditional doctrine that God Is immutable, we have the makings 
of a simple argument: 
1) God and Goodness are identical 
2) God is immutable 
therefore 3) Goodness Is Immutable. 
It is to a discussion of this argument that I now tum. I will look at the two premise~ 
in turn, starting, appropriately enough with premiss number one. 
Replying To The Charge Of Arbitrariness 
God And Goodnesl!)) Are lden~ical 
I do not mean, oi course, that ths meanings of the two teims "GOO" and 
"Goodness" are identicall - !that would be aoouli'd. What i mean is that, tho~h the 
sense of the iwo terms is diffeli'ent, iiw referent is the same item, namely, God. 
Although the phrase "a shape whose internal angles always add up to 180 
degrees" and the word "triangle" do not mean the same thing, they both have the 
same referent, namely, a three sided shape [see Quinn 1978 p. 39-41 for a 
discussion of the relation between truths of meaning and logical equivalences in 
the area of Divine command ethics]. 
Later in my thesis, I hope to show that this idea of God's literal identity with 
Goodness has a long, distinguished philosophical ancestry. What I intend to do 
now is to present this idea to the strongest criticism and see how It fares. 
One important objection to my thesis is made by AMn Plantinga in Does God 
Have a Nature?. Plantinga argues that goodness is a property, but "No property 
could have created the wortd; no property could be omniscient, or indeed, know 
anything at all." [Piantinga 1980 p.47). The argument Is that since God in my thesis 
is identified with a property, He fits Into the logical category of properties and so 
cannot have created the world or be omniscient; in other words, such an entity 
could not be the God who believers worship. 
My reply to such an argument Is that it begs the question In favour of its own 
conclusion. Why should we accept that the identification of God and Goodness is 
one where God is made into a property? Why shouldn't we say, instead, that such 
an identification reveals that Goodness is not a property, that this entity is the 
Being that created the universe and is omniscient? Plantinga is concentrating his 
attention one one side of the identifiCation formula only alld ignoring the other. The 
critic needs to show, it seems to me, why one way of looldng at the formula is the 
best way. He needs to show that there is an asymmetry here that legitimizes his 
bias in favour of the proposition that states that God is Identified as a property, 
rather than the proposition that states that Goodness Is identified as a person. 
One way a critic might legitimize such a bias is to claim that there is an 
epistemological asymmetry In the identification. Thus he would say that we know 
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Replying To Th~ Charge OV Arbitrariness 
what type o~ thin~ Goodness is oottew than we !mow what iyps o~ tl'linc Goo is and, 
there~cm~. i~ is better ~o discover what kind o1 thing God is via the more koowabl® 
concept of Goodness ihan by trying io analyse Goodness through ~hs less 
knowable concept o1 Dei~. lnd~ed T. Maybsrry uses this line o1 reasoning against 
~he whole notion of any Divine Command Ethic - he says we are using a model 
"which we do not understcand ... to aid our understanding" [Maybsny 1970. See 
also i\leiisero 1973}. 
My reply to this notion oi epistemological asymmetry is iwofold. Firstly, it is 
questionable whether, in fact, it is always the case that we know what goodness is 
better than we know what Deity is. Philip Quinn in Divine Commands and Moral 
Requirements says, "It is not altogether obvious what should be inferred from these 
[supposed epistemological) asymmetries. After all, there seem to be matching 
asymmetries which fawur the theological side of the aquation." [Quinn 1978 p.44}. 
In other words, some believers seem to discover what is good through religious 
obseMllnee, prayer, reading of Scriptum. This seems to indicate that such people 
would say the supposed epistemological asymmetry is firmly placed on the other 
side of the identification; to them God Is the more immediately knowable. 
Goodness should, for them, be explicated in terms of Deity not Deity explicated by 
an analysis of goodness. Indeed, such theists might claim that at least in their 
methodology we are trying to communicate with a particular, concrete Being who 
can speak and· reveal Himself to rather than attempting to explore a universal, an 
abstract object. It seems hard then to know what to make of such arguments about 
epistemolagical asymmetries, 
My second reply to the idea of epistemological asymmetry is to say that 
arguments based on them miss the mark anyway. There is a confusion between 
epistemology {how we KNOW things) and ontology (what really exists). I may learn 
what Is good independently of the concept of God, but this does not necessarily 
mean that God and Goodness are, In reality, distinct. I leam that water is wet and 
wavy Independently of the concept of H~. Nevertheless water is H:zO. It's the 
same with God and Goodness. We might team about them separately, 
nevertheless they are the same. 
Robert Adams, in his defence of what he calls his Modified DMne Command 
Theory, makes basically the same distinction that I have employed - namely that 
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tilers is a~ distili'lcraon romw®sn ~he n~~urs Oil' esssnoo o~ s©Jm®~hing an©l ij'ts way in 
which the the word tha~ m~ffi to~~ oorooihing is used, ~h81R is, broC~dly spsald~. 
~he meaning o~ ~ ~arm [Ses Adams i 973 and Adams 1 S7S]. Adams argues 
(citing Kripks and Putn~m in suppm1) iha~ some tru~s aoorn id3U1~ily are empirical, 
but neveflhelsss necessBJry truths. For e)(Blmpl®, iR may los fue ooss ~fr'ISJR frl~ 
disciple Matthew and the ial{ colt®croli, Levi [Mswf~ 2:13] are tile same parson. 1g 
they are the same psrson ~hsn tttey &re neeessai'ily iden~ica! (the argt.Bms~ why 
~is shollll~ ~ m® cass ru~ n~ oon©3m us h®ii®). &mt i't is oot B~n analyik: truth 
that Levi and MaWlaw are ioonii~l; WIS cannot doouoo ~ ~rom tOO rmanlng o~ ihs 
words. we can only disoovsr ij']e wt» aootrt iile maf!Rer [ly smpiriool enquiry. So, 
the argument goes, there are truths aoout ~he nature o~ things which are 
necesSBJiilf, but are not analyOO- iha~ is, they may not las disoovem!Oie a priori. Now 
Adams BJrguss ~hBlt ii is ~his kind o~ nooesscwy trutlh tlla~ o~ins in tlls ~ollowin~ 
idsmi~ smwvoont wron~ns~ is (iden~cal wjij"j) ~~ oommw1d$ o1 a lovnnQ Goo. 
The meaning (the way the word is Jearn~. used ... ew.) or wrongnsss is not usually 
empk;>yoo irD sue~ a wBJy ss ~ imp!y oo~i®\ly I[() GOO's oommoooo. However, fls 
narure o~ wrongnsss is suoh Rha~ ~ is idsnij~l wi2h tlfl® oomm~noo o~ ~ loving God. 
Thus how we oome ~() uss or Yndrs~~ cemun worm d03S nofc give us a 
guarantood undsrsmnding or whai thes~?t isrms m~sr to In rs&liiy. 
The ~ilurs ro awmciBI~ this disijnmkm is what gives tt'na e~memoi~Rcal a&\c~ 
im strength. We have W!fo tsrms whidt ordinarily ha~ dii'ismm soosss, I.e., ~ 
woro1s 'God' and 'goodness· mrs usoolly used in diVlsrei'li ways, ills msanhl@ m \lfis 
words are not ttte same. My clmlm is thai wha~ these iWo l'srmSJ r~er ro is the same 
item, i.e., ~ Chrts~~m GOO. In o~rr words, ~rs ssS®nlaa~. real rna~m ~a~ both 
terms ra1er ro Is ths p3rson who created ~he t.miverse. Rob3v1.Adams claims tria~ 
ths woro1 wrongoos$ doss no~ ordinarily imply conwauriarty ~o God's oommam::ls. 
However, tl"'ls ram atooui how we use the word doss oo~ proV® tha~ there is no 
idsnijqy ~~n wron~noos and OOII'D~OOiy i@ GOO's oommSJn$. We mig~ 
disoowrr tlm~h [p>hi!osoLOhi~l r~n ij't~i w® oug~i ro u~ ih0 wor~ in ~e 
same way tlsootsss ~ey botVl reqetr ro ~ SBJms ij'bin@. li se®ms Ro ms, fthan, ihat ihs 
epistsmological ciBilm fails. 
I tlllnlt ~e criilc's reply ~o thi® mlt?Jh~ 03: "If this !tind og ap~oroach is lsgOUma~~ 
whai limiill§ B16"S ROOm ro wli'IB!i mi~h~ ~ ciB!iUilOO? iq how ws uoo BJ ~i11Cl<l~rr woroJ is 
irretevan~. wha~ limifts are there to whai CimY claims o~ idenmy mig~ !ls maG3? Is 
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~oors BJ no-oolds-ooiTs~ tohilooo¢1ics11 wea 1ou- BJ~I as regaU'~ claims or iasnmy? 
Surely ~he msemin~ o~ Bl term is r®~wrn in doololi119 b3iwsen dm~mnR idsn~iy 
claims? I~ it is irre!ewurnft how atrs we to oofi ouR ~he c~ cla1ims 1rom ttle sane?" A 
iull answer to thss~ questions is cayond irt® scop3 o1 this thesis. My inad®~uetw 
reply is ths~ I am no~ claiming ihat ths ms~nin~ o~ a tsU'm is irrelswn~ to idsnti~ 
claims, only tha~ ift is no~ crucial. To say tha~ the ws~ and wavy thing calls~ watsU' is 
really molscules o~ invnsi~~ H~ is, Oi'll ftllls moo og iR, prsny c~. We BlQi'S® wifth 
~he claim bscause ~em are gJoool rs~sons for I~; in ~is case, good empali'ics.l. 
reasons. I fosliew 'fusrs am good maooii1S for bslisvi~ GOO anOJ Goodness awe tie 
sams thing. Lamr on, I will argue ttlat tlb~ conception is tlle only religiously 
adeQuais way of loo~ing a~ ins roomphysical relaijonship batwssn moralifty and 
Deity. My claim is not crazily arbitrary. 
WhB!R o'liler ci'UtfclS~m$ ooro f(m dirOOioo a~on$R ~s idl®niiilly ~ B~m pr~sing? The 
critic might tum his ~ttsnijon io tile iooue o~ int®lliglbiliiy. He might gmn~ ttla~ ~ can 
diooovGU' uoon'llioos ~sen ~m~ woo~ rs~mn~ ~ am~ ~muoolly clooo ~~ 
S&y that ~s two mf'fm 1 Bim clmlmnn{i) id®nmv fur B!r® malty roo 1a8' armrt. Ha mighR 
say tha~ tOO woli'd 'God' in crdirnary languags is used to refer ro a (OOrticuiar while 
the word'goodnoos' is used io rsfm ~o a univer~l. How can ttls claim h~ a 
universal Md ~ ~rtioolar ~li'S identical oo un~rntood in any dsali' way? 
This objection again begs ttle question. I am noi claiming ~hai a partlcuiBir and BI 
oom Me universal m® U'le sa~rM ~hing; th~~ would! oo aoourd. I am claiming ~~ a 
word which is ordinali'ily THOUGHT OF as refsning to a universal, I.e., goodness. 
REALL v refers ro a pariicular. 
Here the critic can claim that he undersmnc:Js my point ttlai goodness Is ro bs 
mgardool as a paflfoolm, ~ $8)1 thm thiS ®®~ oot affed tile iam ti'lm goooness is 
ordinarily THOUGHT OF as a universal. How is hs to ~PSrtorrn ~e manf.all trick 
required? How I$ he ~o think ~t what oo ha® alw~ys regarded as a Ynlversal is 
really now a particulaw? What inReiUgibilliy OM theU'e oo in my claim? The critic 
might allow as too oowes~ too~obiiB\y that tth® iW@ mighll oo om~. OOii! l'low i$ ~ mak® 
ii intslligible m himself? 
This is a tremsnoously dlfflcun qoo~tl«lfi'l that mtngs in many issues ihat caft'bnot 
b3 dsaiR ~~l'l here. Wtaa~ i win ~ ro dtlJ I$ m~ to foriefly look Bli ~e ooncetoo fii 
inmUigibiiiiy itooii, ihsU1, ssconolly, i wm ~mami~s. again rooofty, how philooo~ical! 
ihoughi has iradution~lly rs~arOOd the relal~onshig» bs!Woon !)aii1icula1rn and! 
universals. This el{amination is long enough to msri~ its own sactnon. 
Universal And Pe~rtlculars And The Quss~ioD1 011nt~lligibili~y 
First lei us e)(amine Ute oonce~ og uninmlligibiiOty. It seenm ~o ms ~ai at least 
part of what it means to SiiilY X is unintelligible Is that){ is inconceivable. Perhaps 
that is the charge ttle critic wishes ~ make. Universals and ~rticulars are so far 
apart in our thought that it is Inconceivable that they should come together, that we 
should find that something ordinarily thought of as a universal is really a particular. 
How, though, are we ro understand the idea of inconceivability? What is it w 
someihing is inoonooivabte? Pemaps li means Uhat i1t is impossible to imagine the 
state of affairs ih~ is baing proposed. Is this what tlle critic means, tha~ It Is 
impossible ~ imagine what it is when goodness is identified with Deity? li the critic 
does mean this, then, I think is argument is w3ak. There are ptenty of states o~ 
affairs that are inoonooiwble in thi~ sense, ~ which we allow as possible states of 
affairs. For example, presumably there Is something it is mw to be a bat [Nagel 
1979]. A bat has oonseiousooss, an awareness of a particular iyps, but it seems 
impossible for us to conceive, except In a very haly sense, what this must be like. 
We do not conclude that it is impoosibJs that there is something it is like io be a bat 
because It is unimaginable. Similarly, Flatlands is a story oi a world o~ two 
dimensional beings who have their own two dimensional physics [Abbott 1950]. 
There may b9 such beings, but it is unimaginable to oonooiw of what it would be 
like to be such a two dimensional being. The believer In the identity of God and 
goodness can say it is unimaginable or inconceivable to know what it is like to be a 
Being who Is Goodness itself, but argue that at least one being in the universe 
. knows what it is Ilks, namely God Himself who is Goodness itself. It seems to me, 
therefore, that this type of uninteHigibility atiack fails. 
Another sense of unintelligibility is much stronger than the sense we have just 
discussed. If a states of affairs is logically Impossible, It is unintelligible. For 
example, it is logically Impossible that them is a round square, thus the state of 
affairs purpt]rtodly described by the phmse •round square' is unintelligible. As I say, 
this sense o~ uninmlllgibillty Is much stronger than the first sense. Doos the crttic 
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warn to ssy ttlB!li wi'lBl1i I prolQOOO - tha~ God! an~ goodnsss BJWS i@n~~ - is log&tally 
impossifols and ~us strongly uroime~legible? 
11 this is wh~t ths critic wan~ to sBJy I think the omJs is on him ttl provide the 
argumenw why ws should say ~t mAch an idant!~lcatlon is logically impossible. As 
I will show, the identification thesis has a long philosophicB!I ancestry. Such 
distinguis~eo1 ttlin~m as St Aquinas and St Anselm roth had no difficulty with ihe 
idea. How, then, would a critic show that the proposed ideniiflcailon is logically 
impossible? He COUJid say thai it iogiCBJIIy impossibi® ihai a u.mivei'SB!I should hs BJ 
particular. I agree, but this is not the Identification I propose; what I say is that 
something ordinarily thought of as a universal is actually a particular and that this 
particular Is the Divine being. 
So tt® Mti© may haw ~ ooll'btei'lt himseti wi~ too Jesser chargs o~ wOOJk 
unintelligibility, i.e., the ide~ that lie ideniifk:ation is unirooginable. For some, this 
type of charge would oo a strofi'Dg objection. For e1mmpte, old style verificationi®~ 
or logical positivists would ~ssumably see this as strongly counting agains~ my 
thesis. All meaningful propositions had, for tllem, to have some kind of experlentfa~ 
pay ofi. Thus, there Is something it is like to oo a bat, because one can SEE on, 
say, an E.E.G. scan movements corresponding to changes in the bafs stimuli. The 
ascription of consciousness to roam is meaningful because, at the end o1 the day, 
there is fur the perceiver some kind of sensory input Arguably propositions about 
God's consciousness have no corresponding sensory backing. Thus, for the logical 
positivim, the albeit weak unintelligibility of my thesis is equivalent to 
meaninglessness. 
Fortunately, logical positivism shoots itself in its own foot. It fails to meet Its own 
criterion of meaningfulness. Consequently there are few logical positMS1s about, 
although 1 would gueoo it still casts its shadow over metaphysical speculation. 
Metaphysics Is still regarded with a tinge of embarrassment. Thus one might still 
feel that weak unintelligibility is a significant objection because there is an 
inellminable mystery aoout the Identification I am proposing. My argument here will 
show that them is a similar inelimlnable mystery even when we talk of so-called 
straightforward cases where particulars merely exemplify universals. Bm before we 
look at this we need to clarify what it means to say thai God exemplifies goodness 
instead of literally baing Goodness. To show whm is meam oonsider what itt would 
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mean to say, 1oli' eltampts, ~hal~~ worship M~l'$, ij'}~ goo o1 wBJr. Whai is n to oJo ttiis? 
Wha~. in Mars, oo I value so much? Surely the answsli' Is I worship Mars booause I 
esteem martial values. I value fthe pailicq,glar indovidua~. Marn, bacause he 
exemplifies the universal or property of possessing martial values. In the same 
way, says ~he critic, when I worship God I am simply admiring ~e supreme way in 
which He instantiates the property o1 Goodness. If this is so, then God and 
Goodness are separable entities. God is afll indMdual, a particular- Goodness is 
the property or universal that He exemplifies. 
Maclagan makes this kind of point He says if God is seen as being one with the 
moral law to the extent that we believe "values in their being constitute the 
CHARACTER of God" then 'We shall be representing Him not as BEING the order 
of values but as fully and perfectly exemplifying it. He will be the Great Exemplar". 
[Maclagan 1961 p.88 my italics]. Again, the order of values will have ns own 
"characteristic mode of being, as something other than apart from Him, and it, 
rather than He, will be the new Deity." [p.89). 
This is the 'straightforward' sense that the critic presumably has no difficulty 
with. I hope to show that this sense is not as straightforward as the critic thinks. In 
Skepticism and Naturalism Strawson considers the case where we recognize X as 
falling under the concept of V, where we see that X exemplifies V -ness. He says 
this "is undoubtedly a type of natural happening, a subjective experience, 
something that occurs In nature, the Instantaneous recognition or seeing of 
sornethlng as such-and-such or as so-and-so." [Strawson 1985 p.82]. He uses 
various metaphors to try to convey the nature of this happening: "the visual 
experience is 'infused with' or 'Irradiated by' or 'soaked with the concept'." 1 
1. Strawson appears, by the way, to be a conceptualist as regards universals. Roughly this 
means he holds that, to usa a definition from Armstrong, "properties are, as it were, 
created by the ctassifylng mind: shadows cast on things by our predicates or concepts" 
(Armstrong 1989). This Is supported when Strawson says, Mlf (universals] are objects at all, 
they are objects of thought alone, not objects oncounterabls in nature or occurring in the 
natural world." [Strawson 1985 p. 70) With this background theory in mind, Straw son Is, 
with these various metaphors, trying to convey the nature of the connection between the 
particular object and the concept or universal they fall under. Straw son appears to be 
using the words 'concept' and 'object' as synonyms with 'universal' and 'particular' rather 
than In the Fregean sense that Dummet argues is distinguishable [Dummst 1978 
p.99-100J. 
Now, even i~ we a1re as ~sneroys wffil Slbi'~wson ~ pt>~sib!®, on® C!allllnoR l'n~!p 
bu~ ~eel ttoa~ ~h~ naruns o~ ih® oonnedion M$ noft ~n mtp!ain\001. Thsrs i$ ttlaft 
ce&iain air of mys~evy. Sftmwson has vaguely aJIIi.!d®d to bu~ no~ shown us how ~® 
connection bs!Woon concsp~ and objoot o!otiillls. This Is what I msSln when I say 
tha~ as regard$ accusations o~ my$tSiY my cri~c appsar$ to bs on ~Yal!y shaky 
ground. Even wher® he is most comrortable - where ~e ml~ is gg particularn 
exemplilyinQJ universals rattler ihan actually baing them - his case is jusft as 
"mysterious" as mine. This is even fl'U)re o~us when one iUms one's attention to 
more classical expllca~ions of the elush~S connections. Here 81 PDpt~lar theory is frla~ 
when two objects, perhaps distant in spaoo and time, exemplify the same 
universal, this sameness is the sameness o1 strict identity. Thus we ge~ a kind of 
weird pseudo-omnipresence where the same item instmtiates itsel~ in many 
different places at the same time. So my whl~e tablecloth's whiteness is numerically 
idsntiool to 1Im whimn®ss m a ~it® ~g ov m~ ills ~pali' moo w sigfB llh® 
Treaty of Versailles. I am not saying fthls doo~ not maka sense, just that if my 
theory is thrown ovemoordl in l:h® nam® @i mystery ®llminatkm I wam ~o fake a mw 
other theories down with me. 
Let us at this juncture look a littfe more closely at the concept that my criti~ 
claim ro find YnintelligibW, e.g., the Udaa m universals being identical with 
particulars. I will show ~hat this idea, far from being at the edge of credibility, is, in 
fact, in other areas, a mainstream philosophic theory. It is not unintelligible; It is 
conceptual commonplace. Them m, in other words, at leam one traditional theory 
of universals which claims that there Is a literal Identification of universal and 
particular. 
The distinction between substance anol attribute has been very influential: 
things (subs1ances) have properties or attributes. (I am hem using 
substance\attribute language in the sense used by the British Empiricist tradition, 
not in the more traditional Aristotelian sense, where so..oolled prim~ suootanoos 
are individuals such as Socrates or a horse [Woolhouse 1993 p. 7~9 Lowe 1995 p. 
67 -72]). The thing that has these propJrties can oontinue to exist even when some 
of the attributes ar~ removed unteoo the attributes are not aooidel"rtal bm essential. 
Thus ihe pen I am using at the moment continues to be even though it Is slowly 
losing the property of possessing ink. It will still exist, evan when the ink runs out 
The property of having ink is an accidental or non-essential property. Because 
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things can loss certairt ~opsmes rou~ still oontii'ltns ro e>ti~. a d0$tln~oli'n oo~ssn 
~ing anoi propsny seems 1oroool upon u~. Howevev-, ihls distinction is not? alw~ys 
rsoogni~ed as !sgitima~e. I~ subsflarn:s is sssn as the mews supp!)ller o~ propsny, W 
seems to bs un!mowable bsoouse arguably only pro~llies have causal powern. In 
Locke's ~amous phrase, subsmnce becomes suootwawm and is "something 1 know 
not whar (Locke 1961 Bk2 Chapt 23]. With tftlis kind o~ difficulty in mind, many 
philosophers mfuse to acoopt that there is any Mal distinction between suootmoo 
and attlibute(s). Roughly, they maintain that there are only attributes. A particular . 
thing is, to use Armstrong's helpful description, m "bundle of universals". uhere is 
no mysterious substratum that has properties, there are only properties and the 
causal powers they possess. This, they argue, is all we really need to make sense 
of the world [Armstrong 1989 p.59-74]. 
The analogy with my thesis is omoous. With God as rregards Goodne~ them ~ 
no distinction between suootanoo and attribute. God IS Goodness, rather than GOO 
HAS Goodness. If the Bundles of Universals Theory Is intelligible (aooll think it is), 
then surely my theory also is intelligible. 
Of course, the elimination of the substance\attrlbute distinction brings with it 
many problems (but then again so does the aooeptaooe of the distinction). These 
difficulties are discussed admirably by Armstrong [1989]. 1 will look briefly at two 
criticisms of the Bundles of Universals Theory and show how, in the case of the 
Divine Being, these problems do not apply. 
The first problem with the elimination uf the substance-attribute distinction is 
that Leibnlz's Law of the Identity of the lndiscemlbles becomes, it seems, 
necessarily true. If particulars am just bundles of universals. then, different 
particulars must contain at least one different universal. However, it seems a 
matter of logical possibility that there may be two particulars which are qualitively 
completely Identical. This should, however, be logically Impossible. Hence the 
problem arises. 
This problem does not apply to my theory for two reasons. First, my theory is 
not a general one: it maintains that. in the case of the Divine Being, God and 
Goodness are identical. In fact, I rather doubt whether a theist would·want to apply 
the elimination of substance and attribute generally. One of the motivations behind 
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the eliminaiions in it!® case of God is ro show how Ynlike fthe rm o~ creation He Is. 
Secondly, the problem does not Bli'ise ior my theory because it is a matter o~ logical 
necessity ~ai ~ere b3 only ons Go«)). If, parr impos$ibJe, there w€lr® iwo Gods, ihen 
each would have to depsnd on the oiher qor the traditional ar&ribmes of the divinity 
ro roe preservoo. But this is aoowd; Goo cannoft depend on anothef ro bs the Being 
He is. If He does, He is not God. (See Ward 1982 p.13-14]. 
A second problem which is so difficult for the bundles o~ universals view is the 
problem of property loss. As we will see, this problem is actually a benefit for my 
theory. If a thing just IS its properties, ihen it appears that none of the properties 
can be lost without the demise of that particular individual. If W just IS properties X 
V Z, then W cannot lose X, V or Z without ceasing to be W. This goes against 
intuition. This pen I am at present using is not changing its identity as I write, but it 
must bs according to the Bundles of Universals Theoli)l, because tt is losing, at 
each moment, the property of possessing a certain mass of ink. Arguably, 
therefore, substanoo-attribute language enables us to pick out and identify certain 
indMduals while they are in the oourse of change. 
What othetWise seems anti-intuitive, in my theory becomes a positive boon 
because the consequence of this consideration for my thesis is that God's 
Goodness becomes something He cannot lose. Furthermore, If God's existence is 
logically necessary (a doctrine I agree with, but cannot argue for here), His 
Goodness Is logically necessary. If God IS Goodness and God Is necessary, then, 
Goodness must be necessary too. 
What about God's other attributes, e.g., His omnipotence, His 
omnlpresence •.. etc.? It was a doctrine of scholastic philosophy that God was not 
only Identical with His Goodness, but was also Identical with all His other 
characteristics (See Mann 1983]. I will not be defending this doCtrine. I want to say 
that God's Goodness is necessary and immutable, but not that God is immutable in 
every aspect. If God is literally identical with everyone one of His aspects, it seems 
to follow that God cannot change in any respect whatever. If God IS omnipotence, 
then He cannot cease to be omnipotent without ceasing to be. Again if God IS joy 
He cannot cease to be joy without ceasing to be. How, then, can He be unhappy? 
How can He respond to creation? This unchanging God seems to be unlike tho 
God of Scrtpture who does · become unhappy with creation and loses His 
0 
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omnipotence ro bs become incarnate. In tile nem chap~er, 1 will oofend only the 
immutability o1 Goo's Goodness. I will try io show how we need not go as far as ~s 
scholastics did!. 
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As I inijmateOJ in ttle ia~ ch~toJ~eu-, i am goinQ '00 a&'g)YS ror a iim~oo nol!Hon o? 
immumfoili~. To tha~ end, is~ me spell ow two sense~ o~ immrnabiUiy. Fir~ ihs 
scholastic notion, which i reject 
God cannot change in any real respect whatsoovau-. By "real resP®cll" 1 mean 
~o distinguish between real change and apparem change, which is now more 
popularly known as a Cambridge change. A Cambridge change occurs when a 
certain type of predicate is true of a subject at one tiroo, but not at another. For 
example, the predicate "baing believed in by Smith .. and then, after a religious 
crisis, "not being believed in by Smith" can be true of God at different times without 
any change occurring in God. Generally a real change oocurs in a subject when a 
non-relational predicate is true of then not true of that subject. For example, a real, 
non-Cambridge change ooours when the non-relational predicate, "is not wall-
paperecr is pmdicable og my iron~ bedroom ~and then, ®ubseqoont ttl much wifely 
coaxing, the predicate, "is wallpapered" becomes (alas!) true. 
Now, as I haw said, I reject this strong understanding of what it means to say 
God is immutable. In fact, It is such a strong notion that It is not immediately 
obvious exactly why one would want to believe it to be true. The scholastics 
thought, for reasons I will give later, that they were doing justice to the idea that 
God Is perfect. However, let us, for the moment, concentrate our attention on the 
understanding of Immutability that I do accept. 
Basically my position is that God is immutable in his moral characteristics, in His 
being Goodness itself. Let us consider what this means. Consider the statement 
that God is merciful. This Is an aspect of what It is to be Goodness Itself. Now God 
Is merciful and Immutable In this characteristic, so He will always be merciful, that 
is, He will always show mercy to those that ask for it. God will never become 
ruthless, because he is immutably meroiful. 
Before we look at the natum of God's moral immutability in mom detail, let us 
look at a different way in which various types of change can be understood. This 
will bring out. from a slightly different angle, the difference between my thesis and 
traditional scholastic doctrine. 
Aquinas makes a distinction between two different types of change that can 
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occur. Furs~. an individu~l can underg() an oocndenilal ch:ange. A useful 12mam~e o~ 
ihis l\IP3 of change is given roy Brian Davie$ [Davies 1992 pAS]. A oow can roo 
frisky and energetic one Ci1ay and Jm:y and lethargic ~e neXi - the cow chaJngss, oo~ 
nevertheless ii continues io bs ih® same individual. The cow may have lost Bl 
propsrty and gained another, but its survival as the same indMdual was neyau- in 
doubt There has, to use scholastic language, only been a change of accid0nts or 
accidenta~ properties. 
There is, however, a much more drastic ~ps of change that can occur. This 
Aquinas calls a substantial change. For example, the cow might die- in this case 
the cow ceases to exist as a cow and becomes a corpse. Now there are, of course, 
borderline cases where it is difficult to decide whether a substantial or accidental 
change has occurred. Locke would have clairood that if an Individual were to lose 
his memory, then a suootantial change would. haw tatum place [Locke 1961 
2,27 ,9]. Others claim that such a loss would roo no threat to the Identity of a 
person; In other words, memory loss woold oonstitute an accidental change. The 
borderline is a little hazy; nevertheless, I think it is clear enough to be useful. 
How does this distinction apply to God? Aquinas denies that It does. He 
maintained, in full scholastic dress, that neither substantial, nor accidental change 
applied to God (Davies 1992 p.51]. Deity, for Aquinas, possessed no accidental 
properties at all. Substantial change was also impossible because God is eternal; 
nothing can make Him cease to be. 
Now I want to discuss how much of this I agree with and how much I disagree 
with. First, I want to make clear in what sense I want to say God is immutable and 
then look at a sense in which I think He is mutable. As I have already said, I want 
to say that God is Immutable in His being Goodness itself. 
A Digression Concerning God's Moral Immutability 
God's moral Immutability can be looked upon as a logical consequence of the 
Divine essence's Identity with Goodness. If God's essence is quantltively identical 
with Goodness and If God's existence is necessary, then it follows thaf God cannot 
cease being Goodness itself without ceasing to be. But God's existence is 
necessary, so this is not a possibility. More formally we might put It like this: let D 
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oo Divine essence BJutc11ei G bs Goodness. Now my ii'bssis says 10 is ~ V®UV ~ms 
ttling as G. So i1 G ceases, ~hen oo doos D. How~v®r, Dis nscessary, so Gi is also. 
Now one migh~ seek some clai'liica\'lon her~. Is it possible ior GoOO!lle~ ro 
chang®, m~r ~M ooaoo to bs? Tlhis, I ~~n~ is a question aiOO~ ttls nartrum ~ 
Goodness, and, ~hererore, a que~ion aoout ~he natur€1 of Goo's essenoo. The 
quesf!i()ro SJitimately oome$ dow~~ whether, iD'!l the CBJSS o~ Goodness, aooidentaU . 
change, rather than substaniial change can ooom. Is ihere, In other words, a 
further distinction in the substantial oore o~ God between substance and accident? 
Now substantial change in Goodness is not possible because this is equivalent to 
ceasing to bs. (That is what substantial changs amounts to in the case o~ God. For 
Aquinas, when a cow underwent substantial change there was not literal · 
annihDiation, sinoo ~her~ w~ matter ~aft survived fu9 cow's dsath, root this WM root 
enough to ensure the survival of the same indlviduml. I~ was enough for you to oo 
able to say, "This Is the oorpse ci · the oow llait died." However GOO is not 
composed of matter. Therefore, if substantial change were iO ooour them would be 
annihilation.). Is aoo!dental change possible in the case o~ Gooonoos? As I say, 
this is a question about the nature of Goodness and oonsequently a question about 
God's essence. 
This question can be viewed as asking whether Goodness is simple or oomptex; 
wheiher, tila~ is, Goodness is a unity, or whether ii can be dMded into parts. If 
Goodness is simple a prima facie case can be made out for supposing that it is 
incapable of change, since any change would be a substantial change, a ceasing 
to be, which, in the case of God, is impossible; we are assuming He Is necessary 
being. If Goodness Is complex, again a prima facie case can be made out; this time 
claiming that change is possible. Now I want to say that Goodness m oomplex, that 
It can be viewed as having difmmnt pa~. or, as I pmfer to say, as~.-But I aloo 
want to say that God's essence, which Is Goodness itself, is immutable, so I am, at 
least on the face of It, involved in a contradiction. How are we to understand God's 
Goodness such that It Is complex, but also ~rfeetly Immutable? 
My mode~ of GOO's asoontial nature that enables footh oomp!sxity IMd 
immutability is vaguely analogous ~o Leibni:ts monads. Lelbnl~ wanted his monad~ 
io ns simple and yet mfloott mulilpliciiy; he wanted diversity in simplicity. Thus what 
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. Let me outline B~ preliminary d®finitlon. X Is 81n aspact and not a part when )( ha~s 
oo inds~rndslllt ®ltis~noo fi"om qoo wh~~- Thus tJ1 SlOOrk p~yg is a pail of an engine, 
bu~ the running of the engine is only an aspoot. Might n oo the case ~hat Goodness 
can be 'dMood' inro aspeeis o~ one ttting? 
Let me try and make this a little more concrete. Goodness is oomplex, but still 
one thing because n has aspects such as Mercy and Jumiee. Perhaps Goodness is 
Love and Mercy and Justice are two aspects of this unity. This can be made 
plausible by reference to the claim made by many writers that Goodness or 
Morality is unified or identical with a single principle [See Sumner 1992 for a 
discussion of what this single principle must be like]. In the case of my theory, this 
single principle i~ love. Jonathan F!erooor, ~r example, claims that all morality is 
derivable from love [Fletcher 1966]. I would claim, tentatively, that Mercy flows 
from Love, as does Justice, as does Forgiveness. Love Is the fulfilment of the law. 
No aspect of Love can be intelligible as a separate entity. Justice beoomes 
something else if it is without Love; Justice cannot survive without Love; Love 
cannot survive without Justloo. 
One might ask here, "If there is a mutual dependence between the whole (Love) 
and the aspect (Justice), what real distinction Is there between whole and aspect? 
Why is one the whole and the other the aspect and not the other way round?" The 
answer to this constitutes the vaguely Leibnlzlan ancestry of my position. 
For leibnlz, individual subjects oontalned all their predicates. He tries to explain 
this, " ... the subject term must always Include the predicate term in such a way that 
anyone who understands perfectly the ooncept of the subject will also know that 
the predicate pertains to it. This being premised, we can say it is the nature of an 
Individual substance or complete being to have a concept so oomplete that It is 
sufficient to make us understand and deduce from it all the predicates of the 
subject to which the concept is attributed."[Woolhouse 1993 p.56-57]. It seems to 
me that here Is Leibniz Is claiming that individuation relies on deduction. So all 
predicates not deducible from.the oomptete ooncept of an Individual substance am, 
for that very reason, not part of that indMduat. Thus Individuals can be picked out 
and. 'parcelled up' by deduCtion or understanding. 
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I~ is sumilar with my mOOJei o~ God's Goodness. li Oils haol a oom~e~® 
undersmr~ding o~ Low, ont?J would oo able to deduce w~a~ were a!llpscts of God'~ 
ssoonoo. I~ may ooi ~liow ~h~~ ~ on~ w~r® ira ~ss~ion o? a complet® 
understanding o~ aut aspect that one woulo1 be able to come into Bl comptew 
understanding of the whole. Thus the primacy of U>ve is esmblishsd. It is the whole 
of which others are aspects. Goo's essenoo, ws can say, is Individuated and ifls 
aspects picked out by the iogic of love. 
These I realize do not constitute a complete argument; I am suggesting a line of 
understanding that I think deserves some consideration. later I will return to this 
discussion when I discuss the nature of the God's Goodness and the idea that 
Goodness is Love. 
Thomas Morris and! the Mutability of God 
Before I go on and more fully explore the reasons the scholastics had for trying 
to maintain God's absolute immutability, I will look at one way in which a modern 
writer has sought to preserve the scholastic sense of strong immutablity in the faoo 
of criticisms such as I give in the next paragraph. 
Consider the story of Noah. GOO, according to Scripture, looks down on the 
earth, sees the wickedness of men, regrets making them and so decides to destroy 
them and start afresh. This appears to amount to something like this: God created 
man, intending them to live a natural span of years (originally with Adam and Eve, 
He intended immortality), but then, in response to human wickedness He changes 
His mind and destroys them Instead. This, I believe, is a clear example of God 
changing His mind in response to human behaviour. This mutability, this ability to 
change in response to new circumstances is, an essential part of a concept of a 
Christian God (although, as we shall see. the scholastics thought that God did 
respond and did act, but, paradoxically, remained unchanging). Scripture, of 
course, Is full of examples of God responding to His mutable, constantly changing 
creation. 
But Thomas Morris asks this question, "Why can't i'i: always and immemorially 
have boon tOO case that God intel'lOO to do A if B arises, or C if D oomes about? 
- 40 ~ 
Th!s wo~Aid ~ fully oom~ijbls wiftr\ an in~mm~Ci1 mBldifi'l@ o~ ihooo pgssag®s which 
seem ~o poiirny GOO as c~ngin~ !his mind in response ro human B~divity as 
situaijons dew lop." [p.89 Mori'iS 1987]. By 'immsmmlal' Morris msans i3l prop3ny 
ihrat an indlvidu~l has always had 2nd neveu- bsg~n ro hav®. 
Moms ho~ ihm l!ilf ihis mow oo ~n atilow Gnd li'eal responsiveness ro His 
craa~Ui·es, but avoid the ides o1 Gool changing Hie mind in any way (and ~hus 
preserve God's a~olme lmmtrtsbiUty). ~ holClS ro show ~i he ~'las boon 
unsuccessfUJI. 
Now, firsft o~ all, Morris' use of the if·clause in the above quotation appears to 
put him in line with an increasing group of philosophers and ttlsologians who 
believe that given real human rreedom, in tile sense oi liberty o1 indifference as 
well as spontaneity, ths inavitabl® oonsequsnoo i~ thBtft God cannoft foreknow tile 
future [see, for e)(ample, Ward i 982 p-130-131, Lucas 1989]. I~ God does have 
iniallibfs and complete fomknowtooge (henceforth ICF), then ift 6$ idle ro !Pfesen1t 
future contingencies in disjunctive\subjunctive form, i.s., If A arises ow B comes 
about From tile Divine perspective, If Goo has ICF. only one eveni will oocur and, 
consequently, the natural way of presenting God's intentions would be, "Because 
A will occur God! intends B." Sinoo Morris does ~Use the if-clause he seams to 
believe in a certain openness of future contingents. let us, therefore, assume, for 
ihs sake of this argument, ihat God doe$ not possess ICF. 
Assume that Jill knows Jaqk to be selfish. Now assume that Jill believes, on the 
basis of her knowledge of Jack's character, that in a certain situation, Jack would 
respond in manner A (e.g. do the wrong thing). Now Jill might intend B because of 
the expected A. Because the future is open it Is at least possible that Jack will do 
the une)(pected C (e.g. do the right thing), so Jill's expectations about the future 
only oount as belief; at the mas1!, it is defeasible knowledge [Lucas 1989 
p.121-122]. let us assume that Jill draws up a different plan of action D just in case 
Jack does the surprising or unexpected C. For example, Jill might think to herself, 
"If Jack does the right thing (unlikely because of his character) I will not punish 
him.'' 
So we have a siiuation where Jill intends to do fj (e.g. ro punish Jack). It is an 
intention because the probablliiy thai Jack will do the wrong thing Is very high. 
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lm~~ins lthm JBlck is ~ oom[OOisiv~ iiBJr. JiW(S minol is, so ~o s~~~. ss~ em S, ols~~s 
the more shadowy, oock-oi-min~-plan ro olo D i~ J~c~ o!oos c. ~uoo Jill BJSsi~n~ 
very little prooo~i!iiy to this romingsncy i~ hBJrdfy acV"uceves ths s~rus o~ an in~roijon. 
Let us assuroo tha~ Jac~ oon1ounds S>tp3~tlons ~m~ ac1uBJIIy dn~s ths righft 
fuing, whB~t i"BBJ~ns? . Ws!l, Ji~l roulo1 roturdy pm~ on will oor oi'igirl!Ell irntsraRiol1l 
and punish J~ack, or shs coul¢dl chan@e her mind and noft r;runish him. Now this is a 
ooau1gs o~ mond surud oo~ j~.a~ a "s~imr' ~S®Wd 11M@ ®q~~ ~Blns o? BJdioD'll, lOmd~iy 
bscause Jill nevsll' assumed ttusy ware squal. Shs b®llsvsd fui)lt A would ooouB" an@ 
so inwndel] B; 1lhe lilwlihooo'l o~ ~a right set oi cirw~noos ~~ iow its uss wsre 
e){trsmely high, but the surprising occurs and Jill changes her mind. 
Oi course ihis gC®s owu a~l trw tlms. I inwnd ita o'Ji'Uvs my CE~r fco worn, even ihough 
I reaiiEs I mus~ fnave 21 diWarsna plano~ aeijon iiI~ doss not wo~. li it w®r0, ~y. BJ 
S!mda my Intentions might ~ com(Oietsly olms~@n~l 
Now on® mi~h~ o~~ ~oot ~ soooowy ooc~-{)~-mind-~D'll ~n oourn~ as afl1l 
lmsntton: one mn~M ~ll ~a~ at loo.s~ Jm unf!enols to oo D IF too LHnli~siy C ooours. Is 
this acospmfol®? I~ may ta3 ~e ~oo ~Dla~ Rh® too~tr on w~l{;h I am iy~~ wm oom 
in~o flames. Jg i~ were ro oo so I would probably dooss ij IJI!iij') waier. I haY® a 
possilille plaln o~ at~n W ~s ownwlllsiming!y unti~s!v wsrs ro OmAII', rooft ~ sssms 
hardly crsdirrns fua~ ~$ I wvlw I h~vs ths lnwnllion w douse my typing paiJlSr witt~ 
wawr. My onlteraV!orJ, a~~ momsn~ iS to csmy on lilfpi~; ~ W()GJ!d CMI19® mv mind W 
spontaneous oombusftion were to ooour. lntsmions are in~mBt~sly conoocwo wiih 
the s>tpa~ijo~ns og ~he su~ct 
How does all this mlaw to God? My oomemton is ihis: i~ God does no~ have 
ICF. flfnsn Hs ~ oouu on~ SISSi~fl1l ~~~~$ iO iL!l\b!Am oomt~ere~. Gt)d my~ halve 
a ss~ o~ sxps~ticms SJOOL!t rtls ~Mrum u~n wrtlch His inwn~ns W® ·i'oUJndsd, bm, 
likra Jill, His e>t~tl«>ns oon bs oonrotnnood. GOO ~n haw ~® immemmi~l 
propai'ly o~ dmwin@ u~ dmeren~ p!cms oi ~dion, I.e., He can "intand" A Jg ~ ~riss$, 
or C i1 DOOm®$ ~OOMt C=bW®V®rr, D MIGh~ llJ3 vsuy ~.mli~l~. S©l C mi@hft rfl@~ ~Chi®V® 
tOO s~rus o~ an imsVl~mt GOO wouki'l, Qb1~s~r®, moli'® lQ)ro~li'iy i!llWno1 A. li ~s 
unl!~sly D wsm i«» oom® aroo~ Gmi1 wm.aki1 dlSJnQJs his mind ili1 WSSl000$6 m ~® 
surprising ci~cumGmnces. 
Morris' 8000~11'1~ sssms ro ~ ~s~ol on Bl bs~is~ ~a~ Blil ru~tBr® oonfffin~sn~ ~ws 
eq~Jally li~ely cmd ~a~. ~l'tswe?ore, ~® immlrtBlbin~ og Gool is presewvool fose21uoo H® 
always intsno1ed ( eqooily) wha~sverr He roes irn rssponse ro ~s cirrcumsmnces ~a~ 
arise. This seems~ mis~ke. Given ~ha~ God doos n~ have ICF, and given ttlat no~ 
aH 1uturs contingencis~ havs S«:aYfJll li~l!hood, ~hsn Divine changes o~ mind S®Sm 
possible. Morris has not prssei'Ved God's immu~billey. 
Now I rooli~® my r®~lf to M\OITi® dep®~ tnl@n ilOO a~um~on ~oo~ Goo 00$ 
not havs ICF. This is m oontemiou3 point Ths id3a that God does hBlV® ICF is "~U'l? 
much more secure in Christlan thin~ng iU'bm ~® «rocMne oi a~lu~s immUiabiliiy. 
All I can do here is re1er the reader to the aoooun~ Charles Ha~home gives o1 
Pierce's unm~nding o1 the metBJphysic o~ lQDSSib!liiy (sse Creei198G]. 
So li'lOW i (a~ !al$ftl) ioo~ Bl~ ib1s oooo~lllic rB~iroon~l® ~i"durod iOO i~a lth~ft G~@ i~ 
absoluwly immuftabl®. B~i~lly ~31/'S are thms ~mom oohinlO] asssn~ to th® 
oo©trin®. I will !oo~ et~ sa~~Pl in rum Btmj ttoo rum my Blil®rniDrn ~ my r~S2$(j)f\l$ fuli' 
ihslw rajactkm. 
ThiS main reason bshind ioo bslisf in aoooMs IOOvin® lmm!JiSJbiiKy Is thQR ttl® 
scholssakm L!SOO Bl broo~ly Arisrow~ian und®rsmnding of D®liy. Foli' Aqu.!lnas, GOO ~ 
oomple\l!Siy ~D; H® 1$ Ssin~ and! oo~ bsoominc: ~~re ~ no p!)~~ialiKy in ~om 
whmsoovsr. All the~ &r~ dlmsrsn~ w2ys o~ sayi~ the same ~In~. The bam way ~o 
urnl3rsf1Elool ii1is i«Bl of oom~i® ~Bill!Uy · is 'ID oon~loor Blfil objem ~Mhich Is no~ 
completely aciual (which I$ everytilJng non-D!vioo). A man, for sJtamp!s Is aoru~l 
bsoouss hs eltl~w. ~i he is no~ oom~ly acrua11 bsooYOO h~ Is no~ all thaR h® 
could bs. He ooulcil, ~or eJtample, acqulr® more !mow~~s or acquire a nsw ~1@11. 
Ths m~m ~15. fire o~®li' W@~. · ~n~~. Thi® ~tt®mlial~ is his onoomjpi3f!® a~~. 
This dooo noi nwan, by the wB~y, fuai W the m~n wsm to boooms B~ll fua~ IR W®i'® 
~SSD~® filr ~im ~«> ~OOm® rt® WOlYidl ~Dl OOid $(}1'00 ednd oi OOJ~IW!®IiiOO (Oft' ~~ 
with Goo; ~ only moons ~~ woUJI!dl Kl$ a 103~ man. M~n Is oo~ ~h® fti~nti1 oi ~In~ 
ihaft hM ~hs rro~en~~llty i©J ooooms ~s Goo1 !s. Cor~sk2®rr, ~v. an alarm c!oo~ ~~~ 
lackoo nothlnp;; that w~ oom(Oiewtv ~~ya!. WoUJio1 trli$ rooan ina~~ al~mll cloo~ 
OOIYio'l ~Y c~ ~~? 01 ootYrns n@ii c~~ ~yin~ P3Dil~~n ~ no~® ~oo of 
!)Otsnijaliiy iha~ ihe BJia~rm cloo~ l~c~ sioo® ~~ying chess 0$ no~ 2 s!(iil ila~ is tJEJil o~ 
even ~e potenijffil og an a!arm clock. Ia Is no~. oo to S[OSB!~. in i~s job dascrlpijon. An 
alarm clock 'only' has ~o ~eU the tims p3i'Vecily and always wake you up ano1 never 
break down ... ero. ~o oo an alarm ctoo~ th~~ wa~ oomple~ely amual. ~ut always iw 
comple~e actuality would ba qualified or limited by i~ ~ing an alamn c!ock; ttl® 
maximum perfection it can possess is oomp!ete a~liiy as an alai111 clock. 
Now God is oompletely acrual, sinoo He lacks nothing that He ooutd have, or 
rather is everything He oou!d Rw. But GOO's oom~ie actuality is differen~ from any 
creature's because, as we have just seen, any creature's possible complete 
actuality is always limited by the typs of being it is. We cannot accuse an alarm 
clock o1 the impsrfection or lack of chess playing skill, since this skill is not pail of 
its actual or potential nature. But W GOO wem m lack the ability to Play chess, we 
would have legntimats catYs~ for complaint God doos no~ ~~w the type o'i naturs 
that limit'J Him or confines Him. His fooing all ihm He oould oo is oi a totally differen~ 
order than a mere man being all ~hat he oould be. 
let us look at the way Aquinas expmssoo these thoughts. First, in talking about 
God's perfection he says this, " ... God Is supremely actual, and thU$ supremely 
perfect, sinoo perfection mean$ achieved, reaii~ool. lacking nothing one's particular 
mode of perfection requires." Next he writes this, "Moreover, his perfection is allo 
embracing: the diverne (and sometimes opposed) perfections of creaturoo ail prno 
exist united in God, wiihoUi detriment to his simplicity ... [Aquinas 1989 1,1,4,2 p. 
16-17]. So God lacks nothing His "particular mode of perfection requires," but thl$ 
Is not limiting sinoo His particular mode of perfection is all-embracing. 
Now God does not possess these perfections In the way that His creatures 
possess them: "'n God, then, the first active cause of everything, all perfections 
pre-exist in the most realized way." 
Now 100 only lhing left that I cannot find fully explained by Aquinas (nor by any 
of his commentators) is whether Goo's all-embracing perfection is meant to 
include, not only all creaturely perfection, but, also, all oonootvabte perfection. I~ 
Aquinas, in other words, following, Anselm for whom God is that than which no 
greater can rae oonoolvad? As we shall see ~ter, lhls is an Important point. Sloos ~ 
can find no absolumly clear guidanoo I will assume Aquinas does rooan to say ttlat 
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God's psri®d B~li-smbmcingnsss is aooo!LOOiy aU-inclusive in ij'je sense o~ 
embracing li~rally all ooncsiwbl® pak1ootnon. Ce~inly sYch an assumption sssms 
to bs in ths spdrit o1 wha~ Aq~inas claims: i~ I oon oonooive o~ aJ pariscticn~ thalt God! 
does not have, at least prima ~acis, it appears to limit God anol yet AquinSJs says, 
"God .. .is unliml~d and pariect" [1. ~ ,7, i p. 20]. H~ra Aquinas ma~s ift ctsali' he is 
not talking oi spatial unlimi~ness. He must, thereiore, bs thinking or a logical 
unlimitedness: in logical spaoo, Goo is unlimited. Thus it seems to ms to bs a safe 
oonjeciurs tila~ Aquinas warned God's pel1eci00n io b® aU-embracing in ihe sense I 
have defined.· 
Of course, this doctrine can lead to some pretty odd conclusions. Since God 
contains all creaturely pariection ihere must bs a sense in which He is the perfect 
wife, tadpole, tree ... atc. Davies comments, "God contains in himself all the 
psn1ootions o~ hi$ creattYroo ~JJndl i® fd'leU®ioll'® pro~riy calioo pstrioot." [Davi~s 1992 
p. 82]. The oddness of this ooncluslon is mitigated by Aquinas' insistence that God 
does oot posseoo sooh perfections on ihe mods ihsy are ®)(hibiieoJ in ihe created 
object. Thus God does not look like ill® most peiioot tadpole or the most parted 
OOUJSS [p. 82]. 
However, this is by the way. The main thing is ro see the basic Thomist point 
that God is completely actual In the sense that He contains within Himself all 
perfection. Now the relationship between this understanding of the pinnacle of 
perfection and! the dOOtrine of absolute immutability is clear. If God is completely 
actual, in the sense defined, any change must be a change for the worse. At least 
that seems to be the implication. The argument might go something like this: let 
God possess literally all perfection. Now If He changes He either remains 
absolutely the same or He doos not. If He remains the same He hWi not changed. 
If He does not He must have either changed to being more perfect or to being less 
perfect. Mom perfedion than literally all perfectiOn is impossible, so He must have 
become less than He was before; He has changed for the worse. (This appears to 
be the reasoning behind Socrates' challenges to Cebes In The Republic. We will 
be looking more closely at Plato's lnftuenoo later on.) 
Now I~ seems to me that this argument is, as li stands, Invalid unless 
psffection is taken in an extremely broad sense. It cannot mean just moral 
perfection, for example. I will use an analogy to bear out my point Consider that X 
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is ~ha mos~ morally psniem man imaginabl~ ~mol al~o has ~s oonam o1 aJnlimood 
powew (so tha~ no one CBin 1oroo him to change from his mora~ psriedioo). Can 
such a parson change? Of courroo he can. He could move his a~rm or leg. Such 
changes could be morally indifferent and therefore there would be no compromise 
to his moral perfection. How is the man able to change without threat to h~ moral 
perfection? He is able to change because there is more to the man than the sum o1 
his moral perfection. He is, therefore, able ro change in regard ~o some predicate 
that is adiophorlc. Now Aquinas does not want to say that God's perfection is just 
moral perfection. It seems therefore possible for God to do something adiophorie. 
But if we, as Aquinas apparently wants us to, understand perfection in a much 
broader sense, then we can see why any change becomes a change for the worse. 
Let us consider our morally perfeei man again. Imagine that he is perfect in 
every oonooiw.ble way. Now can he change? can h0 perform some action that ~ 
neutral as regards his perfection? The answer now seems that he cannot. He 
cannot, say, move his arm since it is in the perfect position. (Forgive the 
strangeness of this thought experiment!). Aquinas (and Plato) appear to b8 forced 
to say something like this about God. His perfection is so complete and inclusive 
and applies to every predicate predicable of Him that He cannot change wi1hout 
detriment to His perfection. God cannot change neutrally since He is no more than 
the sum of his perfections: every aspect, every part, every thought is perfect. Thus 
any change is necessarily a change for the worse. 
I don't think this point is always appreciated. Richard Gale, for example, says, "it 
is implausible to assume that any change in God is for the worse; it might have a 
neutral outcome." [Gale 1991 p.95]. It is implausible, but only if we separate the 
idea of God's immutability from the Idea that God is completely actual in the Divine 
all-inclusive sense. 
So the first strand of reasoning behind the scholastic dootrine of absolute 
immutability is a picture of God's perfection which is bound up with the idea of His 
complete actuality. 
The second strand is bound up with the essentially Aristotelian argument for the 
existence of God, Aquinas' Prima Vta- the First Way. The argument goes {roughly) 
like this: all changing things am changed by· something else. So if X is changing 
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~srs musi oo soms ~in~ V ~Bl~ ~usoo i~ to ch~nt}s. Is V cl'lan~inQ .ow noft? if i~ is 
changing ~hen i~ mu~ hBJv~ bsen chBJngoo roy Z. I~ it is no~ ctiBJnginQ we have 
D"eached ihs end o~ fue causa! sewies and we hBivs, roy dsgjnijkm of fthe argumsnft, 
an unchan~ing changer. Aqlninas assuroos thai ~his uncll~ngin~ ch~nger is GOO. I~ 
we wani w m~~ 1in~l sensa o~ the worl~ we hav® io pnsad~w tU'ls Siti~i®noo o1 
somsfuing tlla~ Is absoluRely lmmullabls. If God changed in any w2y we would have 
a change tl'lat nesdsd ~o las Sitplainsd and ihus would no~ haw reached a gJnal, 
uliimaae~ SBJilit'lliyin~ Slt~nalmtm. A~ lsa®~ h~ is whBJft ~ mgYm~mi claim~ [Sse 
Ward 1 982 p.1-23 for a good rss~atsmsm o~ this argument]. 
The third strand of reSJsoning bshind the dootrins og immutabiiey is oound up 
with the ldsa thai Goo is, in some senS@, timeless. However, it seems iO ms that, 
mo~ 10Tievu ~n not tile ground$ goy i:mlievi~ i111 ~·~ llfii"i1Siessness haw lml® to 
do witll ~hs reasons Vor ooll0ving in His immma~m~y. Th® ~~~~ irn ~® tim~ssnsoo 
of Gool sssrM to me ~© h&V® oosn gorwawaoo as ~ WQlf og anrowin~ ~oo hiJlman 
ac~on in ihs ?ace o~ the ooc\trine thai Goo hoo ICF (a!Rhoug~ In thi$ ~ss. strimly 
$psaron~. GOO ~~~ noft ~~w lltbm~ow!s~, m~rr M® h~ ibii'OOI®oo ~owlsd~). 
So. alfuough ~he ~o iooas 81~ rr~aiOO, 1 am nm {lloin~ io ml~ a loft aoouft tt~s 
doctrine og iimsiassn®Ss. lUll any CSJSS, Blny pirO~PSrr o'lloooo~ion W@Uid w~ m® Roo ~r 
1rom the central oonooms o~ this ~hssis. 
I will now ii'Y ro show why I !Oslisw ~~oo ~uiT"D~tions ~r ll!hs Rwlis~ In Goo's 
immumbilily are wea!(. I will, in the gji'St instance, oonoontmQe my attention on ~e 
idea that God's ~filemlon consists iro His bsln@ oompletaly ecrual. 
My fimt ofojeeiiOil'O to Ri'!® iooSJ tilai GOO's !J3~V1l oonslms in His oompl~~ 
Sl~l~ is ttlaft 1ft too S2$ily ?ails inllo inoohsrsnoo. Ars IOieli'allllf aU psli'Uedion$ 
ooropossifo!e? 
David Blumen1!eld In his (OOPM, Th® Comoosslbii!W o~ ih® DMns Aiiribuie$ 
claims m slllow Rhem is ~ oonimdlclliDil'll ~twoon on~ \W«il c~ U'D0 DMoo tlSuieciia:ms -
namely, omnlscienoo and omnl~tenoo {Siumsnflsld 1978). These Wl!o attrlfoo\19$ 
are, Blum~nfeelo1 clal~. m~lllf inoom~ijb!s - a lh3in~ ooaAio1 haw on® or~® 
o~sr_, bm no~ bo~. His Btrgurooroi rums on tlle ldsa~ tha~ 2 full undemianding o~ 
ca~ni'll oonsatiions and! smo~eon~ ~ on~ !ogo~!iy ~si~® W orne hSl.S acltua~l~ 
el<psrieoosd ihem. Thu®, for full yn~rstandlng, ii is not 01110Y~h ro nt'V'Wl"ioo wlllsi ~ 
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The second pa~ oi Blumsniield's ~rgumsnt is that certain emotions anol 
ssn~\tions oorono~ b3 ®lt~ri®OO®d by 21 ~nrat~ who is omnn~w~. On® cannOJt qotr 
elt~m~is, ~ a~aid i~ oro® is aroooiQ,AW~Y in ooooo! cq ewf1Min@ tha~ h~~ns. Thu~ 
Bla.nmsn~iald SBJys, " ... w~a~ ha~s en omnltcm~srnt b3in~ oo ~ear? Thsrs is no 
desiruction, no harm nor ttts sllgi'btss~ dlmimmon o~ power tttaft c2n pussibly bs~ll 
him. In ttlis case ... he could no~ bsli®V® himsaJg to oo sndan{;lered, and thus ootnlol 
not havs too el!~risruoo o1 WBlr." i~h.smeMs~ol ~S78 p.201). Th® &woo is troo o? 
frustration or despair. 
But, the argument continues, God is metmt to bs omniscieni, yet by virtue of His 
omroipo~noo ooilain items o1 lmrowiOO@s ars dlsnioo him. So GOO is eillher 
omnlpotsn2 or omnisci®nt, but no~ ~Rh. 
N00\1 I oo no~ ~o~ss ID OJndsila~s SJ ~~~ offioi~oo m ~umsrn\1®1d'$ Blll'Qtnrm~ hare 
(I ~toink ~ anWt®r io ~s rid©Jis ~~~ in Sl oons!dlsm~on o'J wh®U'i one can h~ve one's 
da$1ltny un~r a~IU£8 ooniio~ atnd ys~ s~m b3 Sl~lo'l. Ths man who m ~o bs 
eltsc~Reol ~or his b311®1s has his ia~ In hi~ ha81ds. He decides whs~er or no~ h® 
dlss. NeverRR"!sl®ss, he i$ ahnd, h~ oon d®s~ur a~nd ns osr~aun!y w~!i'Bl~. 1 iilin~ 
M a~~,qmani roughly anak>gous m ~his ldoo ooYio'l o1o ~e trick, i.e., where God's 
priooilO!es (oo i@ · s~~) oom® lBP aJgainst His ~mr®tr. ) AU I want ~c oo hem Is draw 
a moral. We have an alleged oontmdkmon b3lWoon only i'Wo ~r1ooiion~. W~a~ 
hsppan~ when ws mt.Biillpiy ~i'Yoofd()Jn Yl(ron p3~~ro unftil ws Blra SLn~ooo1 m 
have Bl baing who Is every conooiw.ble psrlootiora? The potential scops ~orr 
oon\llr~d!ctioi1l is i~nii®!y emffld3d. A()Juilll2$, ~imss~. sssms a~wBirs o1 ~ rts~ o~ 
his conoopi o~ GOO wl'lsn he SQys, "(Goo's] ~riooiion is all-smbmcin~: tl'le dlwrn~ 
(AND SOMETIMIES O~~OSIED) ~~!om~ o~ m·s~~Ui'S$ ali ~e--sl!om In Goo'! ... " 
[Aquooo~ 1989 2A.2 p. 16 my ®mphlalsl®). 
My oooon!61 ora}steRliOU'\1 ail•s hft ~ nV>Ili@lll ~ oom~oo a~IDiy is dmi©~lll ro 
make clear sanoo o~. Goo mus~. aooordlll$?) i© ~I$ no~n. b®, !n sam® ssnss, ~s 
mo~~ p31i~ horoo-ridsr. (I~ Hs weli'® no~ I oou!d soo ~Ram~~~ ~otr nm~vemaaw). 
Now the ide~a~ o~ a Wli'Y gooo jockey is oonooiVBlb!s; inwoo such ~o~e elti$~; they 
~rre a~ ~ mgj~ a OO!i'$S ~() ~~' fr»m oo~ ~ h ~irni o~ ell~a~oo; ~Slf ·~ur® aro~ 
w oon~rol ~ horns ihrough tlghi cornem BJncn so on. Th® idoo o~ ~ veuy tJOOd joo~sy 
is ooherent bm is til~ ~me ths ca1se wh®n O~JU' Cll~snijon rums ~ tie ids~ o~ a 
psi1~ jockey, so parisd i~ ~am iha~ ~hero is necss$2\rily no ootler? Is ~ere ~ 
property o~ bsin~ this mos~ pa!ilect horoo-ridsi'? I~ doos no~ seem to me ~o bs clsaw 
ttla~ there is or can oo such a thin~. I~ one cwguss ij'J~~ thsrs is such a ~lnGJ, then 
one mus~ m~tm ths conoopt clear. 
Charles Hartshorne, in C5liscuooin@ ihis pgrticu~w ~ioore oi the pariedion oi 
God, makes basically ~e same poon~: "Is an absolm® maximum oonceivab!e? The 
truth is that our ancestors had not leamsd our ham mooarn lessons concerning the 
ease with which grammatically smooth expressions ... can mil into implicit 
contradiction. 'Greatest possible number' is grammatical, bui it is sheer nonsense if 
it means 'greatest finite number' ... and It is at bast problematic. Why then should 
'graates~ lClOSSible value' be regarded as safe? ij is vaguer, root perhaps only 
bscauss ot ha~ oo definite me~ning a~ all." [Ha~hmoo 196'7 p. 1 9-20]. 
So my second point Is that the notion of maximum [Oertedion or complet('}, 
urmurpassable actuality oommits one ro hieramhioo oi different attributes that allow 
a last in the series • a maximum. But even If we examine just one maximum, e.g. 
iT1e perfect jockey, ii seems difficult to assign any clear sense ro the notion. Even 
relatively simple maxima, e.g. omnipotenoo and omniscience, are notoriously 
difficult to construe in a coherent way. Again ther~ is a moral: If God's parfootion is 
understood in this maximal, all-Inclusive sense, how are we to make clear sense of 
those properties which neither admit of a last in the series oor a clear ordinality? 
Now my third objection is the most important and complex. Indeed, It will be a 
vein of thought Ulat will run through the rest of my discussion of DMne 
Immutability. 
Aquinas thought that this idea of oomplete actuality was the only picture that 
was adequaUil to truly express Divine perfection. I will argue that It is . not the only 
picture. Another understanding of perfection gives us all we want But what is it 
exact1y that we do wani? io know this, we must first kmk at the ln~lloowal 
ancestry of the scholastic understanding. 
First of ali there m that 'Want' which desires oome ~nd o~ Immutability afil an 
aspect or oonsequenoo of psliootion. PlatvJ expresoos thi$ "wanf in The Republic: 
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.. ·s~ ithe smts o~ Goo and the Divine i~ psriem; a~nd ihswsfom Gn©l is ~easft llafo!s 
of all things to b3 changed into other gorms' 
'That it» so' 
'Then will god change or altai' himself of his own will?' 
'If he changss at all,' he replied, 'that must oo how he doos.' 
'Will the change be for the better or for the worse?' 
'Any change must roe for the worse. For God's goodness is periect.' 
'You are absolutely right,' I said. 'And, ihat being so, do you think that any man 
or god would deliberately make himself worse in any respoot? If you agree that this 
is impassible, then it mum also be impossible for a god to wish to change himself. 
Every god Is as perfect and as good as possible, and remains In his own form 
without variation forever.' .. [Plato 1955 p119 part 381-382). 
So, for Plato, such is the nature of DMne perfection that any change is a 
change for the worse. There is, however, another line of thought In Plato, 
" 'And, 0 heavens, can we ever be made to believe that motion and life and 
soul and mind are not present with perfect being? Can we imagine that being is 
devoid of life and mind, and exists i!'l awful unmeaningness an everlasting fixture?' 
" Later, In the same dialogue we find, 
"'Then the philosopher, Who has the truest reverence for these qualities [rest 
and motion] cannot possibly accept the notion of those who say that the whole is at 
rest, either at unity or in many forms: and he will be utterly deaf to those who assert 
universal motion. As children say entreatingly, 'Give us both,' so he will include 
both the movable and immovable In his definition of being and all.' "(Plato 1892 
Soph 248-249, see Hartshorne and Roose 1953 p.38-57]. 
Clearly them Is a tension in Plato's thought. His 'wanr is that both rest and 
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roo~on oo aliwib~~ ro ~h® Divine. Byt he thin~ ~h~ft chBJn~ seems ro imply 
impsruadion. (We haw alwoody ~u-a~ra1ssoJ his apparent argumen~ why this 
should oo the case). lmm~bilifty, on the o~er homd, seems ro imply a !dnd o~ 
ooaolness, an immuiabl® $~asis, devoid o~ li~s and minot 
Indeed the scholasiics rooogni::esd ihis dllsmm~. Divine !mmumbility ssams to 
bs squiw~ell'i~ ro II~$Snsss; ro awio1 tttis unsawury oonssqusnoo they asooilOOl 
that, though God was psrismly immumbl®, He was aloo psliscily and com~le~sly 
active. Aquinats c!aims, "GOO is sl.llp&"Smsly alovs, ~r he moSi psoo~ly acts wih>u~ 
himsel~ baing moved by others." [Aquinas 1989 1 ,2, 18,1 p.49] The more somethin(il 
is able ~o act withom i~li baing subjsm to change, ~ more ij is aliW~, the more ~ 
is "auto-mobile" [Davies 1'992 p. 112]. This idea appsars paradoxical. Is it not the 
ooss ~at when ){ a<m~ oo changes ~rom ~ssMty ~ 2di\My? · 
To answer this question and also to 11esh oa.rt the iooa or God's p3rioot amlviiy, 
Da\!Uoo nows ~aft A«)JUJ!OOS di$~~@1Ldsi'l®$ ~~soo two f(y~ o~ ~- Some 
acmriiies are 'tralnsi~lvs' Bls o~posoo m 'Immanent'. Datvi®s gives toochin~ as an 
S}{B!m~e o1 tra1111~ a~ffiion. Whem, I'll® Bls~. doos ihls esS®niiat~ cN!ngs mo1.1~h~ 
Blbou~ by waching lis? Is tl'la esseniiatl c~mng® ttls (OOysica! aei o1 putoclng woros on 
a1 blac~ooard? No, ~u.noo 1 oon g;n Bl lliOOYS2nol !onB!c~ooards wliil ls~srs a1nOJ 
diagrams. Btai none og ~ss® swocesses wm cour1~ ~a~s teaching unless somebody 
acRuBIIiy learns oo~m~i~... [!Oavioo ~ 002 p. 1 ~ 3] Too ssssniiBI~ d'langs in il1Js 
ac~ of ~aching is in ij'ts minds o1 ttls lsam®ffi, not in any physl~l gsstlcula~ons 
llhe wooher mnghll ~mrm. DB~viss oonch.noos, "' ... ih!s a~on oi an assnt ma~y lie only 
In the changes brought about In iha~ on which It is acting. I~ need not b3 dsiinool in 
~~ms og ihs 2~flli. "(1$).113]. 
It may oo objsdoo thai swn W ~1'\e prlnci~le change in tmrnsittve change is iro ~e 
0~~ i"Bl~~ ~M it~ SY~~. r&®V®~®~SS COO~® if'il ~ 00~ OOOI..lffi. Oo'l® 
miclht ~ wm~ to ~Y i~~~ ihs ~t~lrJj~ cOOW~SiJOO In im®no'Jing ){ Blft t, ro brili't~ong ~ 
aoouil ilihaut X B!i ?a. This, as siaft~. would ooft ~ a dmlcu~ qor Aquinas s!rucs, in 
scholastic ~inkin~. for Dlvins ami~. lntendinQJ X and bringin~ 1ft BlOOYR ~hBlR X are 
on~ and ihs same aciivi~. Thl~ Is a oons~u®nos o1 ttls oomrin® o~ DMn® 
simplicity. 
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acoount Thrs QallO a~p~8l~s in A~ljJJioos' tr®~~nll ~~ ~oo rslaJ\li(()M~op ~~ro Go~ 
ano1 ~ims. According io Davie~. A~uina~· s:msiijtm is ~rtB~i Gool's ~mloo~ ~n ras 
dated. This hs ciaoms implioo oo change in Gool: "We ~n IOiats God's atmiom~. Bu~ 
only booauss ~her~S I$ hi~~ory irn which sv®nis ooour SYOO®ssowly. or, B\$ we can ~Y 
today, God bs~me ~he giver o~ vicf\0111 ro Wnt!iam og Nomtandy l!il i055, no~ 
booaYss God changed in 1 066, but roaoouse William conqyereo'J England in ~ha~ 
yea~r." [Davis$ i 992 p. 7g] i think such ~ ~iijoo oon fa3 reMOO by ttile ~olk>win@ 
argument 
Lei us assume, 
[1) God brings abow )(at~. 
Now sonoo Goo's bringi~ ~ abt:m~ tttm X aooJ Goo's intsn~l~ X are (aooorrdin~ ro 
the doctrine oi Divine simplicity) identical, we can ~lf. 
[2) God intends X at ii. 
Now can~ say f!hat God intended}{ Bli some 0arller time, t. ? No, 1or ihefil we 
would bs committed (again via ths doctrine of simplicity) to this proposition, 
We cannot say that Goo intended X at some earlier time because we commit 
ourselves to both (1] and [3]. But if God does not Intend X at t1 but does at 12, then 
God changes from not Intending to intending. 
This argument can oo mfu1.tKI by the following oounter-arguroont: 
[1] Is wrongly oonstruoo. What we should say ~. 
[4] Goo wills x-at-12 
Here we change the soopa of the operator "at i2 ". As Mann notes, the vern "WiiiS9 
baoornes tenseles~ [Mann 1983]. Now Goo can have thm Intention at any time 
witho~ the unWGiooi'JW oonsequenoo that God pefibrme actions before He 
p&rfumlS them. 
- 5:2 _. 
Now I ~av~ ~o ili'lin~ ro say Bltnmn~ ~his ooun~er-ar@~msnt 1~ oommoils ~s 
advo~~s ~o tmOO!W~~e DMoo a~rgumsm, soms~ing ~~. as we 11~ve no~®d, 
A()Juinas sssm$ no~ willing ~ oo. My 90oond oommsn~ is l'ha~ iV we haw [4] we 
must ~lso 11aV® ~his, 
i\la~umlly the verb .. brings aoour mus~ os undswsrood tanaslsssty. Now ons might 
~ qtL!iils rsB!dy OOl aolmift trim~ msnml veroo sychJ as "Wm$'" CBJn bs Q.!ln~moodl 
tensalsssly. (This rollows from tole difficulty we hava or making ~emporal sensa o~ 
msnml even~ (Sse Geaoo 1969]). Howsvsr ons mighi bs lass rsBJoiy ~ admit ttla~ 
apparemly causal verbs such as "brings aoour can bs undersrood timelessly. 
CemiiR'IIy, i~ seams tl'la~ a causs mus~ precede or b3 simul~naous wiih i~ enem 
Mdl S© Km, al~ !®®$~, ~@OO~y 00tf81~®. H<W\f®V®Ii' B1 fu~~ Slt~iorn!llf©b'il ~ flilas WOII.S!d ~® 
m3 ~cw ~yoo~ Wus oo~ln®s o~ fuls ~ssns [Soo CN!~b'il ~ 9~8 p.57 ·53 ror a~n 
aoooynt o~ ~d's ~~®ss aCIOOlns]. 
Lei us r~ium ~o Piel~o. A.s W® saw ihsr® is Bl ien9oon in his tloughi. He wanf!S 
oo~ mo~nloosn~ SlOO m~on, cha~~!Sssn~ BIOO ICU1ai'llgs iO b8 BlWi~ls ro 
the Divine. (I ttllntt it WtiomBJ~ic ~or Chris~Sln ttlintdng thsi oo1h am nssdsd, ti12R 
Pia~ has oo~ id®nijfuOOI wlllali our 'wSIU'Dlls' ·. Blti'IS). AOJYonas ~o~hi ttl is \ilms 
possl~e by dlsijnguishlng bstwaan tmnsillvs Blnd imi"Nlnsnt ac~on. Using this 
o1isfdneiioro, hs llHlou~~ ~s h~o'l ~l!lno'l a WSl:V ~ asci'ifas a~ to God whits 
preserving· his immutlalbillly. It aPP®am, ~rom the aroove considera~ons, thai the only 
wa~y this is ~~obi® Is iO mainwin that ~d is ~meless. Scrmiilin@ psmaps ii'IIBI~ 
Aqn.~in~a~s waul~ h~vs iounol ynaooepoobls, thou~h. oi oouwoo, plsniy o~ oth®r 
tulnksrs haW® ~rn cmly oo happy w aooep~ ihls. 
lh® cruool m~~® ifl'il ACSOJiR'Ioo' pus~LTD 1$ hi~ Ill® lUJ~$ ~ wroll"O~ ~m o~ 
W~Slit lit ~ t'@r Gtm W ~ ~uls~. H® YOO® ti® oo~lfy A.i'i$\O~IDBJD'l ki1~ ihBli Gtldl is 
oomplsf!®ly atCiNWII, ~. 101 U$oru~ ~as oonoo~. ~ lmmool~iely IB!nds himsatv in 
diW!cully when W® wa~nt to spsa~ o1 DMn® ~c~on. An@, alisr all, argu~a~foly It is Divins 
acikm ~oo~ i® tOO mast crudBJ! !ism In Rh3 Chri$~111 a~esn~. (For Arimo~®. Divine 
aciion was noR oo mooh o~ ~ ~oblsm. sinoo in a~ way Go~ dlol not ~crually d10 
amyilling. Ms m.to'l oo wm [Da~"\fie$1002 fP. 16JO] ). 
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So wh~~ oih®r plcmm~ o~ Goo is ~hare ~h~~ runiis our 'wa~nm' andl m~$ syr~ 
jus~ics hs done io ~e ttleis~c WSOJUiu-emoo~ ~hal~ GOO is psi1sei? W~ w~n~ God ~0 b® 
paliect anol dyn~mic. How can we achnsvs roo~? 
Chtwlss Ha~homs has proposed ons moos! ~h~ft iw claims rulftls our Pl~ronic 
'wanis.' Hs rsj®ds ~~ Aois~@~siia~n moo1s~ 'Wl8l h~Cw® dusctYss~ amd ~opoocsdl woo~ 
may oo called ~ dual-as(OS~ ttlaovy o~ God. God, hs mainooins, is "in uniqu®ly 
eltosl~m 1Mays, oo~h n~~ny and conij~~. oo~ onginoll® BJn~ ~ntis, loos~oo®nft 
and depsndero~. s~smB~I and temporal." [Harmhoms 1975 p.22]. Ha&i:shoms rsali~as 
~e immooiati€1 BJceus&~n wi~l b3 ihBJi ~s wSirni the ompussi~s: an inoohewency, Bl 
God who is bo~h P Bind not-P. Bui, he argues, a contraoliction is only a contradiciion 
i1 P and rnrt-P ai's predica~ed o'i ~hs saroo as(ll3d o'i an individual. So God migtrt bs 
"immutable In his u~ma~s ~rpose, bu~ BJdo~ new spscioo objemives in response 
ro nsw ad$ by his croorur®s." [(Ql. 23].1 
This, esssn~ooly, us iU1® ~el ~ ~Ul~ ItO aoopt I ilaV® argusd ~St~ God chBJn~~s 
His mind in r3sponss ~o chan~®® in His cm~iion, oo~ is imm~l® in His es®en~21 
baing wh~h is Goodfi®$$ i~lt 
Whet, thou@h, og ths charg® RV'l~~ this imtoliss ch~ngcs and so impliss 
impsriscijon? Ttas answ~u- ro ~is us lli11Bl~ ihs vs~ OJLBSsijon is hmoo ~om ~s 
psrnpsc1ivs iha~ ~s only mooo~ o~ Go~ Is the AriSii'owiiS~n modeL Ordiooi'iiy li is no 
pslDll oq ~ oonc®~ oq cha~rs ~~oft im~~~ ~ml(lS~n; iBldsOO, as Hatil$homs 
notes,~~ is ifle o~sr w&y muool: "O'dinSI~ or im~i1~ irndMdools, ~is irtYS, fQII ~ 
acrumll;es BJII ~sir pnmn~l~s; buft is Rhas, ire~~. & ds~acr? A p31rson se~~o~ a 
career c~ on ~rom rseli:?:a~on optoo~tAnms~ sooh as could noi bs thoughft o'i in 
rsla~ion ro an a~ ... Thus ~0 power oq s~looiion ai'YM)n~ paflly inoomPS~ilbi® 
possimll~oo og sslff-realb:aoolll s®Sms a~ roooour® o~ S)(OOI~noo ra~tmr lthem og 
~flci®il(t}lf." (H~vl$rtOm® 1952 p.35]. HaJ~lf'Bom® OOftCI~ 'irom RV'lls %11~ tir 
1. Gsmch's view of God's ~nowl~dQ® o~ ths fuiurs ooinQJ analogous to a Grandmasiar's 
knowledge that he will win a emma Is slmlhu to this. The Grandmas~cn !mows ila will win -
that is his ultimate purpos® - but h® doss noi control which pmwn his opponsni will mov®. 
Dapandlng on which mov0 his opponsni maltas, tM Grandmsswr adopts 'specme new 
objectivss' in response. Th0 ultimate purpose is assured !Oui ths spsclilcs oi Its a~ainmQ'mt 
may be contingani upon human decisions 
(Gaach 1977 p.57-59]. 
consiG3raiion ihaft God mu~ induo;s al~ pu~n~iSJiiay wif&nin HomseW (~.37). I ~n«] 
Hartshorne's reasoning to b3 valid (Kel~h Warroi's visw Is similar. [Ward 1 990 
p. "i 8-37]). 
In the and ihe Thomls~ anol ~he Anselmi~ view mits ro dis~nguish ba~ssn iWo 
oonool()~ o~ ~r.~~ whi~Ch vuo~iB11~ cro~~r OOU1J ~ coli1ooiv00. Fom. ~sr® is -no 
individual gJrsai®r ih~n GOO i~ ooruooW®~... Sooondly. ih®re is "oo~ S\!en God 
Himss!~ in any ccmce!wro!s s?aw ooulol ~ ~fi'SSliefi' ftha11 H~ acrumlly is .. (He!ruslilome 
1962 p. 35). The second locu~icm l®~ds ro ~h® scho~s~ic p!ctYr® o~ aboolu~ 
immumble baing, ths firs~ leaves opsru ttl~ roossnbiliiy iha~ God ~n surpass Hlmse~; 
in other words, that " ... there Is potentiality as well as actuality in the divine reality" 
[p. 35). 
Such a picrure og GOO as b3in~ 111 CJlllf®m!i'l~ as~m oo~ !mmLO~bis Bind muislbi® 
avoids mooy o~ ile ~10biems asoocialioo'J woutB ihe sdlol~oo wrncsp!ion. Fifi'Sfc; ililere 
is no quesiion o~ a God "devoid o~ U~ ~nd miner. Sooondly, W® h~V® incloooo RU'Is 
g:mssibility oi DMn~& amivif(y wBthouft i12vij~ ~o msoii ro> ad hoo m®at~urss in order ~o 
accomU'OOdate It, as li Goo cr~allin~ or loving or dying wars soroo unim~n~ 
opftional extras iaggool ontto ai'll Arristomlian ooong. IDMns oo11Mfiy, DMOO! mspooo® 
are now integrated into the very oore o~ Goo. italrdly, loglcai difficulties over DMns 
lmowlsdge ali's avoided. ~ow ca1n l(m immtm!b!a God emow Bl changing, mutable 
world? How can my actions make a difference ~o an unchanging (indi~Tersnt?) 
Detty? Now Goo can maliy know ms and !mew the woma willloaAt ooing traJnspt}ltool 
ofi into timelessness as an ad hoo meS~sure. 
Plato sasd chiidrero say entreatingly, "Giw us ooth." We care have OOij') bscause 
God really is IOOtto. 
God, Goodness And lov~S 
I have argued tiwtft God is Goodn~ss and that flhis Goodness is to oo understood 
as ooing love. It is ttte burden o1 thi~ chapter ro show how momlity "reduces" ~o 
love, how love is, in Christ's phrase, the fulfilmsnft of the law. However, bsb'ore we 
start iwo points mYst oo oorne in minot Firstly, I will, in this chapter not oo dealing 
with metaphysics or how, metaphysically speaking, love is tc oo identified as 
Goodness. I have already given some Indication of how the identification works 
(p.36·40). Secondly, my claim is a massive one; I will not be able to pursue all the 
lines of inquiry that may oo relevant to this theme. love Is, 1 believe, the fulfilment · 
of the law, but I will not be able to show how each particular moral notion is relatsd 
to love. Rather I will try to sketch a broad outline of how certain central, "big" moral 
concepts are aspects of love. I will concern myself primarily with Justice. 
We need to identify where we are on the conceptual map, so, first of all, I will · 
examine some of tile main iandmarl® that lie on the landscape of thought about 
love. 
One characteristic thought about low is that it is oonooived of as being 
unconditional. Broadly speaking, the two main philosophical advocates of this view 
are Kierkegaard and Anders Nygren. They argue that the highest love is agape 
and agape, in turn, is to be identified as an unoonditional "giving" of oneself to 
one's neighbour. Agape contrasts with friendship or eros in that agape does not 
give itself because of some peculiarity or Idiosyncrasy that one's neighbour might 
have, but simply because one's neighbour is another human being. Thus I may 
love X because X Is witty, charming and generous. This "love", however, is not the 
highest expression of love, because true ·rove which is agape, loves X simply 
because X Is another human being, .your neighbour. 
Agape's unconditionality has many consequences which, it Is claimed, make it 
superior to mere friendship. First, if I love you, not because you are charming and 
witty, but merely because you are a human being, then. my love tor you is stable 
and permanent. ihus Kierkegaard says, "No change ... can take your neighbour 
from you, for It is not your neighbour that holds you fast ... it is your love which holds 
your neighbour fast." [Outka 1972 p14]. Agape is not dependent on any particular 
characteristics of any neighbour, thus it can survive the demise of any particular 
set of characteristics. This non-reliance on the particularity of any neighbour results 
in a rove which transcends particularity and is perfectly general In sc:Ope. Its 
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. A second fea~urs o1 agaps is that li is suppos®dly egalitarian. Friendship is 
S);{Ciusivs in tlha~ I oomm~ myseW io ~. oocaus® X is wise, bUJ\l I may rajooft V 
because he is foolish. v fall~ outside my circle o~ Mendship and in fuaft roo~PSd is 
no longer equa~ Ro K Agape, however, loves memly on \he !Oasis of ooing a human 
baing and thus all are equal bscauoo all are equally human. I cannot prefer ){ ro V 
i~ I iow agapeistlcaily; tooth X aOOJ V fall into the circle o~ my iove. All people are 
held to be irreducibly and equally valuable in the eyes of agape [Outka 197.2 p12). 
Eros is also inferior to agape in that there appears something ineradicably selfish 
about eros. Nygren claims thai eros arises from need while agape is expressed in 
. . 
spontaneoos giving. Thus Nygren says, "Eros Is yearning desire; but with God 
there is no want or need and therefom no desire nor striving. God cannot ascen~ 
hlgherr ... Sinoo agapg i~ a love that descends, freely and generously giving of Its 
superabundance, the main emphasis falls with inescapable necessity on the side 
of God." [Brummer 1993 p.129]. Here there are two clairm;: fimt !that eros wants, 
desires, strives while agape gives. The second poim iits in with the overall 
message of Nygren's Agape and Eros ~ that Christianity has moved towards eros 
and to that extent has become egooantrtc rather than theocentric [Brummer 1993 
p127 ·128). 
This point about the selfiShness of eros compared with the oolf-glvingness has 
already found expression in the unconditionality of the latter as compared with the 
former. If eros loves because of certain characteristics, then it may appear to love 
those characteristics, rather than the peroon who exhibits them. Additionally, surely 
there is something a IH.tle too easy abOut loving someone because they am witty or 
. charming. Agape, on the other hand, seems to have no hint of scandal about it. If 
you love agapeistically, then you do not love because of X's desirable 
characteristics, but simply becau~e X is human. Also. agape seei"i1S anything but 
easy: it Is universal and egalitarian In scope and so must love not only the 
desirable but also the undesirable. 
This picture of the nature of the highest expression of love is veuy attractive. Both 
Kierkegaard and Nygren believed that the Gospels advocate this kind of love, that 
this unconditional giving agape is the love that God has for us and that we ought to 
emulate. Blit atttr2mwe as i~ is, thsu-a ~rs oorla!~r~ diNWunia$ in rullSJ Ny~rsn cmol 
KierksgaarcUBJn posi~(»n. 
One problem is ®){prsssoo by OuR~ in trns form of ~ ()Jues~on, "Dool3 agaps as 
equal regard in !iSs~ allow ror any way oo cm1®mn~~ bs!wsan a~sntion to 
ano~er's needs and submission w his e){plol~titm, and any waOTani for rssistln@ 
ihs laRiler." [~ 1S72 [(). 2i]. OlD~ ~Us ~us~® OJOOSftion o1 the ~lallro~ chOOJUS. 
Kiei'kegaard rsoognJ~ed that, for the sa~ of the ns~l'lfoourr, ooo may have to rasl~ 
his ~mploUta!iioli'D. Thus one mBlY wei~ Wla~R ift i® in ~e nsig)lhooiUlr's intsrssR to refuse 
his requests, rather as God, iilough loving, woulol ignore my requests that I oo 
immune- from prosecution should I brea~ ihe law. God would re~ni&:e ttlaR ttw 
giving in to the requem would not bs in my best in~erests. Analogously, I may give 
ffil'$9!? irn samest to my ns~~ooMr, bm n~lil4lrs his rrmat!!e$U'$ tMt I hsip him li'OIO ~ 
oonk. N9W \!rots 1 rasln®w 0$ ~!Sl oouvooQ ~n~®ll' ro ~oo ~n~ cU't®qUAS OOiillllndmm. 
However, i1t is im~~nft io n«:»ts ~a~ llU'ue l.!llitOOOOBill@n~l~ o~ Sl@Sl(QS IllS!$ tsel'il sUg~ 
compromise~. ~lsr~~~rd is admif&lng tt12~ ~sr® ~rs ollhs~ g~ a~ from 
agaps tt»m may dllr~ atnd hone one's lows o~ on(S'® neig~oour. If til® only good in 
ttte world were ms 1.mcondffional ~Mng og oneselb' io oms's nsightoour, then ons 
would ooa b3 a~~® ~«> llirDo113lnlf moml reaoofi'll why ooo OUQJill~ ro msiSJ~ ~0$ ®lf~imltion. 
If the ons and only ~ood was unoondiiioool sMng wltttou~ ~ny oompromloo, toon 
otna woulo1 ~SlY® ro hialtp om~'s nei@hOOl\Aii' olo ~ings fua~~ well'S noft in ooo's 
neighoour's lnwrssw; ~Ills only ralswni crtterrion would to® gMn~-doo~w­
evs~un~-S)IS®. 1~. on ihs cihrsr h2nt'l1, ~a~~a~ Is iO ~~ in~@ ~a~coo~nft oiler ~e~to~s. 
ttlen · Its unconolltlonalliy a~les only in the sense tha~ ift ough~ iO ~ psilsmly 
sm~~- 1ft 003s no~ !goor® idliosyncu-asnss o~ a neng~ooiUlr, oo~ ~llil ta~!w ~soo imo 
acoouni In da~suminin~ what ooo ousrn~ to do In ooo's ghllngJ ~o ooo'® neishoour. 
The kind o~ gMng ~haft may b3 a~opri2w ~o }{ may no~ rem a~pri2t® ~o v. 
nsoouse X and v are dmsrsnt poopla w~ dln'emm ~-
Till$ oons~RBoo iaam m® ()il WJ mollOO~ ~DMcl\A~ in ~®~~$ sm«)J 
1\!ygrsn's undMS~ndung o~ whai a~g~~ i~. ln~lly, It mBly sound a~amiv® Qh~ 
ons's lovG ~ no~ d®~n©J ()n ~Iilli' i©lioovncr~y IU'll 4llfl®'~ nsi{3hKm1Ur, !lrl~ft 1ft ~s 
not depsnd on X's ctmrm or wift. Howswr, ij doo~ soYnd !J3CYII81rly g®ooml ~m@ 
un~rna1t. Thns, m msfflfo~ruoo aoo\f®, is @!lilGli'D ~[(1) Blt1 a (!lOOialiw; ~sa-tfiu..!i'® o~ ih&s 
acoouni of a"a~. ro~ as 1\l? 1~ ~ oo noft lov® }{ Klse<&OJIS® o~ }{'s cillai'OOWii'isb. wha~ 
S){a~y is I®~ w lov@? Ones w® mrito X o~ svsry cham~rl$ii~ ihaft m~&k®~ him wh~D 
hs is, Blli we sesm ~to hav® Is~ is ~® ids~ o~ a llummn1 ~in~ or nsit'l)hiOOur in @®n~~t 
Bui I do no~ wa1m to lovs ~e ooncelQ)i ~1 a human fasing I w~nt ~o lov® K I~ agaps is 
jus~ the giving o~ oneseii ~o ons's neiglllooiJlr sim~ foocause ~is~ neighoom, then 
we are no~ loving }{, but r~~her the ici~a of n~ighoourhooo in general. Kiertwgaard's 
acoouni seems w allow a oonsideraiion og X's imosyncrasle$ and to ihSli extern 
enables my love o1 X to be Bl ~fiiicular rather than a genera! 2hinQJ. 
This i<ind o~ objootion to this Ude~ o~ aga~ - ~ai Is g~neral rather U'lan specific -
is similar to objections r~lsed against a very diff®r®m view m love. Socratet) argues 
~at iove arises out of a desire for something~ d@ not haw or, if I already possess 
it, the desire to keep it (C. S. Lewis calls this neoo-love as opposed to gift-love 
[Lewis 1960 Chapt. 1] ). However, according to Socrates, I should, if rational, no~ 
desire perishable earthly things for ttleir own sake, but rather only in so far as they 
insmntiam the Etemal Goodness or Beauty. Only In desiring the impari$hable and 
attaining it through Immortality can I be eternally happy [Brummer 1993 p. 1 'i 1 ]. 
Thus all oorthly lo~ which am !<wed mtiooally are no~ loved ror their own sake~. 
but for the saka of something else; W till$ "something else .. i~ perishable I must love 
it for the sake of something else ... anol so on, until we reach the Etemal or the 
"proton philon" [Brummer 1993 p. 112]. The objection to this is raised by Gregory 
Vlastos, 'What it is really aoom 1~ love for plaoo-oolders of the predicate 'useful' or 
'beautiful' .. .In this theory persons ewks eros if they have beautiful bodies, minds, 
or dispositions. But so oo quite imperoonal objects •.. best of all, the Idea of Beauty 
itself ... [p. 114]. There is a hierarchy of desirability such that the lower is loved for 
the sake of the higher until_ we reach the idea of Beauty itself, but this seems to 
mean that 1 don't love you as a particular, rather I am impressed with your 
instantiation of the universal - Beauty. Thus the objections raised against eros 
appear very similar to the kinds of objection put against agape: that the partiCular is 
ridden roughshod over for the sake of the general. In eros I love Beauty while in 
agape (at least in this understanding of it) I love nelghoourhoodness rather than my 
neighbour. 
These difficulties in th~·acoouni oi agape loooo me into an exploration of the role 
of mutuality in low. Some thinkers hold tha~ the _highest expression of low is no~ 
unconditional ootf-giving, but rather mutual love. Wha~ role does mutuality play? 
These thinkers claim that mutuality is, in fact, an essential feature of agapaistic 
love. They owgus ~h~~ in the ~oo o~ one·~ !©w ~O!i' X bsin@ ulien1y Sl0Yms«:9 f&ls 
appropriate SJtpu-ession WOn.!lo1 bs, "i moo to love }{", raf!U'ler than, "I love X". As 
Outka pure i~. " .. .love is aros~mt when one pa~ cross a~ll ~he QJMng and lhe o~her a~l 
the ta~int'J." [Oli~ 1 972 (0. 38]. Thi~ s~ong c~om &OOYi the fuooijon o~ agapa ough~ 
to b3 disiinguishsol ~rom a weaker c~im. T~® s~ron~ claim is ~hat muftualii:y is 
required ~or agape ro exist The weak3r claim is that, while response wom )( is 
dssiU'Blblrs 8\ndl maJlflm~v® maije5'~ oonskll®!i'~, ~ Hs·ITlO~ neoo~. Thea~ is, 1 can 
love X aga!pais~cally rs~ardleoo o~ X's re~pon$0. Thus agaps doos no~ rely on 
m~alifty - ihis is ~ wsa~w te~nm. Jo~n !SumaJfol? oosms ro ras ~BdnQJ ~~® w~S~err 
claim here, "It Is indeed the tes~ o~ a love which would b3 li!(e God's, that i~ is all-
embracinQJ; but ws mBly bs certain fila~ Chi'isft did oo~ msalll ei~sr ~t it is batter to 
have enemies tllcm friends, or that any ouiWartOI ad o~ b3ne1icence can bs a 
sutootrrute ~cw fu® iilWSl!i'd @is~sil:Bon o~ hea&l whnc&'D woH.!Iol make a ~OOr&d ou~ o~ ijts 
enemy." 10~ 1972 [p317]. 
Let us S}{amine ~® stron~r claim oow. Ro~&lt Johann argoo~ trta~ a~Qp® 
rapines on two oondiiioM. Firm o~ ~II. "ift is nm suffic~nft tlla~ ~tls varus lowd in 
myself roo somehow present IN THE OiHEA. I~ I am ~o lovs him as myseW, 1~ mus~ 
also oo ~soont 10 ME." [Ou~ 1~721 p. 3~ 001¢ua~ses in origin~l}. Now OU~ 
in~erprets this as saying that ror aga~ oo Wt!.IIY ®Jt~i til® ottler, "mum oorm Into 
mnge and somehow ~urn ~towa~ds rii'l®" (p.3~]. Ths ssoooo oondWian h~ Johann 
argues for is tllai fus o~her's "pro1ouoo oontra" be pressnft to ms. Omka 
g39ra¢1rasas thl$: "I haw ito ~ in 'roooh w~ ~se oosic ~® Slllld imsrss~ 
really constitutive og his sel1-awareness, the SB~ms elements that deftemline my own 
identity." Thus, acoordong ro Johann, ntis not jMs~ wtbat I oo ttaft mtarmlnes wheiher 
agape is present, but also whl§lt ths other psroon doos. It Is not enough fo!i' agaps 
that there is a 1-He re~tlonship, I.e., where I ~nlt!e tha~ hs, Ilks ms, is a centre 
o1 consciousness; rather there mYsi ~an l·ih®u relatlonshi~Q where .he and I ars 
in ~ mmt~~l r®l~mtnip. 
Johann say$ ttlls, "Nor .. .i8 the o~h~r pmsent as a vafm~ ~ oo loveo'J o1iwoo\liy 
[i.e. agapaisti~ly] so long ~ ~ oonsid®w aoo i:ir®fil~ him, hoW®wr OOD'tCW®'l®ly a® a 
l=tE .. .in trsatin~ him a~ a HE, ~ mdue~ ih® oftOOii' to ooinQJ sim3)1y a narum, an 
animmtoo oroj~ wlllidll ~tnnelllon$ a oonai~rn s~ WS~lf ~oo ooi ooun® @'ttts!i' wa~y. to 
Johann qualifl~s hislaJSt assei'ilon by s~tin~ ...... whil® smerimiiy ~nd ®}{C!Yslvsns~ 
am cham~ri8il© no~ion~ m H~ iile H~ is mm ~roonB~I, a stJJ~~ o~ rlgf9lt$ - n@ft 
sim~ly a ti'ling, an IT." As a HE, W® mus~ s~m ras~ his rig~~. lnbsoiy aoo ihs 
obligations of justice [Johamn 1954 p-43]. 
Howsvsr, ~s a HE, hs canno~ bs th~ objoot o? dimm love or a~a!)S. Dirsm love 
or agaps "implies bsawesn two parsons ~ stalw of recipr~l CQnsciousnsss. ths 
presence o~ the other as mally a 'second self is necessarily tha~ ~ a subj®ci opsn 
to me in soma seoos as I am ~o 1111lfOOI~ - ~ mus~ ~ ~ wssenoo which ~rmiis 
sxchang® and dial~ue." [p.4~J. 
I am ~mpWdl by this ~ra, ma I ~nnk ~ ne008 ful{ijtsr slaoomiion. li seems io 
ms to boil down to a qussoon o~ eplstsmological accsss. I cannot love X 
agaJpsisijcally ii I know nailing abou~ X. I cannot low him as a thou until 1 know 
him as a thou. Bu~ I cBJn only ~ow him as a ~ou ii he I®~ himoon b3 tmown as a 
tttou. Now thrat which i !mow about X musu ~ rmo~ of m oortain sort Thu$ 1 
may know a lot o~ ?acis aoout )(, bu~ not know him as a thou bsoouss ins iacm only 
much u~n emsmal oonijngenci®$ o~ X's 1~. s.~ .• hi$ CBJr, c~~®s, job, a~~. 
The ~wisdge o? ){ thari I need mus~ oo o~ atn ~~tsly ~roon21 soli, oot ttlis 
lmow!edgs cai'll us~JB~!Iy fa3 rsvool®d only ;:,y }{ ~lmsslt nms X mi!ASt .,UJm to roo .. in 
ordsr that agta~ps ras present 
It is impormnt to now tha~ I am talking aroow human rela~nships with other 
tn.smans mthsr ~h~n Gods w~~iDonsli'nil() w~ lllS. GOO 811\llfays ~~ ®Wryone as a~ 
thou b3cause He always has acooss to tns nsooss~ry psrsonal knowledge. 
Evali'lfons, 1111 ~is sensa, is o~n ~ Gu1o1. No m!.ll~BJiiillf is i¥1srsg«>rs fOOJUJiij'S\01 ~Oii' rna 
w say that Gaol's lovs ror us is agapsistio: God always !mows ms and Iovas me 
d!ss~iie my siY~m B"Sfusa~ '00 acoopfr Him. Wt\&b &luuoon to h~Yman re~ionstui(OO 
ihi~s are olm®rsm bscause access ~o X may bs denied by X. I mBlY lliV ro lov® 
a~atpslstlca~ly ~ ~il. ~usa ){ mveu- o~D'ts ilimssn up to ms. · 
This ptmm·® og rove can ~ se3n M S1 r®®Oil@n to too ld®a~l o~ ~om~milc love. Her® 
013 Sl.!(OJYISU!l1® SltB!M~ ~ ~\1\S WB!~ WV® ilro~~ W~ ruli'Df®()]QJJiltoo]. H®m flli'D® i@V®U' fajvWJslol 
his tee~ and lov®d daspija rejsctloo. ~ ooums tl® IOQUc og this is ~~~ wro~. I~ 
un~u~sd love ~ tl® ~M~ms ®~m~QJI® og low;, iln®n W itae ras~ ilin~lly y~ld$ 
and rmurns tile lov® a1nd rorms a mullOJBJI· ml~l!Wn~hop, ~ w!ue o~ ttl® lm~ involwd 
Is Slc'ru~~~ ~ma®®d, oo~ irrBtm~. 11 }:{ I@~ V 8\rlldl V ®®~ n~ lo~ ~. ll!i1®n l\'~ 
low is supr®m®. fg V bsGins ~o tov® X, toon Rhs smru® o1 X's lovs Is diminishsd. 
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God, Goodness And Love 
Unrequited love can bs painful and passionate. bw it cannot roo supreme; ii cannot 
be the finest love there can be. Basically, it seems to me, such a conception of love 
is immature. I find that Iris Murdoch in The Sovereignty 01 Good makes this same 
point. She talks about the "excitemenr that transforming love into suffering causes: 
such an idea should be avoided [Murdoch 1970 p. 82]. 
Another factor behind the concern for mutuality has already been mentioned. A 
philosophy of love that concentrates only on the attitudinal aspects of love can tend 
towards merely a generalized benevolence where one's love is not so much for 
one's neighbour as for the Idea of neighbourhoodness in general. A concern for the 
importance of mutuality, where one's love is based on knowledge of a particular 
person seems to avoid this problem. In The Virtues Geach says, "F~r God's sake 
we must have charity towards our fellow-men: and that means actual love of 
people individually, not just generalized attitudes of goodwill." [Geach 1977 p.86]. 
However, all this does not answer the question of whether mutuality is a 
necessary condition for agape or whether it is an optional extra. It seems to me 
that genuine mutual love must come higher than unrequited love, but I do not want 
to say that unrequited love is thereby not really love. despite the locution 
mentioned before. i.e., "I tried to love him ... " To say that unrequited love is not 
really love does too much violence to our ordinary thought about love. A 
conceptual compromise needs to be made. I will say that mutual love is agape and 
the most valuable thing there is; unrequited love, is obviously, by definition, not 
mutual, but at least one half of the conditions required for mutuality are there! It Is 
not implausible to assume that man's end or ullmate fulfilment is found in mutual 
love. In so far as unrequited love is a seeking after mutuality it seeks agape and is, 
· therefore, of value. This seems to make sense. I think we would be reluctant to call 
a particular attitude a loving attitude if there was no interest in engendering some 
kind of positive response. Imagine if X claimed to love Y. but said he was not in the 
least bit concerned about Y's response; this would be enough to call into question 
the genuineness of x·s claim. However. if X's attitude was in some degree a 
seeking after a loving response from Y there would be no difficulty In believing X's 
claim. 
let me summarize the claims I have made here. The supreme example of love is 
the kind of love X has for Y where Y loves X too; in other words, agapeistic love is 
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&m individual's low 1m anofthsr in~ mLBftu~! rslaoon$hi~ willil ~a~ o'iJhsr. This ldnd m 
love requires ths pa!i~!.!IS~r kind o~ knowledge wlhem X ha~ ~urood ~o" V and V has 
"iumsd to" X. Unr~lllited love is still love, but ij is no~ agaps since there is no 
mutuallf\y. There may bs knowled{8e, bY~ no~ ~s spsciml, ~rnon~l. intima~ 
knowledge mena!onoo oo~oi'®. 
There is mom tha~ a merely verba~ dmarenoo bemean ma.rtuB!I and unrequ~ool 
love since there Is ihil:l difference of knowledge. l\lut the dlfferenoo is one gg 
subjective feelin~ as welt A mutual love is mom satisfying), mom fruitful! whereas 
unrequited love, while intense and passionate, is not satisfying. I think ;g we met an 
individual who found the fruitless love of another satisfying we would think there 
was something abnormal or pathological about that person. 
Now am1oo with theoo distindiooo and ooncioorons w® CWl ~lYm fto the mam 
purpose of this chapter: to give some Indication of how love is the fulfilment of ihe 
law. 
low And The Fulfilment Of The law 
In thus section I will attempt to show how the positive and negative moral norms 
can be generated from ths idea that there Is a human nature and that th® highest 
fulfilment of that nature is in a community of mutual love. I wiH argue. along with 
John Finnis, that, " ... human fulfilment Is the fulfilment of persons, In community ... " 
[Finnis 1991 p.1 0]. 
The first idea mentioned above is that moral norms are contingent upon the types 
of beings we are, i.e •• what our human nature is like. What is meant here by moral 
norms? 1 mean those prohibitions or prescriptions which are not merely formally 
valid. For example, the moral rule 'Do no wrongful killing' is a purely formal rule, 
since the immorality ofthat which it prohibits Is built into its formulation (p.32 Finnls 
1991 ]. Formal rules seem to boll down to tautologies like, 'It Is immoral to oommit 
immoral acts'. Obviously tautologous, formal rules like this cannot oo the ldnd of 
thing that is oontingent upon ihe character oi human natum. Sinoo they am true by 
definition, the worse that can happen to them is that they ooooroo Irrelevant, e.g., 
the formal rule, aoo oo wrongful killing' wooldl not beoome false if humans werre 
lndestrootible, rather it would ooase to apply in any meaningful oonoo. 
So iormal mor1a11 ru~s a~r® no~ ~~nden~ u~n fi!Ymtali'l na~rure. W~at tdnd m ruk9s 
are delQSnolsn~ then? Perhaps ~o answer ~~is it is faa~ ro mks BJ spaci?ic eltam~. 
La~ us look at utue moral proilibmon agains~ having) sslt wiih anoihsi"s s~use, In 
oiher words, ~he moral ~rohibi~ion ag~in~~ adu~ery. Now i1 ons oo?ines adultsry a~ 
'wrong1td selt' ihe rule bscome~ merely ?erma; and, ij'Jers1ors, pmtly well 
unln~ormativs, a~rt from the useful role oi reminding that there migh~ bs such 
ihung as wrongful oox. ~~ ws ds~ne adluHsry more i'lle~m~llf SlS 'sex wiih BJnotrnw's 
spouse' we are in a position to see that the wron{Jiness oV ~his is depsnoom on ~s 
!dnd oi natures we i'iave. Given a d~ral'b~ narum ~ m~h~ ~ tliOO case ttnat adu~ry 
oocomes morally aooe~ble. Ths wrongness o~ adultsny lies not In the physical 
bshaviour itself, but in its interfering with ihe fulfilment of basic human needs, here 
the neeo1 1or stable, trusting relationships where loyaliy and commiment is o~ 
pararoount im~ilanoo [Finrois 1991 p.37·40J. As I ~y. ii our nait!res were radocally 
different and we had no SUJ!Ch n~. \ftsn ~h® moml sia~® og i!OO am of adl!llt®vy 
oould wen ros changed. 
This conclusion ttta~ oom9 iyps® og moral norm may oo coniingem on our nawre 
may appaar paradmdcal to some. "Surely," tOOy say, "Christian morali~ has 
assumed ~hat mora!liy Is absolu~. not oomlngern In ~he way you say ii Is. Whai 
other moral norms am changea~tg~e? Can we sial!'l ~o ignom tie Ten 
Commandments if we feel ihey no longer suit our.. natures?" As a matter of fact the 
moral theory 1 am aoopttrcg hem oos parha100 tile righ~ m b3 called 'THIE Ci'iristian 
theory'. St Thomas Aquinas,· for example, stalls with an understanding of whBJi 
constitutes human fulfilmsm and then proceeds to show how the norms of moralijy 
are rational in the light of this understanding: of course, earlier than this the same 
kind oi approach m morality is made roy Aristotle in The Nloomachean Ethics [See 
Porter 1994 Chapts. 2·3, Copleston 195~ Chapt. ~. Aristotle 1925 1 , 7]. 
And this esseniially, with a few mooiflootlons, Is what I am arguing for. If we 
have a central Good, love. and we understand tim oorurs of what It is to oo human 
and wha~ constitutes human fulfilment, Wlen all fthe other 'goods' are derivative. 
They am good ~cauoo toow am loving. We tmV®, W you Ilk®, ~ two-~11' rmrality. 
The central aooolute b~ is the only true Good Is low; the other goods are derived 
1rom ~ rand are oontingsnt upon ow· narums. SO, Uor example, ~e goodness o~ 
refraining wom adultery is derivative wom ~n understanding of what oonstitme® 
hum~n fuffilmsmt oomroililed with ihs atooolt.m oomma\001 ~ oo ~e iomng ~~n~. Thus 
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moraliW Is i'aJijon~l giv~n ij'us premisses Ut~~ ~hers is sometttin~ ~h~~ oomprisss 
human ful~lms~ anol fths prsscrllOiion iha~ one shoL!!ol love. Indeed, ihe !ovs ~~ 
one should have is the kind o~ love thai seeks murualilty sinoo, as we have seen, 
mutual love is ~e mos~ fu~illad form o~ low~. 
i\!ow Bl roumiilsr o1 otojaeilons fto ~is ovsmll, broaQ'J~y Ar~oisiiBtrn-Yhomi~ 
concep~lon o1 ChrlsiDan stttics can oo maoo: 
i) li is uoohrisfolan sinoo ij logiooi~ le~m to at 1mm o~ acrr-mnnariamism. The 
moral prescripiion 'Do ~he loving ating' is m~sly to lsad to a lessening o1 the sta~us 
of the Ten Commandmen~. Should we commit adultery if this seems the loving 
thing to do? This lessening o~ the Importance o~ traditionally dearly helo1 rules is 
seen q!Jlije c!eai'iy ill'a Jon~flhBin !Fletcher's Siwa~on. E~ics a~nd Bishop Robinson's 
Honest to Goo. FfJr S){B!m~ts, Rofoinson clta~ims ": .• nothing c~ll'a o1 !meW SJiw2ys oo 
tafoollsd as wronQJ. One cannot, for inswnoo, smi1 ~rom a posiiion 'ool! rela~ions 
bs1ora marriage' or 'd!voroo' ~re wmn@ or sinful in themselves ... ihs only intrh'lsic 
evil Is lac~ o11@W~." iRo~niilSOUb ~ 963 p.118]. Th®r® D$ ooroo ~ urn whai Rooilllson 
says: love is ihe cemral guiding principle, bw ~hs conclusion is noi. ~M~ no aci is 
wrong 1111 iisslfl. Mer~ o1 U1lis ISJi®w. 
2) Ths neo-Arls~oiellan pidurs o~ moraliiy seems io roouoo moraliiy ro saW-
imsrest Mom~iiy oooom®$ a ~ioo og ~licy w~ich eoo~s o111s iO geft oom A ro s. 
'A' is an unfuffllled narurs and 'B' Is a~ fu~i!lad orus. rn oours®, some ti'lin~srs It I$ 
precisely bscat.nss til® idsa o~ 'B' hsls ihse&'ll lost thai momiifty ha~ los~ ~ pnint 
Alisdalr Maeln~rs argyas this in Afler Virtue where he commends the Arisrooolian 
oonoopijcm (Soo MMi~m 1985 Cln~~- 5). HIOOlt®Ver, i:ils ~il11lft remains h)$® wHilll 
a "high S~ic., ooncs~on og morality sse tile ililsODY I a~m prolMJSln@ ~s a su!lyi~ o~ 
rrwmlnty's pumy [Soo HOOsc>n 1983 gl.3~-37~ ror a round-tJJfP o~ ~®$® ar~umsms. 
The phrSJoo 16hlgh SroltrJ line" Is from G®ach 1977 p.16]. · 
3) The ihlro1 line o~ cr~iclsm claims that them Is no adS()JOOW conoo~on og 
what oonstmMoo human ~mishu~. EV®n Ge2ci"o who oomme~ iY'1® Ai'ls'rowliaiil 
tins avoids $2ying maAm ~room wh~ ·~· is [Sss HYdoon i 983 l0-3M-~5]. Tl13 claim 
may t.llts afr"IS ~Cffi"! fmai ~S!i'~ i$ 00 SUJcGl ®lin@ 28 IU.Drml~ nelWi'S - SIYCh a c~aom is 
argued ror by BQny B~roos ~no'! ~\fid Bloor In ~sir ~oos.y Rs!sllll\fi~m. Rs.Eionalism 
and the Sociology o1 Knowla®s [flam®s arn(ll Bloow 1 SiS]. A tr~ly sm~ti'ictal! 
- 65-
alQ)proaci'l is, tlley say, opsr~ minded arorn wh~~ man is; in~oo. wi'lat ils is is 
always a produc~ o~ his environment 
Replying To Th~ss Criticisms 
The 1Urs~ c~scfd()fi1 OO!n fa® ooum®r®dl Rmli®ve rov a! ~p9fi' tnn~m~nd~n~ o~ whBlR 
is baing propussd. The r®sul~ is not @1 zyp® o~ ac~·utllliananism m an a~·Blgapism 
I~ 1972 p.96J·106J]. li we m 11a1w ~ rna~rufi'e 8\nOJ il'lll:s nsrrure is only fuWmoo ill1l 
osiiain ways, then certain typ3s o~ am orr intern~n Rlsooms always wrong. I~ ~e 
killing. oi innooen~ really doos vio!allt® what ~ \tV'uly 1$ to ~ touman, il'llen ~ never 
bscomes the loving thing to do. John Finnis says, "Btit one can juolge an agenfs 
ac~ion wrong as soon as one identifies a morally significani defed in one's 
mo~ivations, or an inswropri~~sness in rele~on eithsr to ths circumsmncss or to 
the means involwol in til~~ o~con · ma!um ®>t (()Juoon.~mqus oomcw." [Finn!$ iSS~ 
p.17J. In other words, It is not lncumbsnt upon the Btgsnt that he has,· when 
oon~cnlt®©1 wn~ 21 mn~e o~ o~ooo, m ca~i©~~ Ofi' ws~~ 111~ ~® ~Will'tliall 
oon~ooll1Jt goOOs oiJ tillos~ atclions which am ~imBl iacie wrong. Thus ot iSD1l'~ my 
responsibil!iy now ro welgll'D UJplDlle ~~®rD!tVal ~oo oo ~ ~ao1 ~om B!dLlims~ jus~ in 
case, in the long nnn, more goods aoorus ~rom just such em a~cilon. 
~ani o~ wha~ is r®ing sai(jj here is h~ ons sooYio'l nsvsr imam~ evil ~~ pd 
should come [Romans 3v8, Pop® John PBJul 1993 79]. Hem too objooror migh~ w®U 
say ihBli sooh a~ ~ormMisl~tm tl3~ iV'lls c:aoos~orn in Ill® owrn iolw~r. The wuy ()Jusstion 
is: is li wrong to do 'evil' when that 'svtr results In gre~t good? Is the 'evil' in 
quesiicn maty e\101 wfn®rt Qhe basco unwn~ is· U> oo ~~ool. w end lJJP w~ at s~w o~ 
anairs where the good predominates? 
li is, o~ oourse, bsttsr to do evll1or ~e Sak® o1 good rather than mr ii$ own sattrs, 
Kmi ilM «)JOO~Ul o~ wn-t®llOOr ~roo ~d® ®VB~ ~©R$ ~li'OO cll'la~ng®@l ~ ih~ ii'D~mi~ns 
og ihs ~era~ us diffica.nl\11• To 1\l® m@re s~ffic. woyld i~ b3 rn§;3h~ roli' m® ic klli an~ 
innooom ~mon 111 by d@l~ oo many live$ oou~ las sav~? We»u~d w~ai Is «)ro'Jin~i'ily 
1. It migh~ oo srgu~d ~hBt~ w~ cmn dls~in~ulsh 0vll irom wroneJ. Thus i~ mi~hl! be ~he cms0 
that X-in21 is an Intrinsically evil action, but that p®i1ormlnt:?J X on a particular oecaslon Is 
justi11sd. In that case X is 0vil, but on this occasion noi wrong. Howev0r, it is th0 validity 
of this distinction that Is in question here. 
an aei illa~ vcoia~es a oosic hurm01 nssd, ~oms aoos~~s iro the?Jse 
circums~ncss? fo\ccordinQJ ~o an BtcHrnlit3lr!an llyt'J8 tllsory, such a~ killing doss 
oocome aooep~ble. Bu~ whe~ aoot.mt ~he moaoor picmre? WhB!~ sWeci would such 
an acR have on me, my wif®, ~he psrson I ·s~vs'? How is on® to weigh up theoo 
various goods and l:m.ds? Th~Sre seems to bs no a!PPfO~rlaw calculus whereby ons 
can judge, wtih any degres o~ skill, the various consaquane~es. 
Pemaps ihe wta~y cmi o~ ~® di~emrm1 ©ra~ussd [»y ~oooo variolY® srenB~oo~ is ro falll 
back on the olomrine o~ double enact Finrnls has no difiiculiy In commending 
certain iypss of physical bshaviouAr as long as what is imended is not Rhe evil thai 
may inevitably ~low from that behaviour. For example, it is always wrong to 
delibsrately kill the innocent This Is a moral absolute, bu~ one may neveiiheless 
kill innocents as long as ons doos not in~end ro do It Air-Vies Marshal Good may 
inieoo ro oomb mil~ry in~l~llio!rb® !rn ali'l en®my ~. H® ~w® ~~i alaoom 
certainly civilians will be killed by tie bombing. Neverih~less their deaths, altlough 
inevitable, Is not what he intends; wh8!~ he Intends Is the destruction or ttte miliiai'\f 
bases. Air-VIce Marshal Bad, on ttte other hand!, wan~ the innooenm to die, so tMt 
the morals of the enemy is weakened. He Intends evil, so that good wm come; ttls 
~ svU ihat he intends B~S fdh® moons to what oo sees as llhs ooslmfo!e Gnd. Aili'-
Vice Marshal Gooo1's intention® am no~ tha~ civilians die; their detiAfl'IS are not a 
mea~rus to an end. 
Can this doctrine be use()] with our type o~ killing oV innocents case? Finnis 
argues thai the wrongness of an action doss not lie wiih a purely physical 
description of that which is under scrutiny [Finnis 1991 p.37-40). If it were the 
physical we were worried aoout. ii would oo impossible to distinguish ootwoon 
Good and ~d's oomfoing. What makes a111 action wrong is its object [p.38]. Finnis' 
posffion is also supported by Veritatis Splendor [Pops John Paul II 1993 71-83}. 
If 1 were to kill soms psrnon for ihe sake of many lives does the doctrine og 
double e~ oome Into play? It Is not1lhe physlml act iiooftf 1lh81i 6$ wrong; this we 
have already seen (p.64). Can I say ths objOOR that I lnmndls the saving oi many 
Jives; the COllin~ i'tSelfl i5l juSft, oo ~o spsak. fth® ine~ble pmwrsow m that adion? I 
do not intend killing; I intenol th® saving of many lives. 
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a desirable ss~ o~ oonsequenoos. It iS the killin{ll oi an innooeni ~artt I intmd Bind 
~his, ooing an evil, should not too part o~ what puts before oneself as arb available 
option. Pope John Paul says this, "The foresooafols consequences are pari o1 
ihoss circumstances of the act which, while capable o1 lessening the gravity of an 
evil act, nonetheless cannot alter its moral species." [77]. My killing would no~ be as 
bad, but i~ would still be an evil and should not be deliberately chosen. 
What are we m say then? I haw said that we should do the loving thing and 
certain species of action are not loving by virtue of their violation of basic human 
needs. However, there appear to be circumstances where these actions appear 
morally ·attractive because of the good that flows from them. Are we then drawn 
Into an overall consequentiallst position which would fly in the face of centuries of 
Christian thought? Perhaps we have a rule-utilitarianism Instead of the more 
severn 'act' variE»ty • nevertheleS$ utilitarianism is what we end up with. 
It appears that even Finnis is consequentlallst up to a point. Certain actions or 
Intentions are wrong. not by virtue of their physical characteristics. but because 
they lead to fulfilment of our humanity. He says, "The proportionalists are right In 
thinking that moral dirootiveness is essentially a matter of truths about the 
relationship between the activity directed and human good, well-being, fulfilment. 
But their account of the relationship betwe0n human good and morally significant 
choice is grossly simplified and incoherent." [Finnis 1991 p.41). 
One significant point is the impossibility of hypothesizing about ttte long-term 
consequences of a particular action. Rationally, therefore, If we can discover 
species of action that damage human goods and prevent human fulfilment, then it 
best to avoid such actions even in cases where It appears that greater good would 
flow from Ignoring any prescription against them. We can ·at least be. sure that the 
list of evils given in Verltatl§ Splendor harm some person; we can never be 
absolutely sure that the deliberate performing or Instituting of these species of 
action will give overall benefit. The ChriStian Church would argue that the likelihood 
of these actions resulting In human long-term nourishment is minuscule: "Whatever 
is hostile to life itself, such as any h~micide, genocide, abortion, euthanasia and 
voluntary suicide; whatever violates the mental integrity of the human person, such 
as mutilation, physical and mental torture and attempts to coerce the spirit; 
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wha~ever is oWensive ro humaJn digniW st.Bch as syfo-human living conoliiiems. 
awbiirary imprisonm~nt .. slavei)l, l()rosfd~rnion ... " [Pops John Paul1993]. 
For the Christian, there is a~notner reason for not psiimming such aciions: Goo. 
I~ God really does command man to avoid these iy~s o1 thing and if God r~a~lly did 
insti~ute the Ten CommandmeniS, ihsn given He is a loving God with a psried 
un~rsta~ndlng o~ ourr nature, it is ra~ooai to comeJ w ~s conclusion ~hat His 
judgements arre roost This, as I will au-gue, doo~ not oompromise our auronomy in 
any signfficaniiy dama@ing way (p.M). As Firmis lOOints ow, '1o respscft the moral 
absolutes which are made known to us by Goo, who has practical knowledge of 
everything without limit And to cooperate thus with God is to ~ke into accoynt 
everything (the principle demands 0~ proportionalists), in the only way we can." 
[FiO"'fli$ 1991 p.20]. 
So, then, a Christian, non-utilitarian ethic is pr~erved. It seems to me that whsn 
Chrisiians like F!etdlsrr and RofglnooO"' oomroon~ Bl !tind o~ uUiliiMan approBlchl, thsy 
forget the signmcance o~ ihe 1am tlat man has a particular nature SJnd a mlos. li hs 
not ttuoogh lack of low that AqiYinas warns agaioot homicioo, itt is on a0001um of 
love - a love ihai recogni2:es what human nature is and sees ihat man's telos is 
God-directed. Of OOtYrse, neithew Robinson oor Fletcher would avsr reoommend the 
killing o~ innocents in order to achieve sQme hoped-for long-term good, but that is 
what theirr ethical matemenis seem on the eoo ro !eat01 itO. I do no'i, then, ihlnk tile 
conception of ethics I advocate leads k> utilitarianism. 
What about objection number two - that this understanding of ethics leads to seli-
. interest; morality oooomes another wav of putting self first The objection claims 
that morality becomes Identical witlil prudence since it is seen as a kind of policy 
that leads X from an unfulfilled to a fulfilled nature. This change is in X's bsm 
interests and, therefore, it is [prudentially rational torr him to pursue it This is soon 
as a muddying of the ~re watem of morality. 
We will invootigam oome ~ tilooe arguments in Re!OOfing to the Charoo of 
Auionomy. For now I shall oonoontrate my attention on wh_at I conceive is man's 
teios. Man's tslos is to live ili'D a oommurnHy of muml iove wililh his fsllow msn arno1 
God. Moralliy is or should oo dlrooted ro tha~ end. Whet we should do, therefore, is 
ro seek ~ esia~lish loving retatkms witth poopte, ondesdl, we shoukll seek ro allow 
ttlsm ~ ss~Blfoli~h loving rsi€;1~ions wi\lh tns as wen. Thtn~ ws Blim in cur Bldioos 
tow8lwds 81 commLBni~ o~ muruallove. Chrisijan [07ssciip-Rions ai1dl pmscropiffions am 
dirsc~ed ~awards man reali~ing this na~urs. 
What can bs selilsh aoou~ ihis? Jg my ooooeption o~ man's tatoo is an aooumts 
one, ws ~ave awiCJOO ~hs ~ro~sm og a ~ilicula~ ~~U"O doin~ @ood j~As~ fosCBJtUSS 
it is the oos~ policy. To see~ aller loving, muruat ij'ela~looships is to S){cluoo 
redtncing morali\lV ~ .. mers SJZ~disncy" [MQ.B~n 1 s~ ~-~). 
Naturally, my conception og roomlijy - Ut® fac~ th~~ it oos a point • provioos 
rational reasons for being moral, but it does nm make you moral. Morality enjoins 
two principles: Love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind and streng~h 
and Love you~ nsighoour as yoursaW. So w om~ 101ooids$ to tty ~ obsy ihese Wlto 
commands oocaius~S one sees that It is on®'s own ~sft int®rrs~w (which m indood i®) 
one nw~ imm~~i®~ ~hrow ta~siOO sum mo~!liiOO$ 2nd ~~ ~ ~ o~ o~rn: 
only than is one truly ruWilloo. Only by sae~nta oo b3 Ia~ can one ooms ftmt [M~rn 
Sv35]. 
Basil Mitchell in Momliiy: Rslk!ious and Soou!arr rna~ a1 similar pnint H0 calls 
~e view iha~ m@raiijy is qoo fo3$t tm!Ccy ~ "®wn·~-eBlfiil" '\fisW while til® i~ea ill'la!R 
morality or virtue is its own reward Is calieOl the "hlgh~mindad" view. The down·w· 
eBJM view is ioo crroo'Je, ~ft the hi~ll'B-mnrn~~ visw "is dol!!~ i.BD'lSBlflfi~~inlf [M~e~n 
1 sao p.142J. First or all, i? virtue is a .. principloo ooncsrn mr o~srs' neoos ttten 
iheoo nse~ rooij~r ow viuiloo so oonooivoo is ~lnhss". Seeooolly, ..... ng ottlerr msn's 
happiness, a~ which ihe good man ought to aim, is disijnct rrom their virrue, ihe 
QJOOO man's own h~wa~sss <:ai11rnm ©ansi~ irn hlis vi~· a Ions." [p.142]. 1~ OOih ~e 
high anOJ dowrn-~o-aandh view oro iOOir own are Ynsaftisfamovy we nesd a way o~ 
forlnglng tllem ~etaerr. We oooo1 'LO insfs1( alcmgJ wo~ .. Pia~o and! Aoisro~ on ~ 
oon~ntroon~ which allends the li1s o~ moral virrue, which is the highsl'j~ and ~~sft 
p!easure ant:a ilmMs gu.om iile re~!ijon ~aR one is achieving e"csllenoo BlS a man" 
[p.143]. I have a~empted ~o do something alon~ the$® lines. We gain a desp ssnss 
og rumlroon~ fcly ~rsltAilil@ virru®, ~we oo ~ aell vi~oYS~ mrr tlni$ fu!llfi"iJl(Sif'Ot, W® oo 
it ~or ~oo love o~ Gool, otters sm!Ol ouroolves. ihos · ~ota~ch ~o ~lcs ooss rno~. i~ 
sesms ~o ms, ~Bld Ro ~ faaooming j~on~ am i01sw~cfl1 ~~ ~ow ctmoning tOns's cw~ 
b3st ln~eresm. 
Whm aJbom ihs ~hnr(l] o~actioll"9? Hsrs ~s miiic cl~~m$ ~ha~ tilers is no s~ch ijlin~ 
as humE!n ooiure, or ihai man has nOJ ~elo~. or oottl. Fmn!(iy ! ~nol ~s view tha~ 
claims ~hat ~hare is no such \thin@ as human nature 'to bs prsijy ba~am:; ano1 
impi(Ausible. It seems ~o me ~o oo obvious ttla~. as humans, w® h~ve ce~in nseoo. 
capacities arnol ways of being. H~re I identify humarn na~ure witll those capacities 
and needs that, in some way, indica~a or dimm ~he parson towards his and. Thus i~ 
appeal's that for healthy, psychological integrity we need rriendshlp. Friendship is a 
kind! of taste of man's final end!. Consequently, irn my definition, friendship or the 
capaci1y to seek companionship of a certain sort is part of what it is ro be human. 
Again, ~he need to mil th0 truth is paf1 of ~he oonditions of man's final end. So 
telling the truth and communicating is part of what it is to be human. I could go on, 
but it would be pointless since I do not think it necessary ~ prove tilat there is such 
a thing as human nature. The kind of nature man has is, of course, a subject for . 
debate. For me, ~he Chrlsti~n unoorstandin~ oi human nature searoo clo~es& to 
what we really find when we study the science of mankind. But this Is a matter iha~ 
cannot oo debated here. 
Perhaps one of tile motives undergirding those who deny that there is no single 
human nature Is a oonoom that we, as Westerners, will impose our view of the 
world upon otheli' cultures. We will see them as ootng a kind of reflection of 
ourselves and not appreciate them for their own uniqueness. This is a laudable 
motive, but it is, I fear, self-defeating. Without oome kind of shared characteristics 
we could not understand other culturoo at all. If they were totally and radically alien, 
we would not oo able to appreciate them for their own uniqueness because all we 
would be able to hear would be babble. a charivari of discordant noises. When we 
interact with other cultures, they moye a bit towards us and we (hopefully) move a 
bit towards them: we find In the middle our shared humanity - for the Christian this 
shared humanity is God's image. This seems to me a noble conception of what it is 
to oohuman. 
I think, then. that all three major objootions have been dealt with. Now I warrt to 
look at one mom objootion to the position I espouse. I mal with it separately 
because it Is more theological than philosophical. 
James Gustafson argues in Theoloov and Ethics that the Thornlst picture of 
ethics being prl~rily about the good lor man is too-anthropomorphic. Scienoo has, 
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he argues, shown us ~hat we are a small pai'l of creation and ~o think ~he universe 
is there for our benefit is implausible. What we need ro do is replace a man-osmred 
e~hic with a ~heocentric ethic. It may bs that our place in God's scheme o1 things is 
not the grand ems ij')a~ Chuis~~n trnolllion has llai..!tJ~. He says, "in ~mlS o1 good o~ 
wlue ttte question is, usoolly. WhBti is ~ood ror man? or What is oi vaJiue to l'mmBtn 
bsings? ... Aitematives are these: Wha~ is good ~r tl1e whol19 creaiion? Wha~ is 
good not only ~or man but for the natural world o~ which man is pail?'" [Gusiaison 
1S81 p.88]. 
Gustaffion develops his argument saying that it could never ba pan of Christian 
thin~ing ~en Goo was made 1or man [p.92]. Iff this is the case, why should we 
assume iha~ God's purposes are exclusively 1or the bsnefit of mankind? The 
. . 
BiblicBJI s~ory oi AbrahB!m 2nd lsaBJc shows us iha~ Goo's pu~l!IDS®S ars not always 
in accord with a man-csntrsd ethic where human ll~e mus~ oo preoorvsd at all oo~ 
[p.89-90]. 
Some oi whai Gustafson point® out is valid, but I diSBlgrss wlih his conclusion 
ttlat we should revise our overall picrurs of ~s rela~ionship bsiwesn God and man 
and move ~award a more Eastern religious tradition. The reason for this Is simple: 
ttw chok:e is not bsiwsen ~n ®thnc ihai Is exclusively man-centred or an ethic which 
is more 'green' and world- or nature-centred. In Thomist understanding etillcs IS 
theooon~ric, rom Goo is a Goo oi low a~ndl so ethics is noi man-ceultred bm wa~r 
love-centroo. Oi course. there has boon as Gustafson points ou~ some disromon- o~ 
this, bart it wouid, I foolisw, bs serioYsly unchristian ro sntsliiain the ideBt th~ GOO is 
not powerful enough ro intend the good ror both nature and man. Gustafson 
complains that Walter Rauschenbusch writes that "the will o~ GOd is Identical with 
the good o1 mankind" [p.94). But do we want to come to the conclusion tllat God 
.in~ends mankind's bad - of course notl 
I agree thai Christian teaching is that God's purposes are directed towards man. 
That is bscanAss we haw a God who is identical with Low. BlYt t!his does not mean 
that God cannot have any other intentions other than ihose that are man-orierntsd. 
There are teasing glimpses in Scripture that God's purposss are wide, oo~ that 
mankind plays a central part: "The creation waiw In eager exp3da~on for the sons 
of Goo it) ~ mvearoo. For ~oo creaiiorn wt&s su~~ iO ifrustraltion, no~ by ~ own 
choice, but by the will of ths one who subjamoo ii, in hops that the creation imeW 
0
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will bs libaratsd Ti'om ijs bondage to dlecay and brought in~ ij'te glorious ~edam o~ 
tile children of God." [Romans 8v19-21 ]. 
We can, therefore, agree wiih Gust~ffion thai we should not bs antl'lropomorphic 
in our thinking aboui God, bui deny the basically unchristian tene~s o1 his overall 
philosophy. This point is made by Jean Porter in After Virtue [Porter 1994 
p.27&185]. 
Finally In this chapter, I tum to the question of the relationship ootwesn Love and 
Justice. 
Love and Justice 
The question is tilis: can justice be accommodated into a themy oi love, or is 
justice contingent in the sense thai other goods are contingent Are principles of 
justice only valid given that man has tie particular nature 11e has? 
In this section, I will argue that there is a deep conceptual relationship between 
love and justice and that it is not, therefore, dependent on human nature. 
Fletcher makes this claim, "Love and justice are the same, for justice is love 
distributed, nothing else." [Fletcher 1966 p82]. William Frankena thinks that this 
kind of identification cannot be made. In Ethics Frankena argues that justice and 
the principle of beneficence are two related, but distinct parts of morality. The 
principle of beneficence which says that one ought to do good and avoid or prevent 
harm [Frankena 1973 p. 45) is the nearest thing to a morality based on love. 
Frankena says, "The clearest and most plausible view, in my opinion, is to identify 
the law of love with what I have called the principle of beneficence, that is. of doing 
good ... " Now because the principle of beneficence cannot cover the whole of 
morality (since It gives no indication of how good Is to be distributed) Frankena 
adds the following point, " ... and Insist that It [the principle of benefiCence] should be 
supplemented by the principle of distributive justice or equality." [p. 58]. 
Now if Frankena is right about the distinctness of love and justice it would appear 
that my case is weakened. However, before this conclusion is jumped at we must 
remind ourselves of what I am claiming. I am not claiming that justice and love are 
exactly the same thing.· Rather I am claiming that justice is an aspect of love, that 
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there is an inijmats conceprual connection b3iwesrn ttle two such th&~ Bl correct 
understanoling of love leads us ~o a corred undersmnding oi jusijce, ttla~ love and 
jus~ice canno~ b3 undai'S~ood apsui rrom each other. 
However, Frankaoo seems to bs making ihe point that there is no~ even this 
concepi:uai connedion. This is the pnint iila~ oooos arguing against 
I will concentrate my attention on distributive justice. Here many differenft 
locWions try ro grasp the essential nature o~ ~is iyps o~ justios; ~or eltample, we 
have; similar treatment for similar cases, to each according to his merl~s or works, 
to each the same thing and to each according to his needs [Outka 1972 p.88-91 ]. 
For the purposes of this thesis, the last locution seems most appropriate. (Of 
course, not all ~hilosophers would agree that it captures all that the notion o~ 
jus~ioo is moonft ~o cowr. looks, for insiancs, argues ttlalt ooo has a right to wha~ 
one has justly acquired; this seems ro bs something that is lost in the locution that 
identifies jus~lce as being about needs. I cannot argue for it here, but it seems to 
me that the notiorn that one's justly acquired items am owneo1 rightfully is an. idea 
that can be met by a need-conception of justice; one can say that to own what one 
has worked ror Is a need ttlat human beings have.) 
Now the ethical theory I have been advocating seems to meld very well with this 
conception of distributive justice. An ethic that has as its aim the promotion o1 
agape, i.e., a love which aims at a positive opening up of the benefitter of my 
actions, must consider the individuality of the particular person and the individuality 
of the set of circumstances that surround that person. One cannot know what to do 
to encourage his positive response If one does not know the individuality of ttlat 
parson; one must attempt to gain that personal intimate knowledge which is 
necessary for the existence of agape. One is, in other words, trying to know the 
needs of that parson and, in tlfying to fulfil them, encouraging him to ~rticipate in a 
loving relationship. 
Now it may be objected at this point that this requires the impossible: knowledgs 
of each individual. This is not the case. With an adequate conception of what it is to 
b9 human, i.e., an understanding of human nature, we are in possession of much 
of tile requisite knowledge. For example, Sonia in Crime and Punishment ~nows 
that the killing o~ the old woman is wrong because the old woman is a person made 
God, Goodn~ss And Love 
in the image of God. Her knowledge of humanity gleaned from Scripture enables 
her to have compassion for what Raskolnikov can only see as "a useless, 
harmless, nasty louse". It seems to me that with a rich and accurate understanding 
of what it is to be human, we have enough personal, intimate knowledge to at least 
lay the basis of love. If there were no such thing as human nature and each person 
was an absolute sui generis individual then my theory would face insuperable 
objections. 
If justice is about needs in general its essential character does not depend upon 
the types of being that any ethical theory is dealing with. The way in which a type 
of being's needs are met depends upon what these needs are, but the prescription 
that one ought to aim at the fulfilment of a particular being's nature is absolute, 
since love would always aim at the good for any being. Thus I think I have shown 
that justice is not contingent, but an absolute. 
Does this mean that love and justice are identical? I think not - as I have argued 
before certain abstract moral principles may be aspects of love (p.39). They can be 
deduced from what love is without a consideration of the types of world we have 
and the type of natures we have. They are a priori in the sense that a consideration 
of what love is alone leads to an understanding of them. How these principles are 
applied is contingent in the sense that we have to see what kind of world we have 
before we know how the specifics of their implementation Is to be achieved. 
The reason why I think love and justice need to be logically distinguishable but 
conceptually linked is because most traditional understanding of the Cross have 
seen it as the resolution of a conflict between love and justice. If the two were 
Identical such understandings G understandings I have sympathy with - would be 
inadmissible [See Carey 1986 for a round-up of various theories of what the Cross 
means). 
So I have In this chapter tried to show how God's Goodness being identified as 
Love Is meant to wort< as an ethical theory. 
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R~p!ying To Autonomy 
In ttlis chapter I want ro re-emamins the argumenffi brought against a Divine 
command morality from those who believe i~ in some way compromises 
'autonomy'. Firs~ I will briefly remind ths reader what the substance o~ these 
arguments involve. 
One argument claims ~hat it is inevitable that each individual is his own moral 
arbiter; even if one were to choose to defer one's moral decisions to God this initial 
choice would be orw which could be morally judged. The Divine command theorist, 
the argument claims, cannot surrender his moral decisions ro God for even this act 
of surrender would involve a moral choice as to whether it was right or wrong so to 
surrender. This argument lays a great deal of stress on the inevitable responsibility 
of each individual to make his own choices. This decision making is part of what 
dignifies each person. Giving up this decision making Is impossible; to want to give 
it up is "infantile" [Noweii-Smith 1961 ]. 
A second group of arguments looks at the foundations of morality and how 
inappropriate foundations can have disastrous consequences. To be moral is to do 
one's duty and to do one's duty is to follow the dictates of reason. Morality is 
categorical ancil is in no need of external support in order to make its absolute 
demands any more absolute than they are. Divine command moralities try to 
provide an inappropriate foundation for morality. Such moralities claim that ethical 
demands are based on contingent, non-categorical bases such as the commands 
of the Church or historical events such as the death of Christ or the New 
Testament Covenant. 
Furthermore, it is believed that these improper foundations can change the 
character of moral motivation. Thus one might do something not because it is the 
dutiful thing to do, but because one is attempting to avoid Divine punishment. In 
contrast, when morality is based on the categorical imperative such mere 
prudential reasoning is avoided. 
These, in essence, are the charges I wish to examine. First of all I will 
concentrate my attention on the point that we are inevitably our own moral arbiters, 
that the Divine command theorist cannot escape his responsibility. I think ihls 
charge makes two distinguishable claims that are often confused: there is the 
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Replying To Autonomy 
LOGICAL point that when confronted with alternatives one must make a choice; 
even if one were to 'refuse to make the choice' that itself is a choice. In this logical 
sense, we are always responsible (leaving aside difficult cases where one is 
drugged or hypnotised. Being coerced to do something by threat is incidentally not 
a case of losing one's logical responsibility. One can, even under threat of death, 
choose death). The second claim is the MORAL claim that to surrender your will to 
authority is wrong; it is a wilful misuse of one's moral responsibility. Even if this 
authority is Divine one needs to consider Its demands according to one's own 
conscience and reason. To do less is to cease to be a responsible moral agent. 
Here we get a new concept of responsibility compared with the one mentioned 
above; roughly, it is responsibility in the sense of making carefully worked out adult 
decisions 
The conflation of these two senses of the idea of responsibility results in bad 
argument The problem is that the particular argument I have in mind is very 
commonly used against Divine command ethics with an unjustified confidence that 
It is pretty well conclusive. Here I will look at how it is expressed by Macintyre. The 
kind of ethical position it seems to commit him to is purely the result of his failing to 
distinguish between the two senses of responsibility outlined above. My exposition 
of Macintyre is not meant to show anything substantive about his own ethical 
position; alii am attempting to do is show the inadequacies of a commonly used 
argument (It is, for example, used by Nielsen 1973 p. 7]. The fact that I use 
Macintyre's formulation is incidental. 
Macintyre says this, "Suppose that a divine being, real or alleged, commands 
me to do something. I ought only to do what he commands if what he commands is 
right. But if t am in a position to judge for myself whether what he commands is 
right or not, then I have no need of the divine being to instruct me in what I ought to 
do. Inescapably, each of us is his own moral authority.1Maclntyre 1961 p.195).1t is 
this last sentence that I find curious. If Macintyre is making the purely logical point 
that one must, when faced with an alternative, make some kind of choice, then I 
agree with him, but I find it hard to work out what he can mean by saying that this 
inescapability of choice-making makes us our own moral authorities. Is Macintyre 
making the claim that because morality inevitably involves choice-making, moral 
standards are a matter of choice? Are we "moral authorities" to such an extent that 
whatsoever we decide becomes, by virtue of that decision, the moral thing to do? 
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This cannot bs MBJclntyre's meanin~ [Ses Macin'iyre 1985 1ou- his own moraJI 
philosophy]. 
La~ us e}{amins this ~urihsr. We must decide whettler or not to surrender ouli" will 
to God. I agree. Thai this is a moral choice, I agree. That my choice creates 
morality, that my logiCB!I auttlority as Inescapable choics-maktsr mal<ss me the 
creatm· o1 moraley, I dsny. Macln~rs says I mu~ judge whethsli" or not ro obsy 
God's commB!nds. I aJgres. em how am I to judge whether or not to ~ollow Goo1's 
commands? It would b® a curious moml philosophy that mainiBJined ~at 111 choose 
to obay I am right by virtue o~ my so deciding AND i11 choose not to obey I am right 
by virtue· or my so deciding. This philosophy would be unacceptably subjectivist to 
philosophers like Macintyre and Rachels (who also emphasises individual moral 
responsibil~ [Rachels 1S71] ). 
It seems to me thaft ~he arguman~ Macintyre uses conftares the logical poim 
about the inescapablllty o~ choice-making with ~he moral poinft abou~ ile 
improprieiy of surrendsring wills to arnhomy. Because of this ~he argumant appsars 
to show that sines it is aJUways ira the end up to us whether to obsy a pamcular 
authority, ihis makes us ineviiabry auihor~tive in regard to morals. But is this true, 
say, In sciencs? it seams to me a logica~l ~ruti1 too~ in the end ii is "up to me'" 
whether or not I embraoo Darwin's theory o1 evolwion, but whether I embrace it or 
not makes noi a jot o~ dmerenos to lis t'i'U1th or falsity. Cenainty the inevitability o~ 
me baing my own chooser does not make me authoriia~lve in matters of science. It 
seems the same way witil momlity: mos~ philosophers of Kantlan leanings want to 
emphasise ow· making choices, but they should not thin~ that morality becomes a 
matter oi c:hoioo. Most neo-Kmtians would, I believe, want io avoid this kind o1 
conclusion. 
The criteria for successful choice-making in morality are "out there" in the world 
so ~o spsak. I oolleve ~hess criteria come from God who is "the source of all good 
desires and right judgements" [From the Evening Collect]. By this I mean til~ it Is 
God who is the 1oundaltion or iinal ground of ®le moral. We mus~ choose, but our 
choices do no~ I believe make a difference to the ontology of morality. What is right 
or wrong sl'iays itle same lndapsn~m OJ~ our desires. Here Kani WaJ$ quite righ~ ro 
insist on morality's autonomy. n seem$ to ms iha~ the logical point does not affOOi 
the validity of my ihoory. Tha~ we hav® to bs our own choosers oloss not a~ the 
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essence ot wl'la~ morBJ!ifly is. 
There is another more general argumeni a~Btinst the Maclmyrean ide~ fuat we 
awel "inevitably oor own moral c:urtnorities". Consider ij'}is quotation from Kant, "Even 
Rhe Holy One from ihs gospa~ mus~ first oo romparoo with our idea! o~ mcmt~ 
pstiedfon be1ore we can n~oognlse him as such."' (Kan~ 1948 p.73J. Here Kan~ is 
concerned to show, as is Macintyre, that we are inevitably auronomous because 
we have to compare even Christ with our prior notion o1 goodness before we cam 
recognize Him as good. This means ~hat, sbictfy speaking, we have no need of the 
example of Christ in order for us to know what to do. We already know what to do 
because we have this prior understanding of goodness. As Basil Mitchell observes, 
this argument, if successful, makes what is an ordinary fact of moral education 
logically impossible [Mitchell 1980 p.148]. It means that we cannot learn anything 
morally new irom goool men anol women. Moral sxamples can only confirm what 
we already know. But surely, Mitchell says, this is highly paradoxical for the fact is 
that we do team new things about morality from good people. Do we have to say 
thai the Disciples, because they recognized Christ's goodness. could ·have 
preached the Sennon on the Mount [p.153]? Surely such a conclusion must be 
nonsense. We do need SOME understanding of what is moral to recognize 
someone's virtue, but we do not have to be a moral genius ourselves. The 
conclusion Mitchell draws about autonomy is much the same as the one I have 
already stated: "The logical force of Kanrs dictum is simply that recognition of 
Christ's moral perfection is in itself a moral act and this we cannot and need not 
deny." [p.153]. The logical point that we, as our own choosers, have to make a 
choice and that this choice Is necessarily a mOral one if it is about what we ought to 
do, does not supply any reason for thinking that morality cannot be based on the 
Divine nature. 
I will oow took at the moral point that it is immoral for us to surrender our will to 
God. I hope, in the course of these remarks, to partly answer one of the other 
autonomy charges, namely, that a DMne command theory puts morality on an 
improper foundation. 
Perhaps the best way to understand what motivates the autonomy attack Is to 
examine the historical circumstances surrounding its conception. We shaU find that 
my thesis about the nature of morality doos not require any censure from these 
typss o1 mofutc;,tion. 
As I have already mentioned (p.5), Kanfs insi~snoo on the the ca~egorical 
narure o1 mornlitty, unnoodful o~ smpiii~l grcnmdin~. can be s®an a$ a pre-amptiv~ 
strike agBinst utilitarianism (p.38 Murphy]. The problem wifth empiricism in ethics, 
as Kan~ saw ~. was tllat ii did ncrt do proper justioo ro the unique staitls of morality. 
Utilitarian-style theories bsllevs that morality Is founded in empirical fa~ aoorn 
human aspirations towards certain types of satisfaction. The problem with this is 
two-fold. Firstly, this seems to put human desire too near the centre of deciding 
what ought to bs done. For Kam, human desire was too fickle a source for an 
adequate theory of morality. Secondly and more generally, morality cannot be 
based on anything liable to change and empirical 'facts' are just that kind of thing. 
Anything empirically grounded Is potentially subject to revision in the light of new 
discoveries and so is essentially contingent Morality's basis needs ~o oo 
something more solid and substantial than this. Hence Kanrs urgent appeals that 
morality should oo based on rationality or some kind o~ allegiance to consistency. 
Thus morality, for Kant, is nearer logic than science. 
But if these are the appeals of Kantian morality and the motivations behind his 
insistence on the foundational autonomy of morality, then I think there Is not much 
for the Kantian to complain about in my theory. It seems to me a correctly 
construed Divine command ethic fits the Kantian bill. Let me explain why. 
In my theory God's commands are not arbitrary pronouncements, but are an 
expression of His immutable nature which is Goodness itself. Thus all God's 
commands flow from an immutable basis. Now the Kantian might complain that, 
. even allowing this, it Is still the case that morality is based on an empirical fact 
about the nature of the Divine essence and thus not categorical in the required 
sense. Now I would agree that in my theory morality is based in something other 
than a non-Divine "objective order of value" [Maclagan 1961 ], but I would deny 
that facts about the Divine essence are empirical facts In any straightforward 
sense. The inadequacy of empirical facts as a foundation for morality is their 
essential contingency, their potential mutability. Thus, for Kant, it is foolhardy to 
base morality on a contingent historical fact such as the death of Christ [Kant 1960 
p.1 05-114]. (In fact, recendy Enoch Powell has (rather eccentrically) disputed 
whether Jesus did in fam die on a cross; perhaps this kind of liability towards 
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disput;l~on was e){ae(ly wha~ Kan~ had in mind whsru oo rsjaewd such 
contingencies as any flitting basis 1or morality.) But ~acts about tlls esssn~l naauws 
of the Divine are, I have argued!, not subjem oo ij1is contingency. Such 1ac?s are 
immutably true because God is necessary Being and by tha~ 1 mean that whatever 
God essentially Is could not have boon different now ever will los different Thus 
God, for exampls, essentially exists so He necessarily exists. His S){istanoo is not 
contingent The same is true of His Goodness. 
In other DMne command theories such contingency Is no~ avoided. For 
Ockham, it was an purely by arbitrary command that God pronounced what was 
moral. 'Moral' was DEFINED in terms of God's commands. Thus God's created 
morality out of thin air. God can also presumably change what is moral at any time. 
As pointed out before (p.17), GOd could have no moral reason for doing this, since 
moraliiy is only defined as that which GOO ooslrroo. In oontraSi, my ihoory doss 
base morality on something, that thing is His immutable essential nature. 11 Kam 
had in mind Ockham-like theories wtwn he rejected Divine commands as a basis 
for morality he was right to do so. 
The kind of argument that I have presented here is used by G. F. Woods. He 
too believes that theological ethics have no adverse effects for autonomy. He says, 
"(when morality is interpreted as] the creative will of God it is no way subject to the 
will of man. No human decision can abrogate or modify what is the case about the 
will of God our creator. The autonomy of the moral standard is here not simply 
affirmed without explanation but interpreted as a characteristic of what is ultimately 
the case. Moreover, the creative will of God is accepted as autonomous in the 
sense that He is not subject to any will greater than His own ... l cannot see how the 
autonomy of the moral standard can be taken more seriously than it is taken In 
theological ethics ... " [Woods 1966 p.1 02}. ·t agree. wlth Woods although ·I would 
take exception to the phrase "creative will of Goc:r. If ethics is just the creative will 
of God, we then haw to defend the theory from those that say such a morality 
would be arbitrary. It is better to say that morality depends on the nature of God as 
Goodness itself. rather than His wilt per se. 
The critic might object at this point claiming that the main reason Kant rejected 
a morality based on what he called "ecclesiastical faith" (as opposed to "pure moral 
faith") was that the former required revelation. I agree that in Religion within the 
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Limits of Reason Alone Kanrs wony was iila~ a DMns oommand 'ih12ory had, in his 
mind, to rely on revelation in order to 1ind om what was right or wrong. 1 do no~ 
agree, however, ttla~ ihis genuine worry anecw my ttlsmy. I do not claim tlla~ 
bscause God is numsrically iden~l~l with Goodness ~hai am agen~ needs to rely on 
revelaltion in order to decide what to do. My thesis is not an ep1stemological one. I 
think tha~ it Is obvious that most people !mow wha~ is moral or immoral quits apall 
from any religi()US iaitlt Perhaps this indstoondence oi rooraiity from revelation is 
over-emphasised, but, on tlle whole, I am quite happy to say thai it is 
metaphysically rather than epistemologically that morality is depsndeni on the 
Divine. Vincent MacNamara makes this kind o~ claim in Faith and Ethics 
[MacMamara 1985 p.177 -196]. 
It appears to me, therefore, that my theory avoids many of the Kaniian worries 
over a1 Divine command ethic and to that extent I hope that, ai least partly, ooms o~ 
the concerns regarding autonomy have been answered. The idea that the Divine 
command theory Is like utilitarianism in any worrying way Is not true, since morality 
is based on something akin to a logical truth, namely, God's immutable, essential 
nature. It is not based on a straightforward empirical observation like the human 
pursuit for kinds of happiness. Likewise, in an epistemological sense tllere is no 
worry. I am not claiming that one needs to know about revelation or any historical 
event in order to establish the morality or immorality of an action. I havs said, 
however, that the epistemological independence of morality from religion is 
exaggerated. I think it a matter of historical fact that much of Western present day 
morality is at least inspired by the Christian ethic as espoused in Scripture. I think 
that without this support other false ethics can intrude. We could, for example, 
have an ethic that pronounced honour as being the central guiding moral notion. 
This has occurred In the past (and in many cultures is occurring in the present 
e.g., Japan) and I see little reason once society is more and more secularised why 
such an ethic should not gain precedence. If this then why not the ethic of the 
Cossack [See Philips 1991 Chapt. 15]? 
I do not deny, however, that religion can be a potent force for evil if God's 
commands are ignored and false 'divine' commands put in their place. It is part of 
mankind's tragic condition that this is the case. However, the fact that something 
can be misused is not a conclusive argument against it. One could crudely argue 
that the idea of natural selection provided the Malis with a scientific justification for 
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iR'Is Holooai!Jst wr,a~ ons mus~ judge in cases where idreas or philosophies ai's 
mishandlool is no~ so much ills ideas themootves, b~ those who misi1Btno11oo ~sm. 
I hopa, tllsn, ~haw gone some way in shownng how Divine command e~ies 
can respond 'to n®o-t(antiaro concerns. However, the ce~l pnirrt has still no~ boon 
directly addressed. The cri~ic still claims tha~ a Divine command ethic requires wha~ 
is itself immoral - a surrendering of one's will oofore tile authority of Goo. James 
Rachels uses this type of idea to attack religious morality in his article God and 
Human Attitudes [Rachels 1971 ]. let me explain the basic poim Rachels attempts 
~o show. 
To begin with Rachels looks a~ the concept o~ worship. He claims that at least 
part of the notion of God is that He should be worthy of our worship. A God not 
worthy of this is no God at all. Rachels S6GS worship as the worshipper's reaction 
to certain beliefs about tile universe and God's relation to it. Thus the religious 
person believes that he inhabits "a world created by an Infinitely wise, Infinitely 
powerful, perfectly good Goo; and it is a wortd in which he, along with other men, 
occupies a special place In virtue of God's intentions. This gives him a certain role 
to play: the role of a 'Child of God' ."[p.40]. Worshipping is "acknowledging and 
accepting this role... As a 'Child of God' one realizes that God is superior to 
oneself. This recognition of God's superiority is part of the role played by one who 
accepts the role of 'Child of God'. Now comes the crucial part Since the believer 
has the beliefs he holds about God he must realize that God has "an unqualified 
claim on [his] obedience"(p.44]. 
Now Rachels argues such a recognition of unqualified obedience Is opposed to 
one important tradition in moral thought, "According to this tradition, to be a moral 
agent Is to be an autonomous or self-directed agent .. The virtuous man is therefore 
identified with tho man of Integrity, i.e., the man who acts aooordlng to the precepts 
which he can, on reflection, conscientiously approve in his own heart.1Rachels 
1971 p.44). The two ideas of unqualified obedience to God and following 
conscientiously the precepts of one's own heart are opposed. God requires we 
obey Him without question; responsibility requires we weigh up each of His 
commands in our own heart before accepting them. Thus the two outlooks are 
fundamentally inimical to one another. Rachels concludes Trom this that God 
cannot exist since it is part of th8 definition of God that He demands such 
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unqualified obedience. 
So, according to this iradition, a Divine command ethic demands the ethically 
impermissible. Surrendering one's will to God is simply wrong. I think this attack is 
fairly easily countered, since I do not think the Divine command theory I have 
espoused demands one to give up moral autonomy. Certainly one must give up 
one's 'rlghf to do anything one wants to do, but I would hope this is a feature of all 
theories of morality! To see why moral autonomy is not affected by my theory let us 
conduct the following thought-experiment. 
Let us imagine that one night Faithful is praying beside his bed when a voice 
clearly and audibly breaks the silence. The voice commands Faithful to 
assassinate the President of the United States. Faithful is a good Christian. He 
fears and obeys God and certainly believes that God requires unqualified 
obedience. So what should Faithful do? If Faithful had no moral autonomy he might 
well concoct a cunning stratagem to ensure the Presidenfs death, but must he do 
this, even if he is a Divine command theorist in the sense I have defined? I do not 
think he must kill the President because he must be sure that the command is 
indeed a Divine one. Faithful has a brain and must "teSt the spirits" [1 John 4v1 ]. 
Faithful, as a good Christian, will know that God has a certain type of nature and 
that such a command is extremely unlikely to have a Divine origin. Faithful must 
use his adult, decision making facnities in order to reach the conclusion that the 
command is a temptation rather than a Divine order. 
The critic might reply that Faithful is not oommitted to automatically obeying this 
'command', but he is committed to the hypothetical, "If God commands X, then 
Faithful must obey without question." To my mind, as a Christian·, Faithful is Indeed 
committed to this hypothetical, but it all depends upon what particular action is put 
in place of the variable. It is impossible that God, for example, could command 
wholesale slaughter of innocent civilians or the torture of children, so it is not the 
case that just any action can replace the variable. God cannot command such 
things since He is Identical with Goodness itself which is opposed to any such 
actions. So, although, Faithful Is committed to the above conditional there Is no 
harm in it. The Christian could just as well accuse the Kantlan of being committed 
to the conditional, "If the categorical imperative demands X, then X must be 
performed." I think the Kantian is quite happy to be committed to this since he 
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bslisves tlla~ the CBJ~orical impara~vs always olsllwrs ihs prop3r moml 
'command'. No dicfrum delivered by duw CBJn bs immowal; no command issued K>y 
God can bs wrong. 
We do no~ Joss our auionomy, sines we mus~ s~U use our minds and come io 
care~ully fuoughNnn rnf!iona! · decisions. Tills Chi'istlam uses much D'le SBJ.me 
tllought-proeesses as the non-Christian, bUi has i\1\fo other imporian~ guiding 
principles: Scripiure and! prayew. Of course, the Christian ~r~ malw momt mistakes. 
There are many a>t:amples of this! But ihe non-believei' can make mis~kes also. 
Holding the Divine command theory is no guammee of moral e>t:cellenoa any more 
than being a Kantian is. 
Philip Quinn, in his aa1icle, uses this distinction between a genuine Divine 
oommand ano'l a pum\'dvts DMns oommand. He oom~ io much ttla sams 
conclusion as me. We do noft lose our autonomy if we are a Divine command 
thsorlsft [Quinn 1978 Chapt 1 ] .. 
There is, however, one major difficulty for my theory. It is one which both 
Rachels and! Quinn mention. Rft is the problem over the interpretation of Genesis 22 
or the story of Abraham's willingness to obey the Divine command and sacrifice his 
innocent son, Isaac. I said before the Divine command theorist can be sure that 
God's commands are always mom! and yet, In this story, we have God telling 
Abraham to kill his innocent son. In ali interpretations of the story, Abraham is seen 
as a hero and there is no question that the command at issue was a genuine 
Divine command. How do we explain this? Is the Divine command theorist 
committed at least in principle to the idea of human sacrifice? 
In this section of this chapter, I am going to look briefly at the Interpretation of 
this puzzling piece of Scripture. I am going to tike it for granted that the story tells 
of a real historical event rather than see It, as some do, as a myth symbolizing the 
end of human sacrifice and the start of the use of animals instead (hence the ram 
caught by Its horns at the end). 
KieB'kegaard's radical interpretation of this story in Fear and Trembling is the 
marting point of modern scholarship in this matter. Let me quickly explain what 
Kisrkagaard's inierpmtation is. Kierkeg~rd sees Abraham as a "'Knight of faiih" 
Replying To Autonomy 
who is wimng ro go bsyond ordinai)f roomiily tov tns sake oU GOO andl his 
relaiionship wi~ Goo! [Kierkegeard 1 983 p. 71 ]. KiernsgBJam1 compares Albraham's 
willingness to sacvmcs his son wifth various simular svents in classicalllitemt~Jre and 
the Bible. He looks a~ ~he s~ory o~ Jephthah who vows tha~ i~ God delivsrs the 
Ammonites inro his hands he will sacrffioo whoever firs~ oomoo i©l moo~ him when 
he returns home. Unfortunately, i~ is his own daughter that Is the first to meet him. 
He ano1 his daughterr agree l'ha~ tt'le sacrifice must still be maoo and so it us done 
[Judges 11 : 30-40]. This kind of sacrifice, Klerkegaard argues, does not go beyond 
morality. He says, "' ... every freeborn man will undsrsmnd, every resolute woman 
will admire Jephthah, and every virgin in Israel will wish to behave as his daughter 
did, because what good would it be for Jephthah to win the victory by means of a 
promise if he did not keep it - would not victory bs taken away from the people 
again?" [p.58]. Jephthah is a tragic hero, but this does not pt.rt him on a par with 
Abraham becauoo Jephthatn never goes beyond the ethical: "He allows an 
expression of the ethical to have Its telos In a higher expressiofb of the 
ethicai...Here ihera can bs no question of a teleological suspension of the ethical 
itselr [p.59J. 
Abraham's act suspends the ethical because there is no moral justifecation for 
his action. He does not save a nation. He is not adhertng faithfully to a solemn vow. 
There is no understandable moral reason for Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his 
son. Thus "The ethical expression for what Abraham did is that he meant to murder 
Isaac." {Kierkegaard 1983 p.30J. 
The justification for the deed goes beyond the ethical, but it does have a 
justification. Kierkegaard is not saying that this is a reasonless event, just that the 
teleology behind it cannot be expressed in ethical terms. It is not just a suspension 
of the ethical, it Is a teleological suspension of the ethical. "Why then" Kierkegaard 
asks, '"does Abraham do it?" Kiet1mgaard's answer is that he does it for God's sake 
and for his own sake. These two justifications are really identical [p.59]. In this 
story the ethical itself is the temptation that may prevent Abraham from doing his 
duty. Klerkegaard says, "Duty Is simply the expression for God's will." [p.60J. So 
Abraham is to be admired and approached with a horror refigiosus (p.61] because 
he is prepared to face the spiritual trial that accompanies a deed for which there Is 
no ethical justification. He does what he does for God's sake. 
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It is clear from Kiernega~aro'l's reading o~ Gen~sis 22 ~hat the be!ievsr may bs 
called upon to perform deeds whech are in moral ~rms wrong. Obviou~ly, tllls 
reading o~ ~e Bible story ooes no~ squaws with my thesis iha~t God will not 
command ~he bsliever to do ~hB~i which is sttti~lly impsrmlssible. In ~act, my ihesis 
is stronger than that: I am committed to tlle notion that Goo CANNOT require the 
ethically impeu-missible. 
What, then, can ~ say in reply? First, I think we have ro note thti!.t Kierkagaard's 
reading of the text is enormously eccentric. In Religion and Moral Reason Ronalol 
Green provides a study of Jewish and Christian commentaries on Genesis 22 
[Green 1978). The vast majority try to show how the willingness of Abraham to 
sacrifice his son can be morally justified. For example, in rabbinic midrashic 
tradition, it is a guiding principle that God only tries the righteous; "Because of his 
foreknowledge and omniscience, Goo fully im©W® the outoome of a ~s~ and in his 
mercy and justice, he tries only thooo who can sustain the adversity." B~ if God 
knows the outcome of the trial, why doeS He go through with the exercise? In the 
Jewish commentary God replies, " 'It was my wish tha~ the world should become 
acquainted with thee, and should know that It is not without good reason that I 
have chosen thee from allltle nations .... [Green 1978 p.87]. The commentators are 
not, in Kierkegaardian fashion, celebrating the inherent anti-moral and anti-rational 
of Abraham's act, but rather trying to express the moral and rational reasons 
behind it. Another rationalizing and moralizing circumstance that is taken into 
consideration is that, despite Klerkegaard, traditional Old Testament notions- of 
sonship did not always allow that the son was a autonomous agent separate from 
the father. The son was seen as part of the father, his possession {Green 1978 
p.9Q .. 91 ). So Abraham's sacrifice is not seen as the sacrifice of a separate entity, 
but rather as an instance of self-sacrifice. Further comment is provided to the effect 
that Isaac was not unwilling to die, but offered himself (p.92-93). Finally, many 
commentators think that the story shows God's hatred of child sacrifice and His 
unwillingness to accept such sacrifices [p.98]. 
The point I am trying to make Is this - Kierkegaard's reading is not the orthodox 
one. God was not mysteriously teleologically suspending the ethical. His act ean be 
ethically understood and traditional Jewish and Christian commentary has tried to 
do just that. Of oouroo, the whole incident is still a challenging and puzzling one, 
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louft I do no~ think tha~ Gsn~sis 22 demands ft~ft ~ !Jali®vsrr ~ lQr®~rsd ~ do 
immoral actions 1m God's sa~~. The bslievsr h8ls very good re~sons ~or b31ieving 
ttla~ a loving and jus~ God opposes such aciions wi~ all His Being. I do not, 
~herefore, thin~ ihat Genesi~ 22 cons~~s any kinol o1 argumsn~ agains~ my 
thesis2• 
Philip Quinn's arosweu- to ttue problem og Abraham is '1:0 accept H"ia~ the Divine 
command theorist may Indeed bs committed, In principle, to "If God commands 
someone to kill an innocent person, then he ought ro kill that person." [Helm 1981 
p.60 Quinn 1978 p.15). His claim is that the principle Is not "manifestly repugnanr 
because God can compensate "both the killer and his victim in the relevant or 
beatific respects either here or hereafter.". My thesis cannot accommodate this 
principle. The reason Quinn can allow it into his theory is that his Divine command 
ethic seems to make few assumptions about the nawm of God. 1ft seems m me that 
given God is love he would not command the ethically impermissible. There is, 
however, a way In which my thesis could allow God to command, not so much the 
ethically impermissible, but perhaps the ethically questionable. I have stated that 
God's Goodness is to be understood as being Love. This is necessary; God cannot 
be anything but Love; it is an essential attribute. However, I have argued, along 
with Duns Scotus, that some of God's commandments may be merely contingent 
exemplifications of His will since they are essentially based on human nature which 
is not necessary [See Swinburne 1989 p.127]. Given a different kind of human 
nature God could, for example, have allowed intercourse with another's spouse. 
Perhaps this kind of qualification could be made in regard to, not only different 
'human' natures, but also different cultures and belief systems. Thus, as s~n 
before, the ancient Jewish culture thought of the son as the possession or 
extension of the father. So the Divine command to kill Isaac is perhaps morally 
justifiable as an example of self-sacrifice rather than the murder of a separate 
person. I think most Christian thinkers have always allowed qualifications like 
these. There are many DMne commands in the Old Testament which, by modem 
day standards, are morally questionable. Not many believers who take the Old 
Testament seriously are prepared to allow that these were anything mom than 
2. It may be objected that there are many more Old Testament stories that show God 
issuing morally untenabte commands. Of course, there is not the space here to deal 
adequately with each of these. The general problem showing itself here Is the balancing 
of metaphysical accounts of Deity and accounts given in revelation. 
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~eml(lmary Divine comamncgs which su~ ~s circums~noos in which ~sy were 
utleroo. This is, o~ course, a dangerous line of mgui'"IWnt Some religious ~natlcs 
may argue ~Bl~ all kirnds o~ DMne prooouncemen~ are merely contingent So I am 
no~ sure how ~ar Divine commands are based on ~hs rsla~ive!y s~ble contingencies 
m human n~rum and how ~ar em the more iemporauy sftrucrures o1 cu~ure Bind 
bslief sys~ms. With this in mind, psrha~ ift wmnld b3 more accurate to clari1y ihs 
poi~ abou~ the eihlcany imf)3rmisslbls aoo God's inabilliy ~o command it The new 
rormul6\tion oould bs: Goo can~ot command anyti'ling Rhaft is oontmry ttl His narure 
as bsing an esseniially loving God. Since love is a relational ierm, wha~ is 
commanded depsnds upon the narurs o~ who is commanded. i think, however, that 
human nature is quite highly uniformly smbls and cross-cultural. 1 would, ttlers1ore, 
favour a quite conseNaiive visw o'i ethical psrmissiveness. 
However, dsspits ~his, ~s ITIBlin pt>ini aoom autonomy is pwessrved, as is ~s 
an~!-KiarnsgaMdian argument which claims ihat God ~nno~ fo3 anti-ethical. We are 
au~onomous bscause ws s2il! havs to rna~ propsr decisions based on our 
undsrst:Andin@ off wha~ moral~ oomauoo1s. JIIASi ~use in my sysfasm moraiOiy is 
psrsonalb.:ed and made identical with the Divine makes no difference as regards 
autonomy. Furthmmom, God dtles not require us io do ttlings which, in 
Klerkegaardian undersRanding, go bayond moraliTy, although~~~~~ have to make the 
distinction that I think all sensirote theories o~ morality make. We need to distinguish 
bstween ihat which Is an essenijal fearure o~ morality and that which iS merely a 
cu~t.ual fearum. li we oo oot oo thi$, no roomlprogress is possible. It would bs ihe 
esse that anything currently. accepted as moral is, roy virtue of that cultural 
acceptabiliiy, truly moml. This calls ini!O debSte all ~nds ~ complex issues aoout 
contingent and essential features of morality and which is which. In my theory whatt 
is essential is Love. I~ seems to me that this is the core that cannot roo lost. This 
core is identical with Goo. Soms of His commands are oontingem bu~ stable and 
'aboolute' iro so mw as ii can oo held tha~ human natum is stable and •aoooltrte'; 
other commands may oo only mmporary injunctions bassol on i"elations betwssn 
Low and cuiWI'all BJSpacts of our humantiy. I oo noft intsno1, in this ttlesis, iO address 
the issue of these oomplsx relations. 
We can oow oonoommm o~Yr foous oro aunofdhei" a~spsci o'i fue ~umoomy aiiac!t, 
namely, tlle issue og prudence. I~ will be rermmfoor®d that ttlls attack claimoo ~a~ a 
Divin® oorrtmaJoo raihcc inftroduced questOOm~b&s noi1-moml ow sven immora~ 
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motiva~lons into ~he heaf'l o~ morBJiifty. The K:lsiiever could, ?or exa~mp!s, 03 accysadl 
o~ doing an action hscause he batievss iil is God's will, rather than doin~ 1~ for the 
more praiseworthy reasorn, "Because ifs kind." Moreover, he might oo aun a~on 
not bscauss duiy demands it, bu~ bscayse he bslievss Goo will reward him. Thess 
kind of motivations are ,acoordin~ ~ a (Ohilooopher like D.Z. Philips, nothi~ short 
of scandalous [Philips 1991 p. i 82]. 
My reply ~o this accusation will ba two-fold. Firstly I will argue thai improper 
motives are a possible, but not necessary feature of my Divine command ethic. 
Secondly I will argue ihai a concern for reward in morality is sometimes not 
misplaced. 
Let us, then, look at my first argument. Earlier in my thesis (p. i 0-11 ), I used an 
illustration to show the powerfulness of the prrudenoo attack. Say 2 ooliewr had 
given money to charity and was asked to give his· reasons why he had done this. It 
appeared that he had to say, if he were a Divine command theorist, that he had 
done it because that was what God wanted. A non-believer, on the other hand, 
could just say he had done it because it was kind or a generous action. It appeared 
more moral to do a good action because it was kind rather than because God 
required it. This kind of thought Is the essence of this type of attack. 
Before we examine this illustration In more detail a clarification is called for. 
Giving money to charity is not normally something that anyone would believe is 
DEMANDED by morality. It would be regarded, in most instances, as a 
supererogatory action. That Is, something not, strictly speaking, required by 
morality, but something morally noble or above the call of duty. If this is the case 
the wording of the Divine command theorist's motivation needs to be modified; 
perhaps it Is better seen as an action that God does not require (though He may 
do, depending on the circumstances), but an action which Is pleasing to Him. 
What I want to question is the foundation of this kind of illustration. Why is It 
exactly that it sounds more moral to justify an action by saying It is kind rather than 
because one believes God is pleased with it? It seems to me that a question mark 
appears next to the Divine command theorist's justification because the relevance 
of his remark is not clear. If one realizes that, for my kind of Divine oommand 
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tl'ieoris~. Goo1 is iden~ICBli w~ GQOOn€}$8 tlls ques~on mBJrn mass away. Irs all ~ 
maltier o~ how doop ths quamionsr wBJnm ro go in his onvestiga1~on of mo~w~ion. 
Since God is Goodness ~he believer does no~ have ro say ~a~ he gives money to 
charity because God Is pleased with such acilon~. he could just leave it as 
"Because irs kind." God is identical with Goodness, so this justification can bs 
made without loss of truthfulness. If asked to go further he would say, as his final 
foundational reaoon, that God is ple~ed with such an action. 
Perhaps this point will bs clearer if w0 compare the balisver's final justification 
with the answers a Kantian might give. i~ seems to me the Kantian could, as I have 
done. leave his justification with the unremarkable, but praiseworthy "Because it's 
kind." However, i1 asked to go further he would appeal to the rationality of the 
unlversalisabillty of kindness. He might mention the categorical imperative. I do no~ 
ihink the Kantian would oo impressed if his qu~stionew said in ~ disappointed tone 
of voice, "Oh, is that the real reason? I thought you were just trying to be a good 
person." The Kantian would reply that to oo a good person and to obey the 
demands of rationality were really the ~me thing. ThG Divine oommand theorist is 
in the same kind of harmless position, although as we shall see shortly his position 
Is even better. 
Part of the problem of motivation Is that we are not normally required to give 
detailed philosophical justifications for our moral acm. The unfamiliarity of these 
kinds of reply maybe contributes to their sounding not quite as 'moral' as they 
could. I do not think, however, this kind of atlack constitutes a serious problem for 
the Divine command theorist. 
The real difference between the Kantian and the Divine command theorist is 
that the latter introduces personality Into the foundations of ethics. Because we 
haw a person who is the source and demander of all moml actions, there is a 
danger that the beUever will do what God wants because he wants reward or fears 
punishment The purity of his motives can be questioned in a way that is not 
possible for Platonic or Kantian theories where duty Is seen in a more impersonal, 
abstract light There are complex questions here about what is a moral, oon-moral 
or immoral motive for an action. Most of us, I suppose, do good actions for a whole 
host of reasons, some of them pure, some of them oot, some of them neither pure 
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or impure, bm neutral. I do no~ Intend t() go in~o this dmicu~ area, rou~ I will s~y ~~ 
my ttlsory does not DEMAND that ~he bsliever doss X bscal~se X is going ro oo 
rewarded or bsoouse noa-x is going ro oo punished. Such mo~ivaiions ai"e an 
accidental 1ea~ure o1 ~ mowality baseol on Divine oommaoos; ihey a~ws no~ 
necessary. 
Furthermore, it seems to me that ihe Divine command theorist may have this 
particular disadvantage, but there are far more advantages that are a part of his 
parsonal conception of morality. We can, for example, talk sensibly of loving 
Goodness, of being grateful for its nature. This would be strange speech for a 
philosopher who believed that morality was an impersonal set of values. I am not 
saying he could not speak like this, just that such speech appears incpngruous in a 
way not apparent where morality is seen as a personal God. H. P. Owen says this, 
" ... values exert an obligation. Their obligatoriness is inexplicable unless they are 
psrsonal. Platonic Forms could, perhaps, attract But how oould they impose an 
obligation? How could we be indebted to them? Why should failure to enact them 
engender guilt? I can betray a person and I know that I deserve the guilt that I feel. 
But I cannot see how I could betray values if they are IMpersonal." [Owen 1965 
p.80 emphasis in original]. There may be a danger of wrong motives, lbut the 
advantages of a personal conception of morality far outweigh this kind of worry. 
My second argument against the prudence attack is to try to show that a 
concern for reward is not· always misplaced. Bernard Williams has warned 
philosophers against thinking the distinction between moral and prudential 
motivation is as clear-cut as Kant thought. He argues that there needs to be some 
way of distinguishing acts that are motivated by selfishness and those that are 
motivated by an interest for others, but he argues that we should be vigilant in not 
making it the case that the only thing we are Interested in is moral motivation per 
se [Williams 1972 p.79-81 ,Helm 1981 p.136-138].1f that were the case, we would 
not be able to distinguish between a situation where a self-centred business-man 
gives money to charity to promote his public standing, or where the same man 
simply buys himself another cocktail cabinet. Surely. WHiiams argues. to give 
money to charity is better than increasing the number of drink dispsnsei'S anyons 
owns. 
Williams' warning that the distinction is not as clearr as some believe Is salutary. 
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I wili argue, similariy ~o Williams, that moral or prudsn~lal motivation ooes not 
always constitute an exclusive disjunction. I will argus it is not wrong to have as 
one of your motives 81 concem ~or yoUJrsel1. Selfishness is wrrong, but a sensible 
concern for oneself based on an appeal to love or justice is no~ misplaced. Let me 
explain what I mearo. 
The reader will recall some of my arguments about the nature of love. I argued 
that agapeistic love is only possible when there is mutuality. If this is the case, then 
one is not being selfish if one Is concerned with how a particular person will 
respond to my love for him. If one ought to aim at mutual love as the highest ideal, 
then it is not wrong to put oneself in the overall picture. If all that matters is loving 
X, then it would be impossible to morally distinguish between a situation where X 
spurns my love and a situation where X responds. It appears to me that the latter 
situation is the more moral situation and, therefore, the one that ought to be aimed 
at. 
Now some Kierkegaardian-inspired thinkers may argue that either you love X 
simply because X is your neighbour or you love X because you want reciprocation. 
This argument, however, presupposes that loving X and wanting reciprocatiOn is 
an exclusive disjunction. It seems to me that it is not. Consider Romeo and Juliet: 
we do not say that Romeo's love is somehow compromised because lurking in his 
inner psyche is the desire that Juliet returns his _love. Romeo is concerned wholly 
with Juliet, but this does not exclude Romeo considering what heaven it would be if 
Juliet were to respond! If he did not care whether Juliet responded but simply 
'loved' I would question the validity of this 'love'. A desire to be ·rewarded' in love is 
part of what it Is to love. Naturally, if V does truly love X, then V will carry on loving 
X even if V does not respond. The Christian believes this to be the case with God's 
relationship to mankind: He loves Bill even If Bill always remains indifferent to His 
love. But this does not mean that God does not want Bill to respond to Him, far 
from it. God's desire that Bill responds is part of God's love for Bill. 
A similar, but much weaker argument can be made in regard to justice. Would It 
be wrong for a just and upright man whose life is full of misery and pain to cry out, 
in the name of justice, that the wicked prosper? If it is then Gerard Manley Hopkins 
was deeply morally mistaken to have oontemplated such a thought in his Dark 
Sonnets: 
Thou are indeed jus~. Lord, I~ I contend 
With thee; but, sir, so what I plsad is just 
Why oo sinner's weys pu-os~r? and why mus~ 
Disappoin~mem alii endeavour enol? 
"MorBJI worn merfu:; moml rew~rcr: ti"fti~ is ~s idsB! bshinol Hop~ns' oomplami oorors 
GOO. This does no~ seem ro ms ~o b3 an improp3r ihoug~t The Psalms am full o~ 
instances whers the writer sooks some ldno1 o~ just OUitoome to his moml pursuits. 
Even Kant, of course, had something thoughiS like these where he required the 
existence of God as a postulate of practical rsason in order that there be a 
correspondence between virtue and happiness. 
Now the orojecmr will SBlY a~ thus point that either ons doos a moral action 
bscause ij is mora~ ro do It or one does ~ \'or mward. The rormer mowation is 
properly moral whereas the la~r is merely pruoontial anol either non-moral or even 
immoral. Again I believe the disjunction is not exclusive (although I believe it to bs 
more exclusive here than in the former case where we talked about love). A 
concern for what one merits may bs part of a wider picture where one mquires that 
a just world order is established where everyone's virtue or immorality is either 
rewarded or punislhed. 
As- I have said, I am not so certain about this argument I bslieve we have to be 
concerned ·with justice, but Christianity has always emphasised love rather than 
justice. The Christian believes that If everyone got what he or she deserved we 
would never enter Heaven. No one deserves any reward, rather they merit, in the 
sight of an absolutely Holy God, only punishment. This religious humility must not 
be confused with self-hatred. We may deserw punishment, but we are not 
worthless. In fact, Kant would argue that it is precisely because we are not 
worthless thai we merit the moral possibility of punishment If we were mindless 
brutes we could not be punished In a moral sense becauoo we would not be 
capable of moral choice. 
Love demands mercy. Hence we get the traditional conception of the Cross 
being an atonement for sin, a satisfaction o1 justice so that mercy can· bs had. 
Strictly speaking, ti would not bs sensible, thermor®, ~m the Christian to demand 
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justice. This kind of reasoning makes me suspicious of my own argument, 
Nevertheless, I think It has some merit and deserves some consideration even iii 
only for the reason that such thoughts seem to have a sound Biblical ancestry. 
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in this chapter, we wm oo ICDokinQJ at why aJ oolievsr shoyld bs oonoom®d to 
defend some oonooptiora o~ the Divine oommano1 theory. My main audienoo, in 
contrast to most og my thesi~. is oth®r ~lievem. I will ifV to show that th® 
position tha1t holds that gooo is im:ia~81den~ of Goo i~ religio~sly irmtdaquate 
oocause i~ impugn~ the sovereignty of God. 
let us S}{amine my basic argument God's sovereignty is impugned 
because if the standards o~ goodneml ar~ independent of Him He must, in 
order to be called morally perfect, always follow the dictates of these 
standards. I do not think the believer, who is concerned to preserve God's 
absolute sovereignty, can allow that God must follow the demands of 
something independent of Him. 
My argument thu~ far may raise two objections: one would be a call for 
clarification, What concept of sovereignty am I working with h~re? The other 
objection would argue that most believers have thought that logical truths are 
independent of God. Surely to admit this kind of independence has no serious 
implications for God's sovereignty; analogously then nothing serious follows 
from the independence of goodness from God. 
First of all let me try to clarify what oonoopt of sovereignty I am using. A 
traditional attribute of the Divine has been His aseity. Aselty is defined in the 
Q.E.D. as underived or independent existence. It is the latter part of this 
definition that I want to concentrate upon in my explanation of sovereignty. By 
sovereign I mean that God does not depend upon anything else in order to b9 
the type of being He is. [I use the word "sovereignty" in the sense used by 
AMn Plantinga in Plantinga 1980 p.1-2]. If he were dependent His asaity would 
be impugned. Thus aseity and sovereignty am strongly connected ideas. They 
are not Identical, however, because !ltoverelgnty has a wider meaning than 
aseity. For X to possess the attribute of aseity implies only that X is 
independent of all other things. For X to be sovereign means not only that, but 
also that all other things depend on X, that X has some kind of priority in 
regard to everything else. Here the locution "depends on" is meant to rover 
both logical and causal dependency. Thus everything that is inde~ndent of 
God depends on Him either-logically or causally. 
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Wit~ this in mind, let us tum our atlen~ion tow~rds the ~siiion tha~ 
goodness Is independem o~ ths Dfvin~. We see tha~ such a doorrins run~ 
oounterr ~o my definition o~ soverreign\ty in M#(} wa~y~. IFirrstly, God is noft 
indepsndenft of goodnas~ since He de~nds on thi~ to bs ih® type of ooing He 
is. God must obey the demands of goodness if He is to roo called gooo. Goo 
must do His duty- where what is dutiful is defined Independently of Him. lh@ 
type of dependency that obtains here is logical not causal, that is, this 
independent goodness does not cauoo God to be good, rather the existence of 
goodness is necessary for the truth of the statement, "God is good". If there 
was no such thing as goodness, there would be no sense in ~lling anything 
good. Serondly, there is no priority of God over this independent good, rather 
the converse is the case. As just mentioned, Goo depends on goodness to be 
the kind of being He Is, but goodness does not depend on God!, in fact, 
goodness just is. S~lled out in these terms, D think it plain that there is a 
problem. 
What shall we say though about the status of logical truths? Surely their 
generally accepted independence from God does not cause any detriment to 
His sovereignty. I shall argue that, in fact, most traditional, mainline Christian 
thinkers have NOT thought that logical truths are independent of God. 
Furthermore, one of the main reasons they have had for defending this 
doctrine has been a eoncem for the sovereignty of God. So, then, let us turn 
our attention on this position and try to show that traditional Christian thinking 
has not separated God from the truths of logic. 
Descartes is perhaps the most famous philosopher to have held this 
position. Descartes aoruses those who believe logical laws am independent of 
God of blasphemy. Thus he says, .. As for the eternal truths, I say onoo more 
that they am true or possible only because Goo knows them as true or 
possible; they are not, contrariwise, known to God as true as though they were 
true independently of him. And if men properly understood . the sense of their 
words, they could never say Without blasphemy that the truth about something 
is antecedent to God's knowledge of it; for in God knowing and willing are but 
one thing; so that from the very fact of his witting something, He knows it, and 
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for this reason alone is such a thing ~rue."[p.250 DsSC(d!iis~ 195~]. it sssm~ 
here that Dsscafies is accusing ~he scholastic tradition oi olrawin@ a clear lins 
bstwsen God and th~ sterna! truths. IDss©aliss' aim is Ro bring ~~Ns~U1in~ 
under the sovereignty oi God. Planiinga rerogni:zs~ that ttlis was Desccui®s' 
aim: ulOsscsrtes' oontm~ claim hem is ~ha~ Goo's power ati1d ~r~ooom mus~ ~ 
infinite, i.tS., without limiis; "the powsli' oi Goo," he says, "cannot havs any 
limits." ... hs oolieves fthat G©d is the oovsrei@rn iiroft being o~ the universe on 
whom EVERVfHING dspends, including the sternal truths. "[Piantinga 1900 
p.i i 0]. 
Descartes' position is known by two names: it is called universal possibilism 
by !Pianiinga, thoonomic positivism by les:zsk ~o~~~owski [Kolakowski 1982]. ~ 
will use the iormsr to refer to it 
Now Des~rtss' yniv®~l possibilism has never OOei'il popular amor~g 
theologians and philosophers. Probably the main reason for this is that ii 
soom~ to make any proposed solution to the problem of evil impossible. GOO 
could, it seems, have mad~ a world whose logic made it possibl~ that He gives 
us froo will and th~ robotic ability to do nothing but good actions. lhat this is a 
contradiction in this world is no probtem to a God who can make nom;ense 
sense and vioo versa. 
This general rejection of universal possibiflsm does not mean, however, that 
orthodoxy has opted for the other extreme of maintaining that truths of Iogie 
are independent from Goo. Rather, as Anthony Kenny observes in The God of 
the · Philosophers, the scholastics maintained that logical truths wem 
independent of the Divine will, but were "entirely dependent on God's 
esoonoo. a [Kenny 1979 p.17). leibniz is a good exam piG of a philooopher ro 
hold this kind of position. He oolteved ihat logical taws were not created by 
Divine fiat, rout still depended for their being by being involved with the Divina 
essence: " ... eternal truths oo not depend on the divine will. The reason og 
truths lie~ in the ideas of thing~ which are involved in the dlvim~ esoonoo itooH." 
[Coplesron 1963 p.328]. Again, he says, God "is the source of whatever is real 
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in thiS possilol®." but C(d!fS~ully dn~iD'lgJDJi~h~S OOM3®n hi~ OOcii'in® artd 
Descartes': "Vet we must no~ ~hin~ tha~ fthe etema! truths toeing de~nden~ on 
God are thersitOrr~ ~rbitr~i1f a1ra© oopsnd oro his will, ~s De~iles se®ms tOl 
have held ... "[lsibni2: i 902 p.260-261] . 
Now there i~ ons ant!-leibnizean argumGrrt in ~avoUii' o1 Descartes. it 
involves the doctrine of Divine !iSimplicity. ~f willing and knowing ~re in God the 
same thing, then if the eternal truths depend upon the Divine u.mderstanding 
they must also depend on His will. Kenny oomments on this argumEmt, saying 
that traditionally scholastic philosophy had NOT allowed that whatever God 
knows He wills [p.19]. Although they would have ooliev®d that, in metaphysical 
reality, there were no distinctions in God, they did think that our finite human 
minds had to make some distinctions when thinking about Goo. 
It Is not then the CSS@ that Christian thlnkern have been prepared to admit 
that the truths of logic and God are sharply distinguishable. But, the qvestion 
presents itself, what exactly did they mean by 9aying that these truths depend 
on the Divine essence? Perhaps the best way of understanding this difficult 
doctrine is to soo how it relates to another dootrin~S - the dootrine oi the Divine 
ideas. 
For Plato there existed supremely above this world of appearance, a real 
world of Ideal Fonns or Ideas. The ·things of the world we inhabit are merely 
the copies of these Ideal Forms. It was intolerable for Christianity that a 
supreme God could have this eternal realm co-inhabiting metaphysical reality 
with Him. This opposition between Platonism and the Christian belief in a 
supreme, creating God is commented on by Thomas Morris in his article, 
Absolute Creation. He says, "The apparent oonflid is between what 11\i arguably 
the central idea of the theistic tradition, the idea of a God as absolute creator 
of everything which exists distinct from him, and the characteristic, 
metaphysically powerful claim of ... Piatonism ·that there are strong theoretical 
reasons for recognizing in our ontology ... a realm of necessarily existent 
abstract objects ... " [Morris 1987 p.161 ]. The two traditions are opposed, 
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neveiiheless Augustine trioo to reconcile them by argllling too~ th® Ideal forms 
were not eJttra·msntal, rout resided e~®maUy in God's mind. This ba~ically is the 
docirine o~ Divin(& ideas. 
Now the relation ootween this doctrine and the domrins of the logical iMhs 
being part o~ Goo's essenoo.should oogln to oo dearer. Th~ doctrine of Divine 
ideas states thai all possibility (the ~deal Forms) ha$ no ontological status apart 
from God!. One of the fundioras of logic Is to map the aroo of the aboolutely or 
logically possible. Thus logic e)(plores the area of the possible; it is a 
description of what is coherent or consistent and therefore a potential 
candidate for real existence. But, as said before, the possible has no 
ontological status apart from Goo. In other words, if there is no Goo nothing is 
possible. Logic is, then, just a way of te)(ploring the DMne ideas which is the 
domain of the possible. Thus when we disrover a logical truth - say that a 
triangle'~ internal angles alway~ add up to 180 degrees 0 we should not 
suppose that this description about what is necessarily possible about triangles 
is somehow imposed on God by an co-eternal Platonic realm. Rather we 
should see this truth as a description of what has always been the case in 
God's mind or essence. Logical truths are still necessary, according to this way 
of thinking, but they are grounded in a deeper reality - thfJ Supreme Necessity 
of God. Again logical laws are not chosen by God. He oould not have decided 
to institute a different set of logical laws had He so wished. This is impossible, 
since God's essential nature is immutable. God is only 'constrained' by who He 
is. To think it possible that logical laws oould have been different is a difficult 
statement to make sense of [see Plantinga 1980 p.116-125]. 
Of oourse not all scholastics accepted the doctrine of the Divine Ideas. 
Ockham, notoriously, did not do so. He thougt}t that this doctrine limited God's 
freedom. This is Ockham's famous nominatism1• He rejected universal forms, 
which were, as we have seen, identified wtth the contents of the Divine 
understanding. Od<ham believed that the Divine ideas wem finite in number, 
1. S.J Curtis argues that Ockham's position Is best called conceptualism: nominalism, he 
argues, is a wholly modern position (Curtis 1950 p. 50) 
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foUowing Plato who thought that ttls ideal Form~ were numeri~lly limi~sd 
[Sontag i 962 p.5i ). He assumed that having this 1inite numoor of prs-endstren~ 
entities compeilng for actualiey was limiting for God. God HAD to aayalizs on® 
o~ these finitely. m.nmberoo pre-e}{ist~ni ideas; therefore His freedom was 
curtailed. For Ockham God's freedom means that he oot.Did create completf81y 
ex nihilo any of an absolute infinity of individuals2. It is hard to gauge how 
much of Ockham's rejection of universal form~ was motivated by thinking of 
them as limited in number or by his thinking that the idea of universal forms ~r 
se is theoretically redundant However, this is a question we do not have to 
investigate here. All we need to see, for the purpose of this thesis, is that 
Ockham would not have concluded from his rejection of universal forms that 
God and the truths of logic were separate and oo-eternal. Certainly, Ockham 
with hi~ emphasis ort God's ~roodom, would have thought such an external 
curtailment of God's possible activity was unacceptable. 
It is not ~o dear then that the objector to my central thesis - that God and 
morality are linked - can point out that no similar linkage occurs in the relation 
between God and logic. It seems to me that it is still up to the advocate of 
Divine and moral ontological separateness to show how his view does not 
impugn God's sovereignty. 
What I intend to do in the rest of this chapter Is to took at another motivation 
behind the oonoom to defend Divine command ethics and then take the attack 
to my opponents and try to show how their views show up as inadequate once 
examined closely. For the sake of brevity and convenience, I will call the 
position that holds that God and value are ontologically and metaphysically 
2. Ockham, claims Copleston, preserves the language of the theory of divine ideas, but really 
rejects it. Thus, Ockham holds, that the divine idea, say, of Abraham Lincoln, is identical with 
Lincoln himself. There is no middle order of abstracts, even within God's own mind, that he 
must possess in order to create. All we need is God Himself and his power to create ex nihilo; 
A middle order of possible individuals is not needed to explain how God creates FROM 
NOTHING, 
James Ross puts forward a similar view to this, although he seems to disagree with 
Copleston's interpretation of Ockham (Copleston 1963a p.100-103 and Ross 1986 p.315-344]. 
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separable, the Cudworth thesis [See Ralph Cudworth's A Treatise Concerning 
Eternal and Immutable Morality Book 1 Chpts 1 -3). 3 
A worry that some believers have when God and morality are separated 
concerns the notion of the dignity of God. If there are values independent of 
God, then it appears we can judge God using these values and not God 
Himself as our criterion. This seems an affront to God's dignity: it is God's 
prerogative to judge, how can sinful man judge the Divine Judge?. This kind of 
complaint is especially strong in protestant thinkers like Emil Brunner and Karl 
Barth. Brunner, in particular, is so impressed by man's capacity for sin and 
self-deception that he sees all secular ethics as a manifestation of man's 
sinfulness, as man's desire to dispense with God and set up his own idolatrous 
ethic. He would see the philosopher's independent set of values as a hideous 
monstrosity, an abomination of desolation, something that is attempting to oust 
God himself from his rightful throne. For Brunner "what God does and wills is 
good; all that opposes the will of God is bad. The Good has its basis and its 
existence solely in the will of God." [Brunner 1937 p.117]. To actually try to 
judge God would merely compound our blasphemy. 
It seems to me that Brunner has a good point here, but it needs some 
modification. I do not think it is religiously wrong to judge God as long as one 
finds Him good. The verb "judge" sounds irreligious because there is an 
3. Actually Cudworth, although usually cited as an opponent of Divine centred ethics, is very 
close in opinion to the position I have defended. In his Treatise he considers an objection to 
the idea that the essence of things In themselves is not dependent upon the will of God -
namely, that such a conception holds it to be the case that, "there would be something that 
was not God, Independent upon God" [p.34). His reply to this is to claim, "that the essence 
and verities of things are Independent upon the Will of God, but th~t there is an eternal and 
immutable Wisdom in the Mind of God. • {p.34-35]. Cudworth claims that God's will is 
subordinate to his wisdom and that • ... all the Knowledge and Wisdom that Is in creatures, 
whether Angels or Men, is nothing else but a participation of that one Immutable and 
lncreated Wisdom of God." [p.35] , 
Cudworth goes further and argues that God's wisdom is subordinate to the "Top or Crown• 
(p.36) which Is God's Goodness. God's nature is better expressed as •an infinite circle whose 
inmost Centre is Simple Goodness: (p.36]. 
Later, in his Treatise, Cudworth says. 8 .. .it is not possible that there should be any such 
Thing as Morality, unless there be a God, that is, an infinite eternal Mind that Is the first 
Original and Source of all things, whose nature is the first Rule and Exemplar of morality; for 
otherwise it Is not conceivable, whence any such thing should be to particular intellectual 
Beings." (p.298] 
So, even Cudworth, an apparent enemy, is a friend and ally. 
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ambigui~: "judge" am imply censure as well a5J to rome to Ql a:m~ct dm:isiorn 
aoout The probl®m Brunner has hit upon is wh®n w® judge God by our own 
wrong standard~. where we, 1or el!ampls, ~i oa,sr ssteu!SAr moral valu®~ oooom® 
the guiding ioroo in Ol!lr coming ~o a decision a!oow th~ Divin®. Th® ooliev®r 
m~~t oom® to a d®cisicm abmAi the goodnoos ¢>1 GOO, bLB~ Uts cri~sria hs us®~ 
must oo the oorred onss. Now, according ~o ths Divims oommand ~heor!si, ~oo 
corredi: moraJI ©riisria are gmm Goo, s~ ~hs~® ®i'® wh®R we m~~~ uss i~ ws are tCOl 
come to a rom~d mmal decision. For !8runner an~hing oth®r than God-giwn 
values are a kind o1 idolatry. 
Now iha objector might objed that this sounds curiously circular. Aren't ws 
using Goo to judg® God? Don't we need ~ posiRioll'D indspsndena of Goo ro 
come ~o a oorroo, im~riial ood~lon? I thin~ laruU1n®r W@~ld say tha~. in ~hs 
case of God, wa nood io b® drct.!law lri ou1r jud@ifllg. A¥00r all, ws ofum jud@® 
p80ple by th® standard~ Rh®y e~~uoo. Sometim®~ w® ®~® they liv® up to 
those siarnda~li'd$, oome~im®~ w® oo® \til~~ ttl®y d©re't !81runm~r would! insist thl3lt 
God always is absol«.daly trye to ~® standarrd~ H® sspt)lYSes. Oi rouroo, ftc 
judge whether or not a !Q®rson lives up to hi~ own standards does not meBifll 
thai we must aerepi these s~andards ior ourselves. Bu~ In the case o~ God w® 
would, according to !Bn.moorr, oonoomn our~@lves ~ w® war@ to FE)jed His 
standards. This oondemnation could noi oo · ~mplaiood exoopt by re1arenroo to 
God's standard:s, so the clrcula~ of justification Is evident 
The problem with Brunner's argument is that ~ oogs the question ootwoon 
the proposed explications of Divine gooone~. Brun~r says thai we mwt usG 
the oorrect criteria woon judging God. The proponent of too Cudworth Thesi~ 
would agree, but say that th~ values noo©1 not oo a humarD h'iv®ntoo, 
idolatrous, secular ethic;. The d'tOioo i~ not bmween God giv®n vatlu® and ~ 
sinful ethic; ther® i$ a~ ihlrr\Q1 a~ltemativs: an a-oocular, a-divins ethic, an ethic 
that is basool on vahJ®~ which are lnd~~nde~ of God and no~ invented by 
ma~n. ~n oth®r woroo, oo insist~ ih~ tru® ®ihi© or 001t ©~ v~llAe® i~ aurooomoq,ns o~ 
man and the DMn®. !Brunner's r~ply to ~uoo an idea i~ unsqyivocably 
negative. Hs ssys, '1'heli'0 is rio sum thing as aun 'intrinsi© good'. Too 
hyposmti&;aiion of a human oonoopijon of tll~ Good aw; ih® '~dea of the Good' i~ 
not only an arootmdiorril ira th® logical oon~®; it i~ doo io tae fam thm man ~~s 
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been severed 1rom his Origin .. Jhe HOIEA o~ tfns Good did noft crea~s li1~ ... ii is 
merely the shadow of ~he real force, namely, the will o~ God ... [Brunner 1937 
p.114]. 
But the Cudworthian theis~ would maintain that God always fulfils psrtsdly 
ihe duties demanded by this independent set of valuoo, so it is always the 
case that we reach the religiously adequate oonctusion that God is good. 
God's dignity is thU$ preserved!. 
It seems then that, although Brunner's recognition of the possibility of false 
ethics is important, his approach cannot be used to defeat those that believe in 
the Cudworthian modet of value. The best way of seeing the religious 
ina~uacy of ihis model is in an understanding of the sovereignty of Goo and 
what this Involves. Hendrick Hart argues, "As far as ~ can see, a view that 
commits one to holding that Goo i$ subject to laws ... that are neither created by 
him nor identical with him, is a view that commits onf» to holding that God is 
neither sovereign nor omnipotent." [Piantinga 1980 p.8). Both luther and 
Calvin seem to agree with Hart hem. Luther says, "He Is God, and for his will 
there is no cause or reason that can be laid down as a rule or measure for it, 
since there is nothing equal or superior to it, but it is itself the rule of all 
things. "[luther 1957 p.209]~ In Calvin we have a similar thought expressed, 
"God's will is so much the. highest rule of righteousness that whatsoever he 
wills, by the very fad that he wills It, must be considered righteous." [Green 
1988 p.119]. For the believer who is committed to a strong concept of 
sovereignty, God must be All in the sense that nothing metaphysically deeper 
can oo His foundation. There cannot be something that He must follow the 
dictates of in order to be the type of Being He is. He is the type of Being He is 
because He is. I believe any other view is religiously inadequate. To show this 
even more starkly, I intend now to look at oome of the accounts of those who 
believe in the Cudworthian approach. First of all, I will examine the views of 
Richard Swinburne. 
In Responsibility and Atonement Swinburne explains his views on the 
relationship between morality and God. He claims that some duties arise 
whether God exists or not - "There are certain minimal duties to one's fellow 
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men which are duties whether or not there is a Goo · oo~h positiv~S du~ies (to 
tell the truth and to keep promises · possibly subject to certain qualifica~icms) 
and negative daJti~s (to refrain from murder and ~oiim®, rape, and theftt)."' 
[Swinburne 1989 p.123]. Goo's Sl!istsnoo is relevant to morality in tha~ if H~ 
exis~s there are certain other duties that arise from his relationship with us. We 
have a general duty to benefactors. For example, children have a duty ~o obey 
parents slnoo they have caused their exlstenoo and have clothed and fed them 
for a number of years. God is mankind's supreme benefactor. At every 
moment our very existence relies on His sustaining power. So one set of duties 
that we owe to God arises out of the fact that He is our creator and sustainer. 
Other duties arise if Goo sooks man's eternal well·being. Swinburne writes, 
" ... If there is a God there i$ so much more to oo made of our live~ than ithere 
would be otherwise; we let down those who give us life, above all God, if we 
fail to take any steps ~o make something of that life." [p. 'i 25]. 
Swinburne believes that there is a core of "'necessary moral truths which oo 
not depend for their truth on the will of God and to which, in virtue of the 
necessity of his goodness, oo will conform." [p.127]. Added to this core there 
are the extra duties that arise from God existence and His relationship with 
mankind. 
This Cudworthian view of the relationship between God and morality has 
some interesting consequences. It means that the core of necessary moral 
truths constitute, "'limits both to the areas over which God has absolute 
authority and to the amount of service men are obliged to render." [Swinburne 
1989 p.127]. God can, therefore, not command a person to do something that 
has no good purpostl whatsoever [128-129]. Our obligations to God are limited 
since on the "normal Christian view" life is a gift. A gift is not a gift if the 
benefactor 'gives' us something with tight specifications for its use; "I cannot 
'give' you five dollars and tell what I want you to buy for me with it." [p.129]. 
My dissatisfaction with Swinburne's position covers two main areas. Firstly 
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his general description o~ our relatior1ship with God s~ems inad®quai~ io 
religious e}(psrisnce. Secondly his oofanoo of the idea thai some moral truths 
are necessary sooms vary weak 
In Swinburne's picil3rs our duties to God aris® in an analogou~ way to our 
du~ies to human bsne~a©tors, only God is much mors o~ ~ loonemctor, so our 
duties are correspondingly stronger and mors general. This seems to me to 
noi do justice to religious ®xpsrienoo. ~f GOO is simply a ~~prsme oonefador is 
it so very wrong to be ungrateful and refuse to repay our debt to Him? We are 
seen, in ihis view, as no more than rebellious children who ought to bs more 
grateful. But is a refusal to be grateful, ihough hurlful to the benefactor, such a 
great crime? Yet, in the Bible, a refusal to obey GOO is not OO®n as analogous 
to rebellious teenagers being moody and dismissiv~ of parental authority. 
Rather such an ad is soon as supr®mely wrong, an abomination, an adion 
that merits severe and tem~e Divine punishment ! oould oorre tile reader wiih 
a hundred quotations to force home my point. Hera is only one which ! choo~e 
more or less at random: "Thus says the lORD GOD: "!Because your heart is 
proud, and you have said, 'I am a god, I sit in the seat of the gods, in the heart 
of the seas,' yai you are but a man, and no goo ... ~use you oonsider 
yourself as wise as a goo, therefore, behold, i will bring strangers upon you, 
the most terrible of the nations; and and they shall draw their sword~ against 
the beauty of your wi$dom and defile your splendour. They shall thrust you 
down into the Pit, and you shall die the death of the slain in the heart of the 
seas. "[Ezekial 28 2-8]. If this nation were guilty only· of refusing to be grateful 
would it oo right for God to inflict sum terrible revenge? Swinburne seems to 
me to have underestimated what we owe God and certainly used the wrong 
analogy in order to explicate the nature of our duty toward God. (There is, of 
oourse, the ParabltriJ of the Prodigal Son whim apparmrtly sees wrong-doing a~ 
analogous to a refusal to obey a father. I am not saying, however, that wrong-
doing cannot oo partly explicated by using the analogy of disobedient children, 
just that this is not thfl whole stofi)f. As with an parable~ and analogies W9 hav® 
to work out what is the oontral point that is being made. It appears to me that in 
this Parable the oontral point is that God waits with father-like faithfulness for 
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His children to return; ~he Parable is no~ trivializing ih® enormity oi rsballion 
against God.) 
Another question pressnts i~sel~: why is it whsn we do wrong i~ is sean, in 
Bib!icaJI terms, as a1rt alironft to God? C®i1~inly when ws do wrong it is noi sssn 
as a case o~ an individual ~ransgressing an autonomous code that God hSJ~ 
taken ur;mn Himsel~ to oo~end. Rather i~ is seen as a reoollion against Gool 
Himseli. Thus, in Genesis, .Adam and Eve do something that is, in all 
appearance, ethically neutral; they eat rrom a tree. The wrong-doing arises out 
of disobedienoa to God. usually interpreted as a "grasping for spiritual and 
moral autonomy rooted in unbelief and rebellion." [Ferguson and Wright 1988 
p.642]. 
Again i~ God and morality am separat~. why Is It ttlat God is seen as ooing 
able to gorgiv~ wrong-doing? Wha~ rig~t has Goo got t~ ~~ ift upon Himself to 
forgive what I do ~o em unles~ what~ do to em is, in some way, a wronging o~ 
God? Swinburne would presymably say that Goo commands not to do wrong 
and as our great benefactor we ought to obey him. In doing this action we 
wrong Bill AND go against the commands of God. Again, this seems to be 
inadequate. Nowhere in Scripture doos it suggest that our final (Judgement 
Day) forgiveness for a particular action depends upon the forgiveness of the 
human beings we wrong. Our forgiveness relies solely upon Goo. If the 
wronging of Bill was equally a wrong to him and to God it would seem ~o 
necessitate that Bill be my Judge as well as God. Since this doos not seem to 
be the case, I conclude that the wrong I do to Bill is primarily a wronging of 
Gocf. It seems to me ihat ihis am only oo explained if we say that any wrong-
doing is a direct pernonal rebellion against One who is Goodn0ss itself. The 
4. This does not mean ihat a wronging or Bill Is not a bona tide wronging, as if Bill were not 
really important. What I am trying to say is ihat the final explanation of what it is to wrong Bill 
must make reference to Goci and His nature. It does not follow from this that no wrong to Bill 
is done. To see this more clearly, imagine how a Kantlan would explain any wronging of Bill. 
He would say that a wronging of Bill Is an instance of non-compliance with ihe law of ihe 
Categorical Imperative in relation to Bill. It does not follow from this that no wrong to Bill is 
perforned and that we really only failed to comply /-with the Categorical Imperative. In the 
same way, in my system the flnal explanation of wrong-doing is ihat it goes against God's 
nature, but that do0s not mean that Bill is not r0ally wronged. 
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concept o1 the Divine is the central guiding notion in the Bibfical S}{plicB!tion o~ 
good and evil. Good is basically a doing of God's will, evil is io sst onesel~ 
against this will. The Kantian noiion of ethics bsing autonomous is alien to the 
spiri~ o~ Biblical witness. 
!n modem theology this idea ~hat tha~ there is a strict separaiion bsiWssn 
God and value has taken hold. Under the grip o~ this Kantian inspired pieium, 
God can only be seen as analogous to a Superman who decides to defend the 
autonomous American Way. Thus Hanson and Hanson in Reasonable Belief 
claim ~hat "We must not think of God as growing angry with people [who do 
wrong] and punishing them." [Hanson and Hanson 1980 p.125]. The wrath of 
Gool should be seen as merely the disastrous natural consequences of sin. It is 
GOD'S wratll because this is God'~ universe and! He made ift such tha~ sin 
would have the consequences it has. But the most Important point they wish to 
communicate is that we "must not indeed represent God as being persona.Hy 
angry with us." [p.125]. It is my contention that they cannot countenance God's 
personal anger with wrong:-doing because God is seen merely as the defender 
of something that is ontologically separate from Him. When we do wrong we 
do not offend God, but rather an autonomous set of values. Because Hanson 
and Hanson subscribe to the Kantian-Cudworthian position they can make no 
sense of a vast amount of Biblical data. They cannot do justice to religious 
experience as it is witnessed in Biblical terms. Sin is seen as an impersonal 
wronging of some abstract set of principles, rather than the rebellion against 
the essential nature of God that it really is. Can this explain the guilt believers 
feel before God when they offend Bill? Can It really. be just a matter of being 
ungrateful? Can we merit terrible punishment for being churlish towards our 
benefactor? Can God forgive us when we have offended something 
ontologically distinct from Him? All these questions arioo from a false account 
of the nature of the relationship between God and morality. It seems religiously 
dubious at the very least. 
My second suspicion concerning Swinburne's account is directed at his 
defence of the contention that ·some moral truths are necessary. In The 
Coherence Of Theism Swinburne argues ~hat moral truths are necessary and 
therefore there is no restriction on God's power to claim that morality doe~ not 
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depend upon Him. Un1oliuna~aly his argumen~ often sooms to rely on a kind o1 
faith tha~ one day we will discover that moral truths are necessary and that 
there is a deep inooheranoo in celiain seemingly contradidionless moral 
viewpoints. He says, "There may be a .. .incoherence buried in "capital 
punishment is always wrong" or in Qcapital punishment is sometimes 
right. ""[Swinburne 1993 p.199). He likens the difficulties in discovering the 
buried inconsistencies to the difficulties in discovering certain logical or 
mathematical truths. Just because it is often difficult to prove that a statement 
is logically or mathematically contradictory is no proof that it is not so; the 
same with moral truths - it may be difficult to discover their logical necessity but 
that is no proof that they are not logically necessary. I agree that sometimes 
there may be great difficulties in discovering logical absurdities in statements 
that have the appearance of being consistent, but surely it takes a greaft deal 
of faith to believe that there are buried inconsistencies in statements like 
"Capital punishment i~ always right" Our faith that one day a proof of 
Goldbach's conjecture (one of Swinburne's examples p.200) will be discovered 
is based upon past successes in mathematics and logic; there seem to be no 
past successes in moral thinking of such an order that they would justify a 
belief that any moral truth can be proved to be necessary; in fact, it's quite the 
reverse: moral thinking has such a bad past record that it appears quite 
staggering to believe that there is a kind of undiscovered logical neoossity 
buried deep down in certain moral statements! Naturally, until proven 
otherwise, it may be the case that certain moral truths are logically necessary, 
but I think the onus is on Swinburne to show this to be the case, rather than to 
suggest the possibility. 
In any case, Swinburne's case seems to rest on a fundamental 
misconception. He thinks that the only way to avoid universal possibilism is to 
hold that God and the truths of logic are metaphysically distinct. Thus he 
mentions Aquinas' rejection of universal possibilism [p.154 Swinburne 1993], 
but does not go on to explain that, for Aquinas, logical truths still, nevertheless, 
depend on God. Aquinas claims, "The idea of a circle, and the equality 2+3:s5, 
possess eternal truth only in God's mind." [Aquinas 1989 1 ,2, 16,7 p.46]. Brian 
Davies states that Aquinas maintained that God and His knowledge are 
indistinguishable [Davies 1992 p.130]. Thus God's knowledge of eternal truths 
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is not knowledge of independent Platonic ideas [See Aquinas 1 ,2, 15,1 -3 p.44), 
but knowledge of Himself and what He is by His very nature. The reason 
Aquinas held such a doctrine was to preserve God's aseity and sovereignty. 
Swinburne thinks it does not matter if logical truths are soon as 
independent of God and since, in his view, moral truths seem a species of 
logical truth his reasoning is that the Cudworthian independence of moral 
truths has no real Implications for our traditional understanding of God. If he 
does think this I suggest he show how such a doctrine does not impugn the 
sovereignty of God as defined by me (p.96). The Manichaean heresy declared 
that there is an eternal dualism in the universe. Good and evil or light and 
darkness are the ultimate metaphysical foundation of the wortd. This dualism 
was rejected by Augustine since it detracted f.rom the primacy and unity of God 
[Hick 1966 p.45 See Augustine 1972 xi,22 p.454]. Swinburne's dualism is less 
destructive to theism, since it is not evil or darkness that cohabits reality with 
God, but a world of Platonic value or goodness. Nevertheless it is dualism. 5 
The independent eternal truths of morality (and logic) exist with God forever. 
They do not depend on God, but He depends on them to be who He Is. Is this 
what belief in an all-sovereign, underlved God amounts to? 
S.Swnburne has argued recently that logical truths and mathematical truths are not real things 
Independent of God, but rather are fictions (Swinburne 1994]. 
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Wha~ ij in~end ~o oo in ~his cha~®r is show thai my claim is an oil:hooolt 
ons, tha~ many classical and mooorn philosophers maks essentially Ut® 
sam® claim as ~ hav®. ij wm, o~ n€iOO$$i\y, leave many im~~n~ 
philosophers out. btl~ I hop® ~o indud~ ~nougtl ~o show thtat~ ~her~ is ampl~ 
histmi~! pr®ood®nt ~or tils ioonlt01i~~ion ~ ®~~~ss. 
Th~ Enneads o~ Plo~h1u~ mak®s a gte»o©l fooginning to fth® study oV the 
histofi)f o1 ths idsn~i1i~tlo111 ~iwoon Goo a1~d Gooo'Jnsoo. Ptotinus' 
metaphysics is insplr®d by Uta Pta~onic idea ~h1a1t th® Forms have an archs 
or eltplanatory principle [Gerson iSM p.57]. Pla~o calls this sntiiy 'ihs Form 
of the Good'. It was commonplaoo In antiquity ~hat~ the Form of Ute Good 
and God wers ems and ihs sams (aiWlough ttl® 1Fom1 o1 ths Good was not 
p3rsorial) [GarsoU'b i 00~ p.G2]. PloftiiFius' phil©~o~y is an attsmpft fto 
invss~gatfts th~ n~hnr® o~ thi~ On(S) (e~s hs ~lis 0\l). Hi~ invssqigaltUore qoroos 
him infto a lali'@®ly ne@al~iv® phiiOl~ophi~l ~~oology. ~~o~lru.!S in~i~~ ~hai ~hs 
On® i~ oo unli~® any ofth®r Rhun~ iha1~ ~si~h1® prad~iroon i~ nigh on 
impo~sibls: "Th® On® i~ no~ SI ~hirng ~mong ~hirogs, Ialii w~ CBJn do i~ bll!~ iry io 
indi~~®. in ouli' owi'll is®b~® ~y. oom®~tlin@ ooiiloomiflg it"' [l?lo~inu~ H~SS 
5,3, i 3, i -3 p. 380]. 
Part o1 Plotlnu~· aii®mp~ io 'ds1in®' ih~ On® I~ to call it, along wlllh 
Pla~o. ,hs Gcoo'. Hs say~. uwr,®n wG ~~BJ~ oi Ths Ooo and when ws 
spsak o~ Ths Good we musi reoognizG an loon~ical nature; we mus~ affirm 
tlley are the sam~ ... [l?lotinufll i 955 2,9, i p.i 08]. 
~nth® Fifflt Enn®~d l?lotinli!S say~. "l'ha?t Supr®ms, a~ ih® Aoooluis 
G@oo aUld n@t m®li'®ly B1 @©X001 ~~11'8~ 011 ~hong, oor~ ooli'b~~oU'il oothh1~. sirruoo ~®r® 
is noRhlng thaR oou!d b@ i~ ~O@«dL.it i~ vo!d o1 ~II oo~ iiooiV ..• Arly gooo thing 
has ~oom® oo by oommijf1lirgf1l pn Th® Gcoo1]; Wi ~ruB!~ ifll whodu i~ ~$ 
communion is noft e1 ~hif19 am10rng ihing~ o1 tta® AU; th®r®Vor® 1'h@ Good i~ noft 
a thong roi alhs A~t Sinoo ft~®r® ns fthis Gooo iro elrllf glbil©d irtii'l@ •. .1~ mu~i ®n~sfi' 
from sl~~wh®r® ih~n fth® worn» oq thing~: ifc mt!A~t Kt® sim~®}t, goo@ alon®: ~Ind 
ther~iortS - and much mofi's - mu~i ~~~ ~ouroo ~ ~ Goo©1 afoo@iWt® ~n©'l 
- i ~ i -
isolated" [Pio~lnu~ i 956 5,5, i 3 pA04-405]. 
Plotinus's poim is ~hat The Good canna~ be good in ~hs sense that 
o~dinary things are good. Ordin~ry thi~ngs aJr~ goool due to tll®ir participation 
in Tha Good. The Good itself is not Gooo by virtue of anyihing aldemal to 
i~lg. ~~is Gooo "absolute and isolated". 
Now, although Plotinus' One is not a personal God in ihe Christian 
sense, we can see a fairly good parall~l to the view I am arguing for. The 
Supreme Arche or starting point of all is not good, rather it is Good or 
Goodness itself. The 'jump' from this view of the Supreme ~eative Being 
and the idea that the personal Supreme Being of Christianity is identical with 
Gooonoos, is quite smalt 
I will now briefly examine the views of St. Anselm as expressed in ~h~ 
Proslogium and the Monologium. Anselm argues that God ~ every true 
good, but that these goods are not part of God, but are to be identified with 
the whole of God: "Assuredly thou art life, thou art wisdom, thou art truth, 
thou art goodness, thou art blessedness, thou art eternity, and thou art 
every true good. Many are these attributes: my straitened understanding 
cannot see so many at one view, that it may be gladdened by all at once. 
How then, 0 Lord, art thou all these things? Are they parts of thee, or is 
each one of these rather the whole, which thou art? For, whatever is 
composed of parts is not altogether one... But these things are alien to 
thee ... Hence there are no parts to thee, lord, nor art thou mom than one. 
But thou art so truly a unitary being, and so Identical with thyself ... 
Therefore, life and wisdom and the rest are not parts of thee, but all are one; 
and each of these is the whole, which thou art, and which ~~~ th0 rest am. s 
[Anselm 1962 Pros. chpt xvlilp. 70-71 J. 
In the Monologium the same point is reiterated: "Is it to oo inferred, then, 
that if the supreme Nature is so many goods, it will therefore be 
compounded of more goods than one? Or is it true rather that them are not 
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mors goods ~han one, but a~ single gooo ds~Cfioooi by many names?" 
[Anselm i 962 Moo. chp~ mril pi i 2-i 13]. Ar»selm's answsw to his qu®stion is 
aru unequivocal Ves. This vi0w se~m~ ioonti~l i~ my own, ~mcept tl'lat ~do 
no~ suoocrioo to ~he scholastic ~hesis tha~ m~inmi~s that an oi God's 
'attribut®~' are id~ntical with Hims~lt ~ thin~ sum a!I'O identifu~ti()Jfi mak®~ 
God logically lnca~ble of chang®. 
Aquinas, too, is committed to saying that GOO and Goodness ar~ the 
same thing. As we shall see (later on in this chapter), Aquinas believes that 
Goodness is to be identified with being. Now since God is <$Being itsetr He 
is also Goodness itselt Aquinas' views are expressed succinctly in the 
following quotation: "There is a threefold perfection in things: firstly, they are 
established in existernoo; seoondly, tooy possess in additicm oortain 
properties necessary to perfect th~irr activity; and a third perfection oomes 
when th~y attain their extrin~ic goal. Now thbi) thr~efold perfection belongs 
by natum to no caused thing, but only to God, who alooe exists by nature, 
has no added properties (power, wisdom and the like which are additional to 
other things belonging to him by nature), and is not disposed towards some 
extrinsic goal but is himself the ultimate goal of all other things. Clearly then 
only God is perfect and good by nature. The goodness of created things is 
something added to their nature ... " [Aquinas 1989 1,1 ,6,3 p.19-20). What 
Aquinas is saying here Is that when we say of some created thing 'X Is 
good' we mean either It exists or it actualizes some potentiality proper to 
itself or it attains its proper end. Thus we can always divide a thing from 
that which constitutes its goodness. God, on the other hand, is alone good 
by nature. It is not possible to make a distinction between God and what 
makes him good. Nothing makes God good; to admit that would be to 
impugn Goo's self-sufficiency. What God is is Goodness itself: He is "the 
pattern, source and goal of all goodness " [Aquinas 1989 2,6,4 p.20]. We 
will briefly retum to Aquinas when we look at the views of Eleanor Stump 
and Norman Kretzmann who give the same interpretation [See also Gilson 
1960 p.172]. 
Soms moosm ~hin~~m oo no~ S}(pli~i~ly m~ks th® idsmi1i~toon of Goo 
and Gooolnsss. ~owsver, their views amount to just aoout ths sam~ thing. 
G.F. Woods is on~ s~Jch ~hirtkrsr. !n A De~enoo o~ Thsologl~l E~lli~ h® 
argues th~~ ift is impo$sibts ~or bsli®vero to ooe moraU\ty a§ ~m ind®~nd®n~ 
stan~rd ~o whech Go~ mus~ tlldh®re. ~n~~~adl, ift ~ ooij®r ~o ~Sllf tha~~ mora!iiy 
is identical with ~® .. crsat!v~ wm o~ God" [Wooos 1900 p. i 01 ]. Ths 
a©Cusation o~ arbitrarrioos~ is avoid®d o~ mu©hl the ~m® w~y at~ ~ haiv® 
argued it ough~ to oo avoided. What oughft to oo and whaft I~ are fused 
together in Ut® natur® or peroonaliiy o~ Goo. Womi ~ays, "~n [God's personal 
being] what is the case and what ought to oo the case are the same." [p.97]. 
Naturally much of whaft we migh~ posit as being mornl in the nature of 
God Is learn~ ~ta~i'at€1iy grom a~n apprsdati©f11 o~ U'i® DMns as~~noo. 
However, su©h em ®pi~wmoiogicai admission, as B h~v® argYoo abov®, ~ 
not affsd the memphysiCStlidentlfiootl~ril. That i~ to ~Y, on!® does no~ n~ed 
ro know tila~ Goo ®nd Goodoo~~ ~rs ooonti~ in ormrr ro ~nive at ©~ moral 
position. 
While not a~ dear In his oommiiment to my thes~ a~ othem, lan Ramsey 
seems to oo moving quit® clooo ro it in Freedom and Immortality. He 
discusses the notion of absolute value and how tii "humanist" like Russell I~ 
hard pushed to justify his belief in such a thing. Ramsey argues that belief 
in absolute value is to move in the "direction of religious belief." [Ramsey 
1960 p.46]. Because of the religious import of belief in absolute value, it is 
legitimate to talk irn terms oi God's will. Although Ramsey makes the 
important point that God'~ will should not be seen a~ analogous with the will, 
say, of a Sergeant-Major as. if by merely ordering His oommands oooome 
mornl standards. Ramooy says that talk of moral absolutes and God's will 
are "alternative deooriptiouut (p.54J. 
H~ leave~ arti~ suggemiorru mom or less lik~ tthis. Neverth@~s~. he 
app€1ars clos~ to too thesi~ I hav@ 00en oof~ndlng. To ~ee this, one need 
only ask what the~® altsmativ® d®ooription~ rould b3 descriptions ot If 
Ramsey answ~rs. "God's natuli's", then he is very clo~® in~d. ~ have 
already maintained ~hat the words "God" and "Goooraessn can 1oo 
understood as h~ving dirl®r®n~ ser.se~. bu~ U1s sa1me rs~ereU'ilt, i.®., Goo·~ 
naiuli's. Ramsey's qua~li~icaRion thaft God's will should noft b® ma~de 
analogous ~o ~ ~r@®alnft-Major'$ s®®ms clooo to my qu~lm~tnon iha~ God's 
commands are not th~ capricious whims o~ a minoli' deiiy, bwr ar~ an 
eltpwession oi a1n esselilti~l ~ndl n~ry e~nd immut~ble ~rur®. 
The crucial metaphysical identiiicaJ~ion is made evsn mom dearly by H.P. 
Owen in Concepts oi Deity. He remarks upon ths relaftionship bstween 
morality and Divine psriection. Owen commends Aquina~· view ~ha~ God, if 
He is to oo iully ~rioo¥:, must not too da1ooive in ~ny ~rt arad says, "This 
argument demonstrat®s, not only God'~ inftell®dusl a~ri©Yi®$, buft ~isOJ h~ 
morBI! g©odnsss. Psvioolon pn fth® ~oo ©J~ GOO] mlnsft in©I!JOO morn~l 
psriedion; ~or ig Goo w~rr~ morr~&liy impar1oo ii'il Q'li~ na!rur~. ti® would to th~i 
®lrt®m roo OO~Stfu?® ill1l hi~ ~!~." [Owsrru i 917~ p.23]. 
This id®a psrr sa I~ no~ sqYivalant fto the me~a~yslcal idt~mii1icaiion- viz, 
God could bs momlly psrted by el{empUiying am oniologi~lly di~iind 
unive~l. ~(»wsv®u-, og w~ oonjoi~rU Owern·~ ~~®~us Ut~t moml ~li~ion is ~til 
of the ~ing of Goo to th~ dodrrin@ of Divins simpliciiy no such move is 
logicaUy p3rm~slfgi~. Arid !~ i~ prsrciooly \the dodrin® of Divine simplicity the1t 
Owen al~o oommsnd®: " ... only he [God] posoossss a oomplsoo ioontliy of 
esoonoo and ~mist®noo (so thai~ h® is all thBit h~ oould ooooms).10w®n 197~ 
p.27]. 
If God m~Sr~ly ®l{emp!l~®d IOOri®di@n to til~ most p®ri®d d®gr®®, I~ would 
bs po~i~~ to oo th~ft which fth® OOW'i81~ o~ $lmplici~ ®~S$1y ©1®ni®~ ~n 
oo done, i.e. It would oo possirots to di$t!ngui~h b®twoon Goo and HI® 
propelil®~. ~n ofthsr w«>roo, It wouki'l oo ~obis ~o hav® ~ m®rtap&'ny~iool 
dis~indion ~tws®n ~uro~t~noo alild aijribut®. As PIB!nftililg~ sh©w~. God's 
simp!ieity is ih~ V®fi'Y «>p!P@$li® o~ stJoo ctn ioo~ [Soo PIBirnijn~~ 'i 980]. 
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Owen mak®s his ~~~ ev~n mora pla~inly in lh® Morn! Ar~tllm~U'l~~ ~or 
Christian Theism. Hls argues ths~ Maclet~~wt is right ~o say ow· @}{~fi®noo o~ 
obligation prasupposes an ~ldra-msnmi, ind®psnoontly ®l!is~~n~ order o~ 
value. However, Owen complains tha~ Maelagan lsavss the mailer h®r® - in 
a kind o~ quta~si-Piatonic mishma~h. Owen's soluiion i~ to ~sfl th® ethical 
1rontiers back a littlE} and claom that a more aooquat~ rorm~lation @dmits ~he 
objective order oi value, bu~ identifies such an ord®r with God. He says he 
agrees with ti1e view ihat "alboolui~ valuels inhere in tlhe psrsotrnality o~ Goo." 
[Owen 1965 p.80]. Even more cl~arly he argues tha~ "in itle oroor of baing 
[and· by this he means metaphysically] ... Goodness and God are identical." 
[p.82]. 
~rt God and the !Processes of R®ality David l?e~ulin argues ft.h~ it is no~ 
"satis~a~ory ~o regarol o1Mne judg®ment about what is good a~ d~toonden~ 
upon a standard of value ext~ mal to tl"i® d!vln~." [Paulin 1989 p.23]. N~ither 
is i~ ~atisfadory to maintaifll that valoo i~ dependent up©Jn dMoo dloioo 
[p.23]. Paulin rocognizes that too only solution is to argue for some kind of 
union of God with value:" ... Goo i~ that by which the goodness of all else is 
finally to be judged but is not subject to judg€tment... The divine nature 
essentially makes final oonse without rfllferenoo to what i~ other than the 
divine. [p.23]. 
E. L. Mascall in He Who Is is similarly clear. He examines the claim 
made by voluntarists that the moral law was freely. chosen by God's will. 
Mascall rejects this contention, but does not conclude from this that God 
and the moral law are ooparable. He ~ys, '"The moral law is thus in its 
esoonoo neither antecedent to nor oonooquent to God; it i$ simply the 
expression of his own self-oonslstency. To say, therefore that Goo is bound 
by [the moral law] is merely to say ... Goo1 Is God." [Mascall 1966 p.122]. 
This view seems to be the same as mine: if thl$ is unclear look at this other 
quotailon from Maswll:. "Goo [in oontrast with a creature's good] i~ not 
merely good, he is GoodnDS$ itself." [p.116]. The moral law is neither 
antecedent to nor oonooquent to God bacauss tile moral law is an 
- 116-
Vincent MacNamara in Faith and Ethi~~= Recent RomtaJn Cattlolici~m is irn 
agreement with those in the Church who support ~he no~i©n tha~ m©r~lity is 
auionomm.ss. By this he mean~ we can disoovew what is righ~ or wrong from 
morality alone and not necessarily ®m anything e!oo, that is, morality is 
epistemologically autonomou$. MacNamara, however, makes a very 
important clarification to this remark: .rro my way of thinking this movement 
for a 'morality from below' is not only right in it~ understanding of moral 
obligation but In its realization of the importance of the emphasis on 
autonomy. Moral demand is epi~temologically independent of .knowledge of 
God or belief in a oommand of God. BUT IT IS NOT MET APHVSiCAlL Y 
INDEPENDENT. For the Christian there cannot be a split between morality 
and religion and one must try to express this further dimension." 
[MacNamara 1985 p.189-i90 My emphasis]. 
MacNamara i8 arguing that our knowledge of what morality requires may 
be independent of knowledge of God, but nevertheless he believes that for 
the Christian, there can be no similar metaphysical separation. This lack of 
metaphysical separation seems a close relative of the theory I have 
proposed about the sameness of Goodness and the essential nature of 
God. 
The last philosophers I will discuss are Norman Kretzmann and Eleanor 
Stump. In their paper Being and Goodness they endorse, in most essential 
· details, the thesis I have been defending. They begin their paper with an 
exploration of Aquinas' moral theory. Roughly they argue that Being and 
Goodness have the same referent for Aquinas, but different senses. The 
referent these two designations share is ,he actualizing of specifying 
potentialities." [p.28 Morris 1988). They say that Aquinas held that a thing's 
goodness is dependent upon its realizing the potentialities proper to its 
nature as the thing it is. In other words, goodness depends upon its degree 
of being. 
'-i17~ 
Now sirnoo God i$ "'~irBg iioolg", "i~ is Go\Cl altOn~ ~o is SS$®ntlal~y 
Goodness i~s@lf." [S~ump and Krst?:mann in Morris i 988 p.306J. Thl$ 
1ormu.Jiaiiofl, they t3\r~ua, avoid~ oo~ Rh~ ®m!OOITa~meru~ og ma~rn@ God'$ 
will ihe sol® soyroo of morality and ~hs rta!igitOu~ly inadequais vi®w ih81R 
holds ~ha~ Gool an(jj ih~ standarnds of g~oodfi{1)S~ ar® iti1da~nderut lhi.Ds ~h9y 
say, "The doorir~® o~ dlvin® simplicity eniall~ a ihird a!temativ® [~c ih~ 
positions wh~li'a Goo decides arbitrarily wlhaR is gooo Oli' wh~rs the starodards 
of goodness are indepanoont of Him ... lBeC@use Goo is simpl~. h® Is 
identical with his goodness; that is, the divine nature itself is perfect 
goodness. Thus there is an essential relationship ootween god and the 
standard by whom he judges; tlhe goodness ror the sake of which and iro 
acoord~noo with V'l® wills only oortain Rhings to roo mm"aily gooo, is ioonti~! 
with his narure. Oro Rh® oih~r hand, oocauoo li i~ God's whol® nature, not 
jus~ his arbitrary d®ci~im'l, whim i~ said ro oonsftitut® th~ smroda.ro jor 
morality, only thing~ oonoonarot with God'$ roatur~ oould roo morally good." 
[Stump and n<re~marm 1985]. 
Here we can s" ~ close ooooeptuai connection between Stump and 
Kretzmann and myself. There ar~ differenoos: their account of goooneS$ 
baing the realization of baing is different to my account oi Goodness which 
claims the Goodness is love. However, the same metaphysical 
identification i~ made and the same advantages seen in its adoption. 
1 hops I have shown In this chapter the way my thesm fits in 
historieally. Having a long and venerable history is no guarant~ of truth, 
but at least it shows an idea has withstood a lot of weathering I 
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For many hLAndreols og ysam, an Wes~am rul~w·e, i~ was an unac~nowledged 
precept that sillies was centred on som® kind of theistic undersianding of 
the universe. 
Since ths Enlightanmeni this kind of approach to ethics has rome under 
increa~unQJ atiiBIC~, not only by ~h©~e wh((ll oo oot bslieve in ~d, ~ut also 
~rom ~hose in the Church who think God makes little din®renoo to our 
undemtanding of moraiiity. 
In this thesis, I have atiempted to show how a Divine centred version of 
ethics can oo defended. I have said litile aoou~ ths posiiive merim of this 
theory. Where I have tried to illustrate th® theory's merits I have aimed at 
~lu®v~r~ - ~or fttiooo who he:~v® a~ seri©oo ~neg in God'~ sov®reignty only at 
theory that pui~ God at ths oontra has any plausibilliy. I have tried to show 
how this works. 
Non-balievers, who take sU'Jia; seriously hews, ! bslievrs, to faoo various 
problems. For tlhsm, moraUiy is lOO\rn!mourat Mora! pli'incipl~~ aro worth 
dying for; th®y ar® worth r®v~ring and approSJching with awe; guilt is 
sa.Bn®r~d oofore su(Ch prindple~. a~n©'l ~~® ~10®~ us hl@id ~~ ~N~n W ihs wm1~ 
wsrs to crumbl® to dust. it would still make sansG to say that Faiih, Ho,:m 
and love are Blli-imporl!alnt. Whai~ ~W1©1 of serulali' s~huca~ ih~S~i'lf can make 
sans~ of the~® p3rpls}{ing facts? 
Ai the end of the day, only a Divin~ centred ethics oolievas in the 
mom®rntm,asll1l®$$ of ou11 a~ions. Thley tiav® ~isma~ sigfblfncaliloo in Ut® 
sch~m~ o~ thing~. Th~y ar® not jY~t t~m~rary ripp!®s fatoo to di® and fades 
awa1y f@r oo®r. Wiihmnt Goo, w® ta5w® a1 goo~ ~ihic. 
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Appendhc A Soluiion To The Pelagian Controversy 
One of the most enduring probtems facing Ch&isiian ~ought is ihe relationship 
between Divine Grace and human will. For St Augus~ine God's Grace is both the 
necessary anal sufficieni condition for the salvation of any ind!vidue11. This idea made it 
difficult to find a place ?or the human will. If only the Grace of God is needed for X to 
bs saved has X any choice in Uls matter? Ara we saved (or damned) despite 
ourselves? Arguably Augustine's position is that the will of X is irrelevant to the matter 
of X's salvation [O'Daly 1989 p.96]. Against this idea Pelagius argued that a 
combination of Divine Grace and the submission of human will are the necessary and 
sufficient conditions of salvation. Goo1 freely gives X the chance of salvation, but it is 
up to X to choose to take the opportunity. Since we do not deserve this opportunity, 
the chance is God's undeserved act of Grace. The Pelagian position appears to avoid 
the morally questionable consequences of the Augustinian position, but it appears to 
exalt the human will too much. At least, thm ·has been the general opinion of the 
Christian Church. Surely we are too given over to sin for us to choose God rather than 
evil. Surely God has to do it all. Another difficulty for Pelagianism is the question of the 
relative importance of Divine Graoe and human will. Do we say that in X's salvation he 
contributes 50% of the causal factors involved in his own salvation whUe God supplies 
the remaining SOO/o? Do we exalt the role of God by saying that X's role is 0.1% whHe 
God's Grace is the overwhelming (but still insufficient) causal factor contributing 
99.9%? Hanson and Hanson [p.148] say that a mathematlca.lly valid resolution to this 
problem is impossible and irrelevant. They cite Blaise Pascal In support and say that 
we must say that in salvation God's Grace and the human will are not mutually 
exclusive; they each contribute 100% - 'We are most ourselves when we are most 
under God's guidance". 
This seems to me to be the correct solution. The problem is how do we resolve the 
paradox that seems to say that Pelagius is right, i.e., X's wiH must freely choose the. 
good, and that Augustine is right, I.e., God's Grace is all that is needed and that X is 
saved despite himself? I believe the thesis that 1 have proposed - that God and 
Goodness are the same thing - resolves the dilemma. Let us consider X who is trying 
to decide whether to choose God or not Let us imagine that X resolves to tum to God 
and that by doing so he is saved. Now the Augustinian would claim that this Is not the 
correct description of the situation. He would claim that X's debating is itself the result 
of God's Grace at work. In the same way X's decision at the end Is the result of God's 
Grace. X does do something, but aH that he doos is the result of Divine Grace at work 
in him. Any talk of X meriting salvation because of his choice is seen as a 
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blasphemous exaltation of will. But let us look at this again, this time remembsring 
that God is Goodness. X is trying to decide whether to become a Christian. How is he 
to do this? I think he must see this as a moral matter. He must bs deciding whether it 
is good to submit his will to God. What criteria is he to use in order to arrive at any 
decision? If God is Goodness any moral considerations he puts before himself are 
really redescriptions of the nature of God, since He is alone Good. We cannot say that 
any good in X is somehow ontologically independent of God. We do not have to 
conclude from this ontological dependence that X's choice is not free, that he could 
not decide to deny God. X is free to choose God or not, but all the moral 
considerations that he puts before himself are ontologically completely God 
dependent. If God did not exist, there could be no genuine moral considerations. Thus 
whatever good X chooses is completely dependent on God in the sense that God's 
Goodness underlies any good that there is. X is nevertheless free to choose one way 
or the other. God does not determine X's choice, rather without the Goodness of God 
no genuine moral choice could be made at all. Thus we can say that God contributes 
100% to X's decision, while X himself fully determines what he does. We can say that 
X, as a result of his decision, 'deserves' salvation, but note that even the notion of 
desert, being a moral notiOn, is absolutely God-dependent. 
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